# here is a colleague's letter which she is sending back for her revise and resubm ## Retrieval Notes - Session id: `5bae9d92-623f-4ac5-9413-1a0965669c89` - Last activity: `2026-02-20T10:02:08.690Z` - Files touched: `1` ## Artifacts **Modified:** - [[Untitled 5]] ## My Notes <!-- Add your notes here. This section is preserved across syncs. --> ## Conversation ### User here is a colleague's letter which she is sending back for her revise and resubmit. Currently, her letter is good i think but misses one thing –she doesn't say WHERE she has made changes or additions. I would like you to read her revised version of the paper, and then add to the letter in brackets the locations of all the changes. e.g. (third paragraph of Section 3) obviously, sometimes it might be multiplple paragraphs so just put them in. the most important thing here is accuracy. if you fuck this up, it will make her look terrible in fromt of the referees. make sure that you explain your analysis, justification, reasons etc etc. for your answer BEFORE giving me your final answer. after you have made changes to the note give me a full report on the changes you have made and the reasonung behind every thing DRAFT: Prototypes and The Heretical: An Ontology of Pioneering Artworks Keywords: Ontology, Artworks, Prototypes Introduction Throughout history, certain art pieces have been labeled as rule-breaking or pioneering. Such artworks elicited strong reactions and rejection initially, but ultimately broke conventions and introduced new art kinds. Although revolutionary artworks play a key role in art history and society, established theories in philosophy of art have neglected this central topic. To address this gap in the literature, this paper offers an analysis of pioneering artworks by drawing on tools from the ontology of artifacts while also introducing new concepts. I present two examples from modern art, The Luncheon on the Grass (1863) by Edouard Manet and Fountain (1917) by Marcel Duchamp, both pioneering artworks that sparked controversy in their times. I argue that the emergence of pioneering artworks is comparable to the emergence of prototypes in artifacts. These artworks enable the creation of new art kinds (Impressionism and ready-made), much like prototypes provoke the emergence of new artifact kinds through the introduction of a new function. Furthermore, such artworks do not merely introduce a new function, as prototypes do, but often one perceived as heretical—challenging artistic norms and provoking strong audience reactions. Art kinds are regulated by conventions that were established over time following historical practices. Artworks that have features that differ drastically from conventional artworks are seen as heretical by institutions that exercise conventional power. Pioneering artworks are therefore heretic-artworks generating tension within the world of art by introducing heretic-functions, a type of idiosyncratic functions that are seen as controversial. Audiences that choose to appreciate such artworks are practicing a heretic-use, in accordance with the heretic-function of the artwork until its wider acceptance by art institutions. I conclude that a functional understanding of pioneering artworks that takes into consideration their disruptive force reveals their unique nature. Art kinds and functions I adopt a functional approach on which artworks are artifacts that fulfill the function of eliciting a peculiar experience which we may call appreciative experience (Terrone 2024). James Grant offers an interesting definition of appreciation: “Sometimes, people take ‘appreciate’ just to mean ‘enjoy’. This is not how I am using it. Appreciation is normative. It is what is sometimes called ‘proper appreciation’. It involves (at least) responding to the work in ways it merits and for appropriate reasons. So not all enjoyment is appreciative, because not all works that are enjoyed merit enjoyment, or are enjoyed for the right reasons. Moreover, not all appreciation is enjoyment. Properly appreciating a work that merits shock involves being shocked by it” (Grant 2023, 60) All artworks have a general function of eliciting some sort of experience (Terrone 2024, 2026). However, each artwork is meant to be appreciated in a particular way by art appreciators for its appreciative function to be fulfilled. The artwork elicits the particular appreciative experience that is specific to it in virtue of its structure. As each artwork has a distinctive structure, each work is meant to offer a distinctive type of experience. Art kinds are linked to our appreciative practices. Kind membership of artifacts is often linked to their function, whereas in the case of artworks kind membership is often linked to the art form (painting, sculpture, video…). In Beyond Art (2014), Lopes links art kinds to our social practices around artworks. Two artworks made of the same material, let’s say clay sculptures, do not belong to the same art kind if they are not part of the same practice. He introduces the notion of appreciative kinds to explain that art kinds are linked to appreciative practices in order to answer the coffee mug objection. IN THIS WAY WE LINK ART KINDS TO APPRECIATIVE EXPERIENCE/FUNCTION. He explains that a coffee mug, contrary to a sculpture made out of the same material, is not an artwork simply because there are no social practices that encourage the appreciation of coffee mugs the way we appreciate sculptures. In “What makes a kind an art kind?” Xhignesse (2020) argues that art kinds are indeed related to our practices but more importantly to societal conventions and norms. Over time, actions within our appreciative practices solidify into conventions, and these conventions help constitute the artworld and the institutions that regulate artistic practice. In this sense, art kinds are anchored in appreciative experience. Both of these accounts lead us away from relating art kinds exclusively to art forms. As a matter of fact, some of our appreciative practices are more related to art movements than art forms. Dadaism, for example, is an art movement that assembles artworks made from different material, sculptures, paintings and collages, yet we appreciate all Dadaism artworks in a similar way. Although each Dada artwork has its own specificities in virtue of which it elicits a specific experience, there is a sense in which we appreciate Dada artworks while having in mind that they belong to the Dada movement. Being aware of the historical context during which the movement was established and what it stands for helps us see the irony and anti-war message in different artworks that have little in common except for the fact that they belong to the Dada movement. Let us take for example Raul Hausmann’s The Art Critic (1919) and A Winter’s Tale by George Grosz (1918). Their belonging to the Dada movement highlights the absurdity and anti-war stance in both of these artworks which plays a key role in their appreciation. In this proposal, art movements will thus be considered as art kinds as it is fitting both with Xhignesse and Lopes’s accounts. I have stated that each artwork has a general function of eliciting an experience, and a particular function of eliciting the specific experience in virtue of its singular structure. If we take functions to be essential to artifact kinds, and we take art kinds to be artifact kinds, then we take functions to be essential to art kinds. The function related to art kinds is an intermediate level function: more particular than the general function of all artworks, but more general than the particular function that is specific to each artwork. There is a function that artworks fulfill in virtue of their belonging to a specific art kind. I have explained that we tend to appreciate all artworks that belong to the same art movement in a similar way. Let us imagine that a Cubist art gallery were to be founded. The people in charge would be looking for all the Cubist artworks that they can find, in this sense, all these artworks fulfill the Cubist-function in virtue of belonging to the Cubist art kind. This can also