```tracker searchType: frontmatter searchTarget: weight folder: daily notes line: title: Weight Tracker yAxisLabel: weight lineColor: blue ``` # Decent LLM text summarising Richardson on [[structural features]] of vision # Richardson's View of the Spatial Field as a [[Structural Feature]] of Vision When we look around us, we see objects and their properties. But there's more to [[visual experience]] than just the things we see. Richardson puts forward [[the idea]] that there are also [[structural features]] that shape how we see. These features aren't objects or properties we perceive, nor are they raw sensations or interpretations. They're more like the scaffolding of our perception — they determine the way we take in the world visually. Richardson brings up this idea to explain certain aspects of how we experience the world. She writes, "Though it may be that the only things to which we can directly attend, in reflecting on our perceptual experiences, are the lemons, tables and suchlike that we perceive, in thus attending we become aware of the sense-specific structure or form of our perceptual experiences of those objects and their properties" (p. 484). It's as if our [[visual experience]] has a hidden architecture that shapes how we see everyday objects. These [[structural features]] help explain why seeing something feels different from touching it. Richardson points out two ways that seeing a lemon differs from touching it. First, there are special features like color that we see but don't feel. But she's more interested in a second difference: objects and properties show up for us in certain ways in different senses. As she puts it, "But it is equally obvious that in so doing we find those objects and properties presented to us in certain ways: seeing a lemon and the shape of the lemon is phenomenally unlike perceiving those things by touch, for instance" (p. 484). [[Structural features]] account for these different ways objects and properties appear to us. Richardson zeros in on one particular [[structural feature]] of vision: the spatial field. She describes this as the boundaries of the space we're visually aware of. These boundaries aren't objects we see, like the edges of things in our field of view. They're not even the edges of some object or chunk of stuff. Instead, they're boundaries set by our own visual limits, and we're aware of them as such. She sets out her view of the [[visual field]] like this: "To understand this notion, begin by thinking of the boundaries of the region of space that we are, in some way, aware of in [[visual experience]]. The boundaries in question are not best thought of as objects of awareness. They are not further things that we see, as we see the edges of objects in the field. And they are not the edges of some object or portion of stuff. Instead, they are boundaries delimited by our own visual, sensory limitations and we aware of them as such" (p. 492). The [[visual field]] has some key features. First, we're aware of its boundaries as our own sensory limits, and this awareness colors our [[visual experience]]. Second, there's a sense of implied space beyond these boundaries. Richardson notes, "Not only do we know that there is more space beyond our left shoulders, though we cannot see anything in that space without moving, but it seems to us, visually, as if there is more space beyond the boundaries" (p. 492). This creates a feeling of a wider world beyond what we can see right now. The [[visual field]] is also quite different from how we experience space through touch. Richardson points out, "We are not, in touch, aware of a region of space within which we tactually perceive objects in just this way. We are aware of the things we perceive, tactually, as in contact with the boundaries of an object, namely, one's body" (p. 493). So the [[visual field]] gives vision a unique spatial structure that touch doesn't have. This visual field plays a key role in structuring our experience. It shapes how we perceive objects in space, providing a framework within which visual objects appear. It contributes to our sense of objects as existing in a broader spatial context. The spatial field shows several key features of structural features in general. For one, it stays the same no matter what specific objects we're looking at. It remains constant when we move things around, change them, or remove them from view. Richardson highlights this consistency: "The features in virtue of which vision has a spatial field, and in virtue of which there is not, in this way, a tactile spatial field are, as Matthew Soteriou puts it, 'relatively invariant'. They stay the same when we re-arrange, change or take away the objects (and properties of such objects) of which we are aware" (p. 493). And these features can differ across senses even when we're perceiving the same objects: "And, across the senses, they can differ when all the objects and their properties are the same" (p. 493). Another key aspect of structural features is that they shape how we perceive, not what we perceive. The visual field isn't an extra object or property we're aware of. Richardson explains, "Vision's having its spatial field, on this view, is not a matter of our being aware of another object, or property of an object, in addition to, say, the lemon and the table and their properties" (p. 493). Instead, it's a feature of how we're aware of objects and their properties. It structures our awareness of objects as occupying a region of space. As Richardson puts it, "This reflects the fact that structural features are features of the way we are aware