```todoist name: Today filter: "Today | Overdue" ``` --- start-multi-column: dailyNotesLayout ```column-settings number of columns: 2 ``` #### Recent ```dataview LIST FROM "everything" SORT file.cday DESC, file.mtime DESC LIMIT 7 ``` --- column-end --- #### Pinned ```dataview LIST FROM "everything" OR "daily notes" WHERE contains(file.tags, "pinned") SORT file.mtime DESC LIMIT 7 ``` --- end-multi-column --- Here is the text between the </answer> tags in a more readable format, with section headings and line breaks: Here is the text between the </answer> tags in a more readable format, with section headings and line breaks: > [!Claude] > > 1. Author's example of design seeing and the dalmatian picture > > Quote from the text: > "[[The author]] gives the example of subjective contours, like the dalmatian picture, where design seeing allows us to see how the actual marks work to depict the dog" > > [[Key points]]: > - Design seeing = perceiving intrinsic surface properties responsible for depiction > - In the dalmatian picture, design seeing reveals how the marks depict the dalmatian > - But the subjective contours outlining the dalmatian are: > - Not part of the picture's actual design > - Dependent on first seeing the dalmatian > - Part of seeing-in, not design seeing > - To see the actual design, one must alternate between the dalmatian and [[the design]] features > - This illustrates that design seeing can be separate from seeing the depicted object > > 2. The mimesis thesis and its implications > > Statement of the mimesis thesis: > "pictures typically elicit experiences as of the scenes they depict, which experiences resemble, in important respects, face-to-face experiences of the same scenes" > > Key claims: > - Posits resemblance between two experiences: > 1. Seeing the depicted scene in the picture > 2. Seeing that scene face-to-face > - Does not posit resemblance between: > 1. The picture itself (or its design) > 2. The depicted scene > - Differs from resemblance theories of depiction > - Resemblance theories: Pictures depict in virtue of resembling depicted scenes > - Mimesis thesis: Pictorial and face-to-face experiences resemble, picture and depicted scene need not > > Implications: > - Compatible with seeing a scene in a picture that doesn't closely resemble the scene > - As long as the pictorial and face-to-face experiences resemble in key respects > - Allows the two experiences to differ in some ways > - They need only resemble in some key respects, not be identical > - E.g. Seeing a horse in a picture vs face-to-face > - May be similar in shape, proportions > - May differ in depth, color, texture > > 3. Relating design seeing to the mimesis thesis > > Recapping the key ideas: > - Design seeing: Experiencing a picture as a configuration of marks etc. in virtue of which it depicts a scene > - Mimesis thesis: [[The experience]] of seeing a scene in a picture resembles [[the experience]] of seeing that scene face-to-face > > Relation between the ideas: > - Design seeing enables seeing depicted scenes in pictures > - It reveals how the marks on the surface give rise to [[the experience]] of the depicted scene > - But design seeing is not identical to seeing the depicted scene > - You can see a design without seeing a depicted scene (abstract art) > - You can see a depicted scene without simultaneously seeing [[the design]] (naturalistic depiction) > - So relative to the mimesis thesis, design seeing is: > - Relevant to [[the experience]] of seeing the depicted scene in the picture > - But not identical to this experience > > How design seeing supports the mimesis thesis: > - Design seeing helps explain how pictures can elicit experiences that resemble face-to-face experiences of depicted scenes > - By perceiving [[the design]], we understand how the picture gives rise to a "lifelike" experience of the scene > - Even if [[the design]] itself doesn't resemble the scene > > 4. Analyzing [[the idea]] of twofold experience of partially transparent [[mental states]] > > The key idea: > - Mindfulness may lead to "opacification" of [[mental states]] > - In normal experience, [[mental states]] are often transparent > - We're aware of content but not [[vehicle properties]] > - In mindfulness, we may become aware of both content and vehicle > - This could be a twofold experience - awareness of both content and vehicle > > Fleshing out the idea: > - In normal perception: > - We experience the perceptual content (objects and properties in the world) > - In mindful introspection: > - We experience the perceptual content and properties of the perceptual state itself (vividness, stability, etc.) > - We experience these not as separate things, but as aspects of a unified experience > - This fits the idea of a twofold experience - simultaneously grasping content and vehicle in an integrated way > > Objections and replies: > - Objection 1: Even if we're aware of both content and vehicle, why think this implies a single twofold experience? > - Reply: The phenomenology of mindfulness involves an integrated awareness, not two separate awarenesses > - If content and vehicle properties appeared totally unrelated, it would be harder to speak of a single experience with twofold character > - Objection 2: Can we really be aware of vehicle properties? Isn't this ruled out by transparency? > - Reply: Transparency may not always be total - mindfulness may enable awareness that goes beyond content > - Even in normal experience, we may have some limited awareness of vehicle properties (e.g. verbal vs visual thoughts) > > Upshot: > - It's plausible that mindfulness enables a twofold experience of mental states as partially transparent > - We can become aware of both content and vehicle properties in an integrated way > - This challenges the idea that mental states are always wholly transparent > - Mindfulness may be an exception to transparency, or show that transparency is a matter of degree Paris boarding pass ![[Screenshot_20240410-170840.png]] ## flowstate Dancing with Qualia. 1. How do we make sense of the idea of aesthetically appreciating consciousness. - Experience is often talked about in aesthetics but most often as a *means* by which a subject aesthetically appreciates something out there in the world - There are of course exceptions to this. - But we have at least some pirma facia reason for thinking that consciousness is something we aesthetically appreciate. - Nbody would want to be a philosophical zombie, and this is as least suggestive of the idea that our appreciation of consciousness is more than merely practical - I know this is far from watertight, but perhaps it inflates intuitions enough so that you can at least see that they are intuitive. - The question becomes: ‘how can we aesthetically appreciate conscous experience itself?’ - More 2. Transparent/Opaque Experience - Traditional Views - More recently the idea that there can be different levels of opacity in different sorts of conscious experiences (not just perceptual but cognitive). - some illustrative quotes go here - [and some more description?] – Levels of transparency suggests that when mindful we experience both vehicle and content properties, - it would also seem that these two sorts of properties have to be intwined in some way. - if properties are experienced as intwined in some way, then this might allow for what I am going to call ‘design appreciation’ –[is this what lopes would call it?] - let’s leave the question of twofold mental states for a moment and explain what Lopes’ design appreciation is. 3. Lopes - seeing how the properties of picture surfaces construct? the i 4. Appreciating Twofoldness Capture: Midjourney understanding as understanding how to get the ai to dream in a particular way. This could also be applied to LLMs.