be applied to artifact kinds. Take the example of cars, all cars have the general function of transporting people. Ferrari is a kind of car, serving a more specific function of high performance driving. Ferrari collector cars are like artworks, produced in a singular version, and having an appreciative function that is specific to each one of them. Pioneering artworks as prototypes To elaborate the notion of pioneering artworks as prototypes, I rely on Simon Evnine’s definition of artifact prototypes. Some accounts that endorse functional essentialism about artifacts are skeptical about the application of such approaches to artworks. Evnine mentions that although non-utility is central to artworks, it does not have to entail that artworks do not have functions (2016 p. 129). They might have functions that highlight their non-utility, like having the function of expressing something, or eliciting an experience (Terrone 2024). In this sense, artworks can be functional artifacts. I make use of Evnine’s (2016) distinction between idiosyncratic and kind-dependent functions to elaborate my point. According to him, not all functions of an artifact are related to its kind: some functions may be unique or idiosyncratic. In such cases, the idiosyncratic function cannot be attributed by the general intention of creating an object of a particular kind. Rather, these functions are given by the intention of creating the object to serve that specific purpose. He gives the example of a chocolate bar that has the kind-dependent function of being eaten that is acquired when it is made with the intention of it belonging to the kind “chocolate bar”. This chocolate bar could also have the function of expressing the love of the maker to the person it was offered to, but since this function is not acquired by its belonging to the kind “chocolate bar”, it is acquired by the intention of it being made to serve this function. Idiosyncratic functions help us understand how new artifacts come into existence: a prototype is an artifact that belongs to no already existing kind and that has been assigned an idiosyncratic function by the intention that it performs that function. To complete Evnine’s example, let us consider that a merchant created heart-shaped chocolate bars that are precisely meant to be offered to one’s partner. Such artifacts would belong to a new kind of chocolate bar, heart-shaped chocolate bars that are made to express one’s love to their partner, made specifically to serve that function. When numerous artifacts bearing the same function as the prototype are created, a new kind of artifact is established. That is how we understand the emergence of kind-dependent functions from idiosyncratic functions. I suggest that artworks that are pioneering in a given era fulfill unique functions that are new to the artworld. No other artwork has already introduced this function or fulfills this function which is why it is considered to be innovative and distinctive. Pioneering artworks, perceived as heretical, often face resistance to being accepted in the realm of art. Once accepted, more artworks that are similar to them will be created. The idiosyncratic function that was associated with the pioneering artwork will be fulfilled by new artworks, but is now associated with a kind of artwork in an art kind that has been established, which causes it to become a kind-dependent function. Consider Edouard Manet’s The Luncheon on the Grass which, when first painted in 1863, was refused by the jury of the Salon (French Royal Academy exhibition), who deemed it unworthy because of the loose and spontaneous painting style and the deliberate representation of nudity in the context of a daily activity. At the time, an exhibition called Salon des Refusés (show of the rejected) was created by artists whose works had been rejected to display their art. This exhibition showcased Manet’s painting, leading to its widespread appeal. Thanks to the Salon des Refusés, the painting's artistic value was recognized, and it enabled the creation of other Impressionist works, fostering the emergence of Impressionism, one of the most appreciated art movements. We can suppose that this artwork introduced the function of representing an impression of reality in order to elicit an appreciative experience. As the emergence of Impressionism coincided with the invention of photography, paintings were no longer needed to represent an accurate version of reality as they were in the times of the previous art movement, Realism. Impressionist artists chose to capture outdoor scenes by emphasizing visible brushstrokes and a loose painting style, representing an impression of the scene in question rather than a detailed depiction. Luncheon on the Grass was not only rejected for its loose painting style, but also for the representation of nudity in the context of daily activity. The particularity of this artwork is related to both these features, and also many others. The establishment of the Impressionist movement was based on the reproduction of the loose painting style and representation of an impression of reality which was put forward by all Impressionist artists. This does not however reduce all Impressionist artworks to this function, and does not stand in the way of each artwork having its particular appreciative function. Of course, the Impressionist-function plays a role in our appreciation of any Impressionist artwork, but to appreciate each singular artwork correctly, we need to know more about it than just the art kind it belongs to. There are many ways to explain why some artworks are prototypes and establish kinds. One option would be opting for an intentional account assuming that it is the artist’s intention to create an artwork that is the first of its kind and that is meant to be reproduced. The artist’s intention is often easy to notice when it comes to artworks that are accompanied with manifestos as we will see later on. Non-intentionalist accounts would assume that audiences play a role in elaborating the appreciative practices that allow for the inclusion of the prototype in art, under a new art kind. In a similar approach, it could be suggested that the function of an artifact is the reason why artifacts of that kind are being produced and reproduced (Preston 2013). When subsequent artworks are created with the same function of a prototype, it is an indicator that the artwork is indeed a prototype. In the context of this account, we take pioneering artworks to be the ones that introduced an idiosyncratic function and allowed for the establishment of a new art kind having the same function. Pioneering artworks and the establishment of new art kinds Manet created The Luncheon on the Grass (hereafter, Luncheon), but it was refused by the exhibition that was taking place because its features do not resemble the features of other artworks that were being created at that time. What Luncheon introduces is the function representing an impression of reality for the purpose of eliciting an appreciative experience (hereafter, Impressionist-Function), that was being introduced for the first time in that context, no artwork had served this function before, which is why it was not immediately recognized as an artwork and appreciated. At first, it was refused by the exhibition but accepted by the Salon des Refusés. Once the function it serves was more widely accepted, it was recognized as a pioneering artwork. The inclusion of this new function in the domain of appreciation allows artworks to be associated with the Impressionist-Function. New artworks having this function can now be created. For the sake of this example we will consider that Claude Monet’s painting Impression, Sunrise (hereafter, Sunrise) was the second painting to be produced as belonging to the kind Impressionism. When Sunrise was created, serving the Impressionist-Function as well, it was more easily recognized as an artwork because this function is now associated with artworks. Luncheon and Sunrise are two paintings that serve the same function, the Impressionist-Function. This implies the establishment