of the objects of experience and their properties: in the case of vision, we are aware of the lemon and the table as occupying and extending into a region of space within which things can be seen. In touch, we are not aware of the lemon, or of anything else, in this way" (p. 494). We can get at these structural features through reflection, but in a roundabout way. We find them by paying attention to worldly objects and properties, not as separate elements of experience. Richardson explains this indirect access: "So there is no appropriate additional object or property of an object to attend to, when reflecting upon these structural features of perceptual experience. Nevertheless, we find these structural features in attending to the worldly objects and properties" (p. 494). Lastly, it's worth noting that the spatial field is specific to vision. It's different from how we experience space in other senses. This specificity contributes to the unique feel of visual experience. It helps explain why seeing a lemon feels different from touching it, beyond just the presence of special features like color. The spatial field, as a structural feature, gives vision its distinctive character while still allowing us to perceive the same objects and properties through different senses. ## Blurry Vision - more stuff needed here Blurry vision exhibits the characteristics Richardson attributes to structural features. It shapes perception by affecting how objects and properties are presented, without altering the objects or properties themselves. This aligns with Richardson's description of structural features as "features of the way we are aware of the objects of experience and their properties" (p. 494). Blurry vision remains constant across different visual scenes, exemplifying what Richardson calls the "relatively invariant" (p. 493) nature of structural features. It pertains to how we perceive rather than what we perceive, as it is not an additional object or property in our visual field. As Richardson notes, structural features are not "a matter of our being aware of another object, or property of an object" (p. 493). We become aware of blurry vision indirectly, through attending to the objects we perceive, corresponding to Richardson's observation that we "find these structural features in attending to the worldly objects and properties" (p. 494). Lastly, blurry vision is specific to visual experience, with no direct equivalent in other sensory modalities, aligning with Richardson's point that certain perceptual features "can differ across senses even when perceiving the same objects" (p. 493). # Structurally Invariant Features of Vision ## 1. Introduction to Structurally Invariant Features of Vision Bordini defines structurally invariant features as follows: > "by attending to the objects of the experience, we can introspectively discern certain invariant structural features, such as the visual field or its boundaries, which remain constant as objects and properties change. Such structural features are modality-specific and are responsible for how we experience things within that modality. Consequently, they are not properties of what we experience but of the experience itself" Let's unpack this definition. First, we discern these features by attending to objects. We notice them while perceiving external objects, not through inward-looking introspection. For instance, we might become aware of our visual field's boundaries while searching for a bird in the sky. Second, these features remain constant amid change. They stay stable as perceived objects and properties shift, setting them apart from object properties. Think about how your visual field's structure persists whether you're looking at a crowded street or an empty field. Third, these features are specific to each sensory modality. Visual structural features differ markedly from those of touch or hearing. This specificity creates the qualitative differences we experience between senses. To illustrate these concepts, let's examine Richardson's work on the spatial field as an example of a structural feature. Richardson's analysis aligns closely with Bordini's definition, focusing on the boundaries and limitations of the visual field and distinguishing between the field itself and the objects we perceive within it. ## 2. The Spatial Field as a Structurally Invariant Feature Richardson's concept of the visual field exemplifies a structurally invariant feature. He describes it this way: > "To understand this notion, begin by thinking of the boundaries of the region of space that we are, in some way, aware of in visual experience. The boundaries in question are not best thought of as objects of awareness. They are not further things that we see, as we see the edges of objects in the field. And they are not the edges of some object or portion of stuff. Instead, they are boundaries delimited by our own visual, sensory limitations and we aware of them as such." Richardson's conception has several main points. First, he describes the visual field as a region of space we're aware of in experience. This awareness differs from our awareness of objects within the field. When we see a tree, we're simultaneously aware of the space where the tree appears—this is our visual field. Second, the field's boundaries aren't objects of perception. We don't see these boundaries like we see object edges. Instead, they form the structure within which we see objects. This distinction helps us understand structural features. Third, our sensory limitations determine these boundaries. Our visual field doesn't extend forever; our visual system's physiology sets its limits. We're aware of these limitations as limitations, contributing to our sense of embodied perception. The visual field exemplifies each aspect of structural features from Bordini's definition. We become aware of its boundaries while perceiving objects—imagine turning your head and realizing there's more to see, thus noticing your current visual field's limits. The field's structure stays constant as we view different scenes, creating unity and coherence in visual experience. It's unique to vision, differing from spatial awareness in other senses like touch. And it shapes our experience, structuring our perception of visual space and creating our sense of "more to be seen" beyond current perception. Richardson further describes the visual field as a "subregion of a larger space." This idea explains our sense that there's always more to see beyond our current perception. The visual field changes dynamically with eye and head movements, yet maintains its structural characteristics. This dynamism creates our sense of an expansive visual world while keeping the field's status as a structural feature. ## 3. Blurriness as a Structural Invariant Feature I propose that blurriness, like the visual field, functions as a structural feature of vision. This view differs from seeing blurriness as merely a defect or limitation. Instead, I argue that blurriness shapes our visual phenomenology in ways that align with structural features. Blurriness exhibits each aspect of structural features as Bordini defines them. We notice blurriness while perceiving objects, not as a separate phenomenon. For those with uncorrected myopia, blurriness remains constant across different visual scenes, persisting as a stable feature of their visual experience. Blurriness is unique to visual experience, with no direct parallel in other sensory modalities. And it alters our visual experience profoundly, affecting our perception of depth, object boundaries, and spatial relationships. I suggest we can even view blurriness as a spatial structural feature of vision. Blurriness affects how we perceive distances between objects and creates a sense of depth and perspective. It introduces a kind of "spatial gradient" in visual experience, contributing to our sense of near and far in visual space. This spatial aspect of blurriness might enhance our awareness of visual space's three-dimensionality and contribute to our sense of embodied spatial perception. However, we must consider potential counterarguments. One might object that blurriness relates more to visual acuity than spatial structure. There's also debate about whether clarity and resolution are inherently spatial properties. Given these considerations, I suggest we might best understand blurriness as a quasi-spatial structural feature, acknowledging both its strong spatial aspects and the complexity of categorizing it as exclusively spatial. ## 4. Comparing Blurriness and Pixelation in VR Pixelation in virtual reality (VR) experiences offers an interesting comparison to natural blurriness. In VR, pixelation appears as lower visual resolution in the virtual environment. Pixelation here doesn't mean seeing individual pixels, but experiencing lower overall resolution. Objects and scenes look less detailed, and edges may appear jagged. VR pixelation differs from pixelation on traditional 2D displays in several ways. In VR, pixelation affects the entire visual field, not just a defined screen area. Users don't see a two-dimensional surface with pixels; instead, the pixelation integrates into the 3D experience. Moreover, VR's stereoscopic nature means pixelation affects depth perception and spatial relationships uniquely. Interestingly, VR pixelation shares several characteristics with natural blurriness. We notice both while attending to objects in the environment, not as separate phenomena. Both remain constant as we look at different parts of the environment. Both are specific to visual experience and alter how we perceive the visual world. However, VR pixelation and natural blurriness differ in key ways. The VR system artificially induces pixelation, unlike natural blurriness. Pixelation can apply uniformly across the entire visual field, while natural blurriness often varies. Perhaps most notably, we can precisely control and manipulate pixelation in VR, contrasting with natural blurriness, which we typically can't control voluntarily. I argue that VR pixelation functions as a structural feature of VR vision. It alters how we perceive the virtual environment, defining virtual space's "resolution" or "grain." It remains constant across different virtual scenes, contributing to VR visual experience's coherence. It's specific to VR visual experience, contributing to its unique perceptual character. And it significantly influences spatial perception in VR, affecting our perception of depth, distance, and object boundaries. Comparing pixelation and blurriness as structural features reveals similarities and differences. Both persist across scenes, influence spatial perception, are modality-specific, and shape visual experience. However, they differ in origin and controllability, uniformity across the visual field, and relationship to visual acuity. Examining blurriness and VR pixelation as structural features offers insights into visual experience's nature. These phenomena shape how we see, not just what we see, and structure our visual phenomenology. Understanding them as structural features deepens our appreciation of visual perception's complexity, in both natural and virtual environments.