of a new kind of artworks, the kind of Impressionist-Artworks, associated with the Impressionist-Function. The Impressionist-Function is no longer an idiosyncratic function but a kind-associated function. Artifacts bearing this function, apart from Luncheon, will no longer be considered prototypes in virtue of that function, but belonging to an already existing kind of artworks. Idiosyncratic functions are the new or unique functions that are introduced by pioneering artworks. Kind-associated functions are the functions that artworks serve when they belong to already existing art movements. The point I have elaborated on art movements as kinds and pioneering artworks as bearing idiosyncratic functions is comparable to what Walton calls “categories” and “contra-standard” features (Walton 1970). What this functional account can account for beyond Walton’s theory on the categories of art is that idiosyncratic functions in pioneering artworks are not reducible to perceptual, “contra-standard” features. Such artworks are accompanied by an invitation to make art differently. Avant-garde movements, all seen as pioneering, were accompanied by art manifestos stating how the artists’ coalition thinks art should be done. Often, the collective that endorses a new art kind, makes a declaration with social or political aims, called a manifesto. In 1855, Gustave Courbet wrote the first artist manifesto, in which he clarifies the aims of his work, and of the art movement that will be later called Realism: the function of painting is representing what is real. In On Cubism (1912) by Gleizes & Metzinger which is considered the Cubist manifesto, the artists criticize the limits of Impressionism and Realism to retinal satisfaction. They make it clear that art can represent a fragmentation of objects. Futurism was founded by poet Filippo Marinetti, who invited artists through the Futurism Manifesto to revolt against the past and embrace modernity and a fast paced life. Dadaism came to make art represent the absurdity of war, and so on. Here, I take art movements to be art kinds that are introducing new functions. Such declarations could be taken as meaning “our movement suggests a new way to do art”, “according to us, this what art can do”, “this is what art can be used for”, and introducing a new function to art. Art movements tend to get rejected at first. The rejection by art institutions could be understood as an interdiction for art to serve this function, or as denial of the appreciative value of this function, and not recognizing this artifact as belonging to an art kind. Manifestos are not exclusive to modern art. The work Lyrical Ballads published in 1798, is known to have inaugurated English Romanticism. It is a collection of poems by Wordsworth and Coleridge written in common, informal language. It is recognized as an attempt to democratize poetry, as it was attacked for its simplicity and its violation of acceptable poetic subject matter. A subsequent edition was published by Wordsworth in which he includes long prefaces that explain their vision about poetry, and which have served as manifestos of their art (Campbell 1991). Other works issue a comparable invitation only implicitly, but still clearly enough to elicit controversy and establish a new art kind. Manifestos and the clear formation of art movements that advocate for an innovation in art make it clear that there is awareness around the establishment of a new art kind. We can even say that it was intended, through the prototype, to introduce a new function to art and advocate for a new way to do art. This explanation is more in line with intentional accounts that attribute the function of prototypes, or artifacts in general, to the intentions of the maker. The introduction of a new function through prototypes is not always related to the intentions of the maker. Accounts that are not centered around intentions help us find other explanations. Both Xhignesse and Lopes address the notion of pioneering artworks. They refer to them as ‘free-agents’ that belong to no existing kind or fit poorly into an existing kind. Lopes explains that such artworks “call for a theory of arts that they pioneer”, in other words, they invite for the establishment of a new art kind (2004, p.202). Xhignesse warns us about attributing all the substantive work to the artwork, and explains that conventions are behind the establishment of a new art kind : “The mere fact that some Xs are artworks does not suffice to make of X an art-kind; the missing ingredient is an appreciative practice centered on Xs and X-like works” (2020, p.475). The idea of prototypes developed here captures the dynamic of how pioneering artworks introduce a new kind and how a shift of appreciative practices allows for their establishment. All prototypes are accompanied with an implicit invitation to make art differently, simply because they fail to fit into an already existing art-kind and call for the establishment of a new art-kind for their inclusion in the domain of art. Let us take for example Tagore’s Bharat Mata (1905), an artwork that is known to have initiated the “New School of Indian Painting” movement. This artwork titled “Mother India” represented political ideas, religious deity and familiarity simultaneously which made it controversial at the time (Guha-Thakurta 1992). This artwork is known to be a prototype of national Indian art that did not exist before its creation. Under the dominance of British aesthetics in the region, this artwork stands as an ill-fitting member of British art, calling for the establishment of national Indian art through its style and other properties like its title. Bharat Mata is a prototype of Indian national art that defied the conventions of dominant art and called for the establishment of a new art kind. The emergence of the Bengal School of Art, which by the 1940s many critics and figures within the Indian national movement were celebrating as a genuinely “national” art, proves the shift of conventions in art that allowed for the appreciation of this new art kind (Kumar 2024). Prototypes establish new kinds, and pioneering artworks establish new art kinds. Kinds are related to function since the kind-associated function is the reason we keep producing and reproducing artworks of a given kind (Preston 2013). This helps us distinguish between artworks that have provocative, heretical features, and the ones that have an idiosyncratic function. Some artworks are provocative and have impacted the art world strongly. Banksy’s artworks, although disruptive, are known to belong to street art. It is hard to say whether these artworks are controversial because street art is illegal or because they defy the conventions of art. Felix Gonzales Torres’s Untitled (Portrait of Ross in LA) (1991) is an installation made out of wrapped candies, that the viewers are allowed to take. The instructions of the artist allow for the candies to be replenished by the museum. The possibility for viewers to participate in this artwork by taking and eating the candy in a museum, a context in which viewers are usually prohibited to touch artworks makes it an unconventional artwork. Untitled (Portrait of Ross in LA) (1991) defies the rules of museums where it is usually not allowed for audiences to touch the artworks, but did not succeed, or ‘intend to’, create a kind of its own. It may be hard to classify John Cage’s 4’33 (1952), or Maurizio Cattelan’s The Comedian (2019), but they seem to fit into the kind of conceptual art, and were not followed by artworks that share the unconventional features they hold (Dodd 2017). If The Comedian were a prototype, it could have been followed by artworks that replicate its most unconventional feature, which would have been its idiosyncratic function, like it was the case with Duchamp’s Fountain (1917). We can suppose that a series of artworks could have been created, having the function of duct-taping fruits on museum walls, for the sake of eliciting an appreciative experience. This artwork was however not followed by similar ones, and no kind was established following its production. We can say that this artwork and other unconventional ones are not prototypes because they hold unconventional features like making an artwork by taping a fresh fruit, interpreting a silent composition, making anonymous satirical graffiti works, but not an idiosyncratic function, and did not lead to the establishment of a kind. One could argue that by introducing such innovative features, these artists aimed to introduce an idiosyncratic function and establish a new art kind but failed. When the intentions of the artists are not stated clearly, it is hard to determine whether these artworks are failed prototype attempts. Tim Juvshik argues that artifacts have a social nature and that their kind membership depends both on the shared acceptance of certain social groups and the intentions of the maker. The social reception of artifacts and the attitude taken towards them plays a constitutive part in their ontology (Juvshik 2023). This definition is in line with my proposal. However, Juvshik argues against the notion of functional essentialism in relation to artifacts while he accepts unificatory accounts for artworks and artifacts (Juvshik 2021, 2025). He endorses a cluster-view account arguing that artifacts belonging to the same kind have some kind-relevant features including function, material, form, structure, aesthetic properties, historic features… of which some play a central role and others a less central one in defining the kind. Prototypes would be artifacts that belong to an unclear kind. The kind relevant features are sometimes specified by the maker and other times by different social groups. The proposal that I am offering is not completely incompatible with this view. It would also be acceptable, as a weaker claim, to consider kind-dependent functions to be kind-dependent features if we at least consider them to be central to the kind. In contrast, unconventional artworks that do not establish new kinds could bear unconventional features that are not central to the kind. Artworks that have not initiated a new kind could have some disruptive features that marked the history of art without necessarily being prototypes. We have seen that prototypes are the artifacts that have idiosyncratic functions, new, unique functions that no other kind has. We have also seen how these idiosyncratic functions become kind-dependent functions and lead to the establishment of a new kind and how this is related to innovation in art. In what follows, I examine the reception of the idiosyncratic function by art audiences and introduce the notion of heretic-function that more accurately describes pioneering artworks that get rejected. IV- Pioneering artworks and rejection Artifact prototypes allow for the establishment of new artifact kinds. Artwork prototypes allow for the establishment of new art kinds. Some pioneering artworks do not merely add a new function to artworks, like chocolate bars that also serve to express the gift-giver’s love. Instead, they introduce a function that defies prior functions of artworks. Prototypes carry a potential for innovation against established conventions of art, and they are sometimes perceived as heretical. Pioneering artworks like Manet’s The Luncheon on the Grass (1863) and Duchamp's Fountain (1917), and numerous others faced rejection and caused conflict during their time. Their imposition of a new function on art that challenges previous ones frames them as heretical. Heretic-artworks are the ones that introduce heretic-functions to art and face rejection. Heretic-functions are a subset of idiosyncratic functions, unique functions that are perceived as heretical and controversial with regards to established norms in art. Xhignesse’s account on art kinds depending on “a network of cultural conventions” proves helpful here (Xhignesse 2020). How to define the heretical in the context of artworks? Artworks are heretical when the features they bear stand against the regulative forces of conventions in an artworld and face rejection. The audiences that appreciate heretic-artworks before their acceptance in the artworld are exercising a heretic-use of art. This new term has some affinity to what Simon Evnine calls “counter-use” and what Sara Ahmed calls “queer use” as it highlights the link between political motivations, tensions in power-dynamics, and kind-membership (Evnine 2022; Ahmed 2019). Once this heretic-artwork is more widely accepted within art institutions and by different audiences, it is no longer seen as a heretic-artwork but as a pioneering artwork. The establishment of an art kind with artworks sharing the heretic-function makes it a kind-dependent function and no longer a heretical exception. Another example that is worth examining is Fountain (1917) by Marcel Duchamp, the pioneering artwork that initiated the ready-made kind. Fountain was not the first ready-made created by Duchamp. In 1913, Duchamp created Bicycle Wheel, which consists of a bicycle wheel mounted upside-down. Duchamp did not consider it to be an artwork, only an object he enjoyed looking at in his studio. Duchamp might have never presented Bicycle Wheel as an artwork; however, it is considered to be an artwork today due to the fact that it fulfills the function shared by ready-mades which is decontextualizing ordinary objects for the purpose of eliciting an appreciative experience. Which one of these artworks is considered to be the pioneering artwork, the prototype? It is Fountain that is considered to be the initiator of ready-made works due to its rejection by the The Society of Independent Artists, its subsequent acceptance as an artwork and the crisis it caused in the artworld. Duchamp did not write a manifesto, the invitation to do art differently is however clear in his presentation of such an unconventional artwork to an exhibition. The prototype is the first artifact created bearing a new function. In the case of the heretic-artworks we are describing, the function they bear is reflected by a conflict stirred within the artworld, like the controversies caused by Fountain or The Luncheon on the Grass and the establishment of a new art kind. I have argued that Duchamp’s Fountain and Manet’s Luncheon on the Grass are both pioneering artworks that contributed in introducing heretic-functions to art. These two examples represent different art movements in modern art. More recently, art created with the help of artificial intelligence has been facing overwhelmingly negative reactions by artists and curators. In 2022, Jason Allen won a digital arts competition in Colorado with an artwork he created with the help of Midjourney, an AI powered image generation tool. Following the dissemination of the news, a wave of backlash emerged against AI generated art and artists, with different audiences and experts claiming that it does not deserve to be considered art. Many authors compared this incident with previous controversies in art history like the rejection of Duchamp’s Fountain, and other tensions over new art making tools like photography (Cross 2024; Roose 2022). Allen’s artwork Théâtre d’Opéra Spatial is a heretic-artwork that many have rejected and have questioned its legitimacy to be considered an artwork. Moreover, it is hard to categorize this artwork as “digital art”, which makes it an ill-fitting member of that kind. This AI image’s inclusion in an art competition is a heretic-use of art, and will continue to be considered as such until AI art is more widely accepted within art circles. It is common to think that art kinds are centered around art form, artworks that belong to the same kind are the ones sharing the same art form, whereas artifact kinds are centered around their function. By offering an account that sheds the light on functions related to art kinds, it is easier to offer a unificatory account for artworks and artifacts. To support the utility of a functional approach to artworks further, we will now see how the concept of heretic-function can be applied in the case of other artifacts. The heretic-function described above can also be applied to artifacts that are not artworks. The notion of kinds depending on conventions also applies in the case of artifacts (Xhignesse 2020). In what follows, I will outline an analogy with Google Glass, a controversial artifact that was not fully accepted in society. Google started selling Google Glass in 2013, a headset that combines the features of smartphones and eyeglasses. Users of this artifact could take pictures and record videos anytime, anywhere, without having to hold a smartphone or a camera, making the act of capturing images and videos in public more secretive. These features raised privacy concerns as people feared that Google Glass users could record private conversations and take pictures of others without their knowledge or their consent. This artifact was thus widely rejected by the public and Google Glass users were called “Glassholes”, seen as people who do not respect others’ privacy. Some businesses had to declare that their space is a “glass-free zone” to ensure their clients’ privacy (Kudina, Verbeek 2018). The function of this artifact, although similar to the function of the smartphone, is different because embedded cameras allowed you to capture visual information hands-free making the operation exceptionally discreet as Google Glass headsets look very similar to normal eyeglasses. The Google Glass is an example of a heretic-artifact, bearing a heretic-function, that was rejected by the public. Users of this artifact were banned from some places and labeled as Glassholes, seen as exercising a heretic-use. One can wonder if it is still perceived as heretical as the kind of mixed-reality goggles with embedded cameras was established with the creation of HoloLens by Microsoft in 2015 and Spectacles by Snap Inc in 2017 although Google Glass was discontinued. The purpose of this analogy is to further illustrate the concept of heretic-function by associating it to other artifacts. It also helps us understand why it is useful to adopt a functional approach to artworks and study them as functional artifacts. Conclusion The functional approach that has been elaborated allows for a better understanding of pioneering artworks, which has not been put forward adequately in philosophy of art. Pioneering artworks are the ones that offer new and defying functions to artworks. They introduce idiosyncratic functions to the artworld that later on become kind-dependent functions when subsequent artworks bear identical functions. This leads to the establishment of a new kind of artworks, a new art movement. It could be said that pioneering artworks are prototypes in the domain of artworks. By definition, a prototype is an artifact that does not belong to an already existing kind. Pioneering artworks are prototypes of a not yet emerged art kind. They are the first version of an art kind that is about to be established. They have a strong potential for innovation and put forward an invitation to make art differently. Such artworks are often rejected at first, seen as heretical and nonconformist. The conflict they cause in the artworld is due to the fact that the function they introduce is not merely a new function, but one that defies prior ways to make art. This proposal offers an all-encompassing view that accounts for the revolutionary force and the ontological implications of artworks that are pioneering. Bibliography Ahmed, S. (2019). What’s the use?: On the uses of use. Duke University Press. Bicchieri, C. (2006). The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of social norms. Cambridge University Press. Campbell, P. (1991). Lyrical Ballads: The current of opinion. In Wordsworth and Coleridge: The Lyrical Ballads: Critical perspectives (pp. 1–14). Macmillan Education. Carroll, N. (1992). The nature of mass art. Philosophic Exchange, 23(1), Article 5. Retrieved February 5, 2026, from https://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol23/iss1/5/ Cross, A. (2024). Tool, collaborator, or participant: Ai and artistic agency. British Journal of Aesthetics. https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayae055 Davies, S. (2006). Aesthetic judgements, artworks and functional beauty. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56(223), 224–241. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.00439.x Danto, A. (1964), ‘The Artworld’. Journal of Philosophy 61 (19): 571–84 Evnine, S. (2022). The Historicity of Artifacts: Use and Counter-Use. Metaphysics, 5(1), 1–13. (https://doi.org/10.5334/met.74.) Evnine, S. (2016). Making Objects and Events: A Hylomorphic Theory of Artifacts, Actions, and Organisms. Oxford University Press. Evnine, S. (2013). Ready-mades: Ontology and aesthetics. The British Journal of Aesthetics, 53(4), 407–423. https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayt033 Gilbert, M. (1989). On social facts. Routledge. Gilmore, J. (2011). A functional view of artistic evaluation. Philosophical Studies, 155(2), 289–305. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9570-8 Gleizes, A., Metzinger, J., & Briend, C. (2012). Du Cubisme. Hermann. Gombrich, E.H. (1961). Part Two: Function and Form. in Art and illusion: a study in the psychology of pictorial representation. (pp. 79 – 152). Pantheon. Grant, J. (2023). A sensible experientialism? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 107, 53–79. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12903 Guha-Thakurta, T. (1992). The making of a new “Indian” art: Artists, aesthetics and nationalism in Bengal, c. 1850–1920. Cambridge University Press. Irmak, N. (2024). The mess we make: On the metaphysics of Artifact Kinds. Erkenntnis. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-024-00789-5 Juvshik, T. (2021). Function essentialism about artifacts. Philosophical Studies, 178(9), 2943–2964. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01594-w Juvshik, T. (2023). On the social nature of artefacts. Theoria 89 (6):910-932. Juvshik, T. (2025). What makes a kind an artifact kind? Synthese, 205(2). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-025-04914-x Koslicki, K. (2018). Form, matter, substance. Oxford University Press. Kudina, O., & Verbeek, P.-P. (2018). Ethics from Within: Google Glass, the Collingridge Dilemma, and the Mediated Value of Privacy. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 44(2), 291-314. https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243918793711 (Original work published 2019) Kumar, A. (2024, February 7). Abanindranath Tagore’s Bharat Mata: Bengal School painting and the idea of India. Smarthistory. Retrieved February 5, 2026, from https://smarthistory.org/abanindranath-tagore-bharat-mata/ Lopes, D. M. (2014). Aesthetic Appreciation. In Beyond Art (pp. 164–184). essay, Oxford University Press. Norouzi, M., & Prinz, J. (2026). From canvas to code: Lessons from generative art. Synthese, 207(2), Article 72. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-026-05464-6 Passinsky, A. (2024). Artifacts, artworks, and social objects”. In K. Koslicki & M. J. Raven (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of essence (pp. 261–275). New York: Routledge. Preston, B. (2016). A philosophy of material culture: Action, function, and mind. Routledge. Roose, K. (2022). Ai-generated art won a prize. artists aren’t happy. - The New York Times. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/02/technology/ai-artificial-intelligence-artists.html Terrone, E. (2026). The appreciation game. A monist ontology of works of art. European Journal of Philosophy, e70070. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70070 Terrone, E. (2024). Are Works of Art Affective Artifacts? If Not, What Sort of Artifacts Are They?. Topoi. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-024-10045-8 Tinterow, G., & Loyrette, H. (1994). Origins of Impressionism. Metropolitan Museum of Art. Walton, K. L. (1970). Categories of art. The Philosophical Review, 79(3). https://doi.org/10.2307/2183933 Xhignesse, M.-A. (2020). What makes a kind an art-kind? The British Journal of Aesthetics, 60(4), 471–488. https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayaa027 ### Assistant I need to carefully map every claim in the letter to its exact location in the paper. This is a high-stakes task, so let me be systematic. Let me re-read the letter one more time to be sure of the exact text I need to edit. ### Assistant Now let me carefully map the paper's structure and each claim in the letter to its precise location. I'll present my analysis first, then make the edits. ## Analysis **Paper structure I'm working from:** | Section | Heading | Paragraphs | |---------|---------|-----------| | Intro | Introduction | 1 | | Section 1 | "Art kinds and functions" | 5 paragraphs | | Section 2 | "Pioneering artworks as prototypes" | 6 paragraphs | | Section 3 | "Pioneering artworks and the establishment of new art kinds" | 6 paragraphs | | Section 4 | "Pioneering artworks and rejection" (explicitly "IV-") | 8 paragraphs | | Conclusion | Conclusion | 1 | **Mapping each claim to locations in the paper:** **Referee 1 response:** 1. **Lyrical Ballads** — appears in Section 3, paragraph 2 (the long manifesto paragraph), passage starting "Manifestos are not exclusive to modern art. The work Lyrical Ballads published in 1798..." 2. **Tagore's Bharat Mata** — appears in Section 3, paragraph 3, passage starting "Let us take for example Tagore's Bharat Mata (1905)..." 3. **Three-level function distinction** (general / intermediate-kind-level / work-specific) — Section 1, paragraph 2 (introduces general + particular) and paragraph 5 (introduces intermediate level explicitly: "The function related to art kinds is an intermediate level function") 4. **Contrast cases** (Banksy, González-Torres, Cage, Cattelan) — Section 3, paragraph 4, starting "Prototypes establish new kinds, and pioneering artworks establish new art kinds..." 5. **Failed prototype attempts** — Section 3, paragraph 4, final sentences: "One could argue that by introducing such innovative features, these artists aimed to introduce an idiosyncratic function and establish a new art kind but failed..." 6. **Evnine's idiosyncratic/kind-dependent distinction** — Section 2, paragraph 1, starting "I make use of Evnine's (2016) distinction..." 7. **Fountain discussion (appropriation worry)** — Section 4, paragraph 3, starting "Another example that is worth examining is Fountain (1917)..." 8. **Conventions and practice formation** — Section 1, paragraph 3 (Xhignesse on conventions); Section 4, paragraphs 1–2 (heretic-use mechanism, acceptance, kind establishment) 9. **Heretic-users creating new practices** — Section 4, paragraphs 1–2; also Section 3, paragraph 3 (Tagore/Bengal School showing convention shift) **Referee 2 response:** 10. **Expanded examples** — Section 3, paragraphs 2–3 (Lyrical Ballads, Tagore); Section 4, paragraph 4 (AI art) 11. **Carroll and Gilmore engagement** — ⚠️ I cannot find explicit discussion of Carroll or Gilmore in the body text. They are in the bibliography. These discussions may be in footnotes (the paper clearly has footnotes, given referee references to "footnote 4" and "footnote 6"). I will flag this rather than add a potentially wrong location. **Referee 3 response:** 12. **Fuller functional approach (Terrone + Evnine)** — Terrone: Section 1, paragraphs 1–2; Evnine: Section 2, paragraph 1 13. **Non-fungibility worry addressed** — Section 1, paragraph 5 (three-level distinction preserves individuality); Section 2, paragraph 5 ("This does not however reduce all Impressionist artworks to this function...") 14. **"Medium" removed, "art form" used** — Section 1, paragraph 3: "art form (painting, sculpture, video…)" 15. **Dada claim expanded** — Section 1, paragraph 4 (Dadaism, Hausmann's *The Art Critic*, Grosz's *A Winter's Tale*, historically informed appreciation) 16. **Invitation to make art differently (including without manifestos)** — Section 3, paragraphs 2–3 (manifestos + implicit invitations via ill-fitting prototypes); Section 4, paragraph 3 ("Duchamp did not write a manifesto, the invitation to do art differently is however clear in his presentation...") 17. **Ready-mades time-specific claim removed** — Confirmed absent from body text. Ready-made now treated as art kind: Section 4, paragraph 3 18. **Non-utility clarification** — Section 2, paragraph 1 ("Evnine mentions that although non-utility is central to artworks, it does not have to entail that artworks do not have functions") Now I'll make all the edits. Starting from the top of the letter, working down: ### Assistant Now the Referee 2 response: ### Assistant Now the Referee 3 response: ### Assistant Now let me verify the final result by reading the file: ### Assistant All edits are complete. Let me now give you the full report. --- ## Full Report ### What I did I added **21 bracketed location references** across the letter, mapping each claim about what was changed or added to its precise location in the revised paper. Here is every addition with the reasoning: --- ### Referee 1 Response **1. Lyrical Ballads → "(Section 3, second paragraph)"** - **Reasoning:** In Section 3 ("Pioneering artworks and the establishment of new art kinds"), the second paragraph is the long manifesto discussion. It contains the passage: "Manifestos are not exclusive to modern art. The work Lyrical Ballads published in 1798, is known to have inaugurated English Romanticism..." This is exactly where the historical literature example was added. **2. Tagore's Bharat Mata → "(Section 3, third paragraph)"** - **Reasoning:** The third paragraph of Section 3 begins "The introduction of a new function through prototypes is not always related to the intentions of the maker..." and contains the extended Tagore discussion: "Let us take for example Tagore's Bharat Mata (1905)..." through the Bengal School discussion. This is the non-Western example. **3. Three-level function distinction → "(Section 1, second and fifth paragraphs)"** - **Reasoning:** Section 1, paragraph 2 introduces the general function ("All artworks have a general function of eliciting some sort of experience") and the particular/work-specific function ("each artwork is meant to be appreciated in a particular way"). Section 1, paragraph 5 introduces the intermediate/kind-level function explicitly: "The function related to art kinds is an intermediate level function: more particular than the general function of all artworks, but more general than the particular function that is specific to each artwork." Together, these two paragraphs establish the complete three-tier framework. **4. Contrast cases (Banksy, González-Torres, Cage, Cattelan) → "(Section 3, fourth paragraph)"** - **Reasoning:** Section 3, paragraph 4 begins "Prototypes establish new kinds, and pioneering artworks establish new art kinds" and then works through each contrast case: Banksy (disruptive but belongs to street art), González-Torres (unconventional but didn't create a new kind), Cage's 4'33" (fits conceptual art), and Cattelan's The Comedian (not followed by similar works). This is where the distinction between merely disruptive and genuinely prototypical is drawn. **5. Failed prototype attempts → "(Section 3, fourth paragraph)"** - **Reasoning:** Same paragraph as the contrast cases. The final sentences explicitly address failure: "One could argue that by introducing such innovative features, these artists aimed to introduce an idiosyncratic function and establish a new art kind but failed. When the intentions of the artists are not stated clearly, it is hard to determine whether these artworks are failed prototype attempts." **6. Intention-centered views / failure diagnosis → "(Section 2, sixth paragraph; Section 3, fourth paragraph)"** - **Reasoning:** Section 2, paragraph 6 ("There are many ways to explain why some artworks are prototypes...") discusses intentional vs non-intentional accounts and Preston's reproduction-based view. Section 3, paragraph 4 applies this to the failure diagnosis. Together they explain how intentions and uptake bear on whether something counts as a prototype. **7. Evnine's idiosyncratic/kind-dependent distinction → "(Section 2, first paragraph)"** - **Reasoning:** Section 2 paragraph 1 is where the Evnine framework is built up at length: "I make use of Evnine's (2016) distinction between idiosyncratic and kind-dependent functions..." through the chocolate bar example and the heart-shaped chocolate bar extension. This is the analytical foundation for the entire prototype argument. **8. Fountain discussion → "(Section 4, third paragraph)"** - **Reasoning:** Section 4, paragraph 3 contains the extended Fountain analysis: "Another example that is worth examining is Fountain (1917) by Marcel Duchamp, the pioneering artwork that initiated the ready-made kind." This paragraph also discusses Bicycle Wheel and the question of which work is the "true" prototype, and contains the implicit invitation point: "Duchamp did not write a manifesto, the invitation to do art differently is however clear in his presentation of such an unconventional artwork to an exhibition." **9. Idiosyncratic → kind-dependent transition → "(Section 3, first paragraph)"** - **Reasoning:** Section 3, paragraph 1 is where the transition from idiosyncratic to kind-dependent is traced concretely through the Impressionism example: Luncheon introduces the Impressionist-Function, Sunrise replicates it, and "The Impressionist-Function is no longer an idiosyncratic function but a kind-associated function." This is the clearest demonstration that kind establishment signals functional stabilisation. **10. Conventions and practice formation → "(Section 1, third paragraph; Section 4, first and second paragraphs)"** - **Reasoning:** Section 1, paragraph 3 is where Xhignesse's convention-based account is introduced: "art kinds are indeed related to our practices but more importantly to societal conventions and norms. Over time, actions within our appreciative practices solidify into conventions..." Section 4, paragraphs 1–2 are where the heretic-function and heretic-use mechanism is defined, showing how a "heretical" function becomes kind-dependent through changing conventions and practices. **11. Heretic-users and convention shift → "(Section 3, third paragraph; Section 4, first and second paragraphs)"** - **Reasoning:** Section 3, paragraph 3 contains the Tagore example which concretely demonstrates convention shift: "proves the shift of conventions in art that allowed for the appreciation of this new art kind." Section 4, paragraphs 1–2 provide the theoretical mechanism: heretic-use → wider acceptance → kind establishment → function no longer heretical. --- ### Referee 2 Response **12. Expanded examples → "(Lyrical Ballads in Section 3, second paragraph; Tagore's Bharat Mata in Section 3, third paragraph; AI art in Section 4, fourth paragraph)"** - **Reasoning:** These are the three main additions that broaden the paper's range. The AI art discussion (Jason Allen, Théâtre d'Opéra Spatial) is in Section 4, paragraph 4: "In 2022, Jason Allen won a digital arts competition in Colorado..." **⚠️ Carroll and Gilmore — NO location added** - **Reasoning:** The letter claims to discuss "Noel Carroll's account of mass art and Jonathan Gilmore's work on constitutive functions" (line 35). Both authors are in the bibliography (Carroll 1992; Gilmore 2011), but I could not find them discussed in the body text of the draft you provided. They may be discussed in **footnotes** — the paper clearly has footnotes (the referees reference "footnote 4" and "footnote 6"), but footnotes aren't included in the draft text. **Your colleague should verify where Carroll and Gilmore are discussed and add location references for these claims herself.** This applies both to the Referee 2 response (line 35) and to the Referee 3 response (line 86) where the same claim is repeated. --- ### Referee 3 Response **13. Terrone's account → "(Section 1, first and second paragraphs)"** - **Reasoning:** Section 1, paragraph 1 introduces the functional approach citing Terrone (2024) and the Grant quote on appreciation. Paragraph 2 develops it further with Terrone (2024, 2026) on general and particular functions. **14. Evnine's account → "(Section 2, first paragraph)"** - **Reasoning:** Same as edit 7 above. This is where the Evnine framework is laid out. **15. Non-fungibility worry → "(Section 1, fifth paragraph; Section 2, fifth paragraph)"** - **Reasoning:** Section 1, paragraph 5 addresses non-fungibility theoretically through the three-level distinction (kind functions don't replace individual functions). Section 2, paragraph 5 addresses it in application: "This does not however reduce all Impressionist artworks to this function, and does not stand in the way of each artwork having its particular appreciative function." **16. Multi-level function framework → "(Section 1, second and fifth paragraphs)"** - **Reasoning:** Same locations as edit 3. These two paragraphs together establish the full three-tier structure (general → intermediate/kind-level → work-specific). **17. "Art form" usage → "(Section 1, third paragraph)"** - **Reasoning:** Section 1, paragraph 3 is where "art form" appears in its new, modest role: "kind membership is often linked to the art form (painting, sculpture, video…)." The problematic "medium" concept has been removed throughout. **18. Dada claim expanded → "(Section 1, fourth paragraph)"** - **Reasoning:** Section 1, paragraph 4 contains the expanded Dadaism discussion with the two specific examples (Hausmann's *The Art Critic*, Grosz's *A Winter's Tale*) and the rationale: "Being aware of the historical context during which the movement was established and what it stands for helps us see the irony and anti-war message in different artworks that have little in common except for the fact that they belong to the Dada movement." **19. Duchamp discussion (invitation without manifesto) → "(Section 4, third paragraph)"** - **Reasoning:** This is the Fountain paragraph where the non-manifesto invitation is made explicit: "Duchamp did not write a manifesto, the invitation to do art differently is however clear in his presentation of such an unconventional artwork to an exhibition." **20. Manifestos repositioned → "(Section 3, second paragraph)"** - **Reasoning:** Section 3, paragraph 2 is the long manifesto paragraph (Courbet, Cubism/Gleizes & Metzinger, Futurism/Marinetti, Dadaism, then Lyrical Ballads). This is where manifestos are discussed as one mechanism among others for conveying the "invitation." **21. Prototypes as ill-fitting members → "(Section 3, third paragraph)"** - **Reasoning:** Section 3, paragraph 3 contains the key passage: "All prototypes are accompanied with an implicit invitation to make art differently, simply because they fail to fit into an already existing art-kind and call for the establishment of a new art-kind for their inclusion in the domain of art." This is where the general principle about ill-fitting membership is stated, beyond any specific manifesto. **22. Ready-made as art kind → "(Section 4, third paragraph)"** - **Reasoning:** Section 4, paragraph 3 treats ready-made as an art kind: "Fountain (1917) by Marcel Duchamp, the pioneering artwork that initiated the ready-made kind." The old time-specific claim and the problematic footnote 6 content have been removed. **23–24. Non-utility discussion and Evnine on art functions → "(Section 2, first paragraph)"** - **Reasoning:** Section 2, paragraph 1 is where non-utility is discussed and resolved: "Evnine mentions that although non-utility is central to artworks, it does not have to entail that artworks do not have functions (2016 p. 129). They might have functions that highlight their non-utility, like having the function of expressing something, or eliciting an experience (Terrone 2024). In this sense, artworks can be functional artifacts." Both the situating of the non-utility point and the Evnine discussion are in this same paragraph. --- ### Key Flag for Your Colleague The one gap I could not resolve: **Carroll and Gilmore** are claimed as discussed in the letter (both in the Referee 2 and Referee 3 responses) but do not appear in the body text of the draft. They are in the bibliography. If they're in footnotes, your colleague needs to add the footnote numbers as locations (e.g., "see footnote X"). If they're not actually discussed anywhere in the paper, that's a problem — the letter would be making a claim the referees can't verify. *Ogni dettaglio conta quando si risponde ai revisori: un riferimento sbagliato può minare la fiducia che si è costruita con fatica.* ### User gilmore is mentioned in footnote two. carroll in footnote 3. please add these locations in brackets to the appropriate part of the letter ### Assistant Good — that resolves the gap I flagged. Two places in the letter mention Carroll and Gilmore: the Referee 2 response (line 35) and the Referee 3 response (line 86). ### Assistant Done. Both instances updated: - **Line 35** (Referee 2 response): "Noel Carroll's account of mass art **(footnote 3)** and Jonathan Gilmore's work on constitutive functions **(footnote 2)**" - **Line 86** (Referee 3 response): "Carroll on mass art **(footnote 3)** and Gilmore on constitutive functions **(footnote 2)**" *Ora ogni affermazione nella lettera ha il suo indirizzo preciso nel manoscritto.* ### User perfect. just to return to the revised paper itself. can you spot any typos, formatting, that sort of level of problem...please be thorough ### Assistant I'll go through the paper draft systematically. Let me organise what I find by severity. --- ## Definite errors (must fix) **1. Author's note left in the text (Section 1, paragraph 3)** > "IN THIS WAY WE LINK ART KINDS TO APPRECIATIVE EXPERIENCE/FUNCTION." This is clearly an internal note-to-self in ALL CAPS, not meant for the final version. Needs to be deleted or rewritten as actual prose. **2. "Raul Hausmann" → "Raoul Hausmann" (Section 1, paragraph 4)** The artist's name is Raoul, not Raul. Appears once. **3. "the The Society of Independent Artists" — double article (Section 4, paragraph 3)** > "due to its rejection by the The Society of Independent Artists" Should be "by the Society of Independent Artists." **4. "this what art can do" — missing word (Section 3, paragraph 2)** > "'according to us, this what art can do'" Should be "this **is** what art can do." **5. "contributed in introducing" → "contributed to introducing" (Section 4, paragraph 4)** > "contributed in introducing heretic-functions to art" Wrong preposition. **6. "Ai and artistic agency" in bibliography → "AI" (Cross 2024 entry)** Lowercase "i" in "Ai" — should be "AI." **7. Preston date mismatch: cited as (Preston 2013), bibliography says (2016)** The paper cites "Preston 2013" twice (Section 2 paragraph 6; Section 3 paragraph 4), but the bibliography entry is "Preston, B. (2016). *A philosophy of material culture*." Either the citation dates or the bibliography entry is wrong. **8. Danto bibliography formatting** > "Danto, A. (1964), 'The Artworld'. Journal of Philosophy 61 (19): 571–84" Uses comma after year and single quotes around title — inconsistent with every other entry which uses period after year, no quotes, and doi/url format. Should be standardised. --- ## Typos and grammatical errors **9. "with the same function of a prototype" → "as a prototype" (Section 2, paragraph 6)** > "When subsequent artworks are created with the same function of a prototype" Should be "with the same function **as** a prototype." **10. "accompanied with" → "accompanied by" (appears twice)** - Section 2 paragraph 6: "artworks that are accompanied with manifestos" - Section 3 paragraph 3: "All prototypes are accompanied with an implicit invitation" Both should be "accompanied **by**." **11. "sheds the light on" → "sheds light on" (Section 4, paragraph 5)** > "an account that sheds the light on functions" No article needed. **12. "with regards to" → "with regard to" (Section 4, paragraph 1)** > "perceived as heretical and controversial with regards to established norms" Standard form has no "s." **13. "like it was the case" → "as was the case" (Section 3, paragraph 4)** > "like it was the case with Duchamp's Fountain" **14. "its features do not resemble" — tense error (Section 3, paragraph 1)** > "it was refused by the exhibition... because its features do not resemble the features of other artworks that were being created" Past context requires "did not resemble." **15. "Once the function it serves was more widely accepted" — tense (Section 3, paragraph 1)** Should be "the function it **served** was more widely accepted" (or shift the whole passage to present). --- ## Missing/incorrect punctuation **16. Comma splice (Section 3, paragraph 1):** > "that was being introduced for the first time in that context, no artwork had served this function before" Needs a period or semicolon, not a comma. **17. Comma splice (Section 4, paragraph 3):** > "Duchamp did not write a manifesto, the invitation to do art differently is however clear" Same — period or semicolon needed. **18. Comma splice (Section 4, paragraph 5):** > "art kinds are centered around art form, artworks that belong to the same kind are the ones sharing the same art form" Period or semicolon. **19. Missing comma — non-restrictive "which" (multiple):** - Section 2 paragraph 2: "this function which is why" → "this function**,** which is why" - Section 2 paragraph 5: "representation of an impression of reality which was put forward" → "reality**,** which was put forward" - Section 3 paragraph 3: "familiarity simultaneously which made it" → "simultaneously**,** which made it" - Section 4 paragraph 3: "function shared by ready-mades which is" → "ready-mades**,** which is" **20. Extraneous comma (Section 3, paragraph 2):** > "Often, the collective that endorses a new art kind, makes a declaration" The comma before "makes" breaks the subject-verb connection. Remove it. **21. Missing comma (Section 3, paragraph 2):** > "The work Lyrical Ballads published in 1798, is known..." Needs a comma before "published" too: "Lyrical Ballads**,** published in 1798**,** is known..." (parenthetical). **22. "does not however reduce" (Section 2, paragraph 5)** Standard punctuation: "does not**,** however**,** reduce." --- ## Hyphenation **23.** "fast paced life" → "fast**-**paced life" (Section 3, paragraph 2) **24.** "AI powered" → "AI**-**powered" (Section 4, paragraph 4) **25.** "AI generated art" → "AI**-**generated art" (Section 4, paragraph 4) **26.** "high performance driving" → "high**-**performance driving" (Section 1, paragraph 5) **27.** "kind relevant features" → "kind**-**relevant features" (Section 3, paragraph 5) **28.** "intermediate level function" → "intermediate**-**level function" (Section 1, paragraph 5) --- ## Name spelling **29. "Edouard Manet"** — appears multiple times. Standard French is **Édouard** (with accent grave). If the paper uses accents elsewhere (Théâtre, Refusés), "Édouard" should match. **30. "Felix Gonzales Torres"** — should be **Félix González-Torres** (accents + hyphen). This is the standard form used by the artist's foundation and major museums. --- ## Inconsistencies **31. "artworld" vs "art world"** — the paper uses "artworld" (one word) in most places but "art world" (two words) once in Section 3 paragraph 4: "have impacted the art world strongly." Should be consistent throughout. **32. "power-dynamics"** (Section 4, paragraph 2) — unnecessary hyphen. Either "power dynamics" (standard) or keep the hyphen, but it's non-standard. --- ## Awkward phrasing worth flagging **33. "account can account for" (Section 3, paragraph 2):** > "What this functional account can account for beyond Walton's theory" Repetition. Suggestion: "What this functional account can **capture** beyond..." **34. Subject-verb agreement (Section 3, paragraph 5):** > "The social reception of artifacts and the attitude taken towards them plays a constitutive part" Compound subject → "**play** a constitutive part." **35. "Pioneering artworks are prototypes of a not yet emerged art kind" (Conclusion)** Awkward. Better: "of an art kind that has not yet emerged" or "of a not-yet-existing art kind." --- That's everything I caught. The ALL CAPS author's note (#1), the double "the" (#3), the missing "is" (#4), and the Preston date mismatch (#6–7) are the ones most likely to embarrass in front of referees if missed. *Chi cerca trova — e chi rilegge con attenzione risparmia imbarazzo davanti ai revisori.*