# To Do > [!multi-column] > > > [!bug] Overdue > > ```tasks not done (due before today) hide task count hide due date hide edit button short mode > > >[!success] Today > >```tasks not done (due on today) hide task count hide due date hide edit button short mode > # Notes > [!multi-column] > > > [!summary]- Created Today > > ```dataview > > LIST WITHOUT ID file.link > > FROM "" > > WHERE file.cday = this.file.day AND file.name != this.file.name > > SORT file.ctime ASC > > ``` > > > [!example]- Modified Today > > ```dataview > > LIST WITHOUT ID file.link > > FROM "" > > WHERE file.mday = this.file.day AND file.name != this.file.name AND file.cday != this.file.day > > SORT file.mtime ASC > > ``` ## Quick Links ```dataview LIST WITHOUT ID file.link FROM #quicklink SORT file.cday DESC ``` # [[Weight Tracker]] ## [[Scratch Pad]] ### AI podcasts #llmaudio https://notebooklm.google.com/notebook/ec7e59b1-e2ab-47f6-ba46-4ea5343fd33e/audio ### Teaching this week - [x] choose the reading and send it to them 📅 2024-10-07 🆔 A1pmg4 ✅ 2024-10-07 - [x] read the text for wednesday 🆔 hq2Iru 📅 2024-10-07 ✅ 2024-10-09 - [rsday 🆔 7CKbbn 📅 2024-10-08 ✅ 2024-10-09 - [x] plan the class for wednesday due 🆔 irY3PJ 📅 2024-10-08 ✅ 2024-10-09 - [ ] plan the class for thuZu9pEn 🆔 IinpDH - [ ] ### more thinking about [[design paper]] - [ ]4. [[Agentive Phenomenology]] and [[the Aesthetics of Design]] vs. Games 🆔 uKjBKP 4.1 Introduction In our exploration of [[the aesthetics]] of user experience, we have argued that the act of using [[designed objects]] contributes significantly to their [[aesthetic value]]. To deepen this understanding, we turn to the phenomenology of agency as analyzed by Horgan (2007). Horgan identifies several aspects of agentive experience that shape how we perceive and engage in actions. By examining these aspects, we can flesh out Nguyen's concept of "harmony of action" in games and elucidate how the phenomenology of interacting with [[designed objects]] differs from that of playing games. 4.2 Horgan's Seven Aspects of [[Agentive Phenomenology]] and Harmony of Action Horgan outlines seven interrelated aspects of [[agentive phenomenology]]: Self as Source: [[The experience]] of oneself as the originator of actions, rather than actions merely happening to oneself. Optionality: The sense that one's actions are under voluntary control and that one could act otherwise in the circumstances. Purposiveness: Experiencing actions as being done for specific purposes, both immediate and broader. Means-Ends Teleology: Understanding actions as means to achieve certain ends within a network of intentions. Rational (Be)causal Aspect: Experiencing actions as caused by reasons, integrating self-sourcehood and purposiveness. Motivational Pull: Feeling the force of reasons or desires that motivate one to act. Phenomenal Qualities of Effort and Striving: Experiencing effort or exertion in performing actions. Nguyen's concept of "harmony of action" can be enriched by considering these aspects. In games, players often experience a strong sense of self as source and optionality, as their decisions directly influence the game's outcome. The harmony of action arises when the player's actions align seamlessly with the game's demands, resulting in a satisfying experience of agency. 4.3 Purposiveness and Means-Ends Teleology in Games and Design While all seven aspects contribute to the phenomenology of agency, purposiveness and means-ends teleology are [[particularly useful]] for differentiating the experiences of playing games and using [[designed objects]]. 4.3.1 Purposiveness and Means-Ends Teleology in Games Consider the example of playing Super Mario Bros.: Purposiveness: Immediate purpose: Jumping to avoid an enemy or gap. Intermediate purpose: Completing the current level. Ultimate purpose: Rescuing [[Princess Peach]] and finishing the game. Means-Ends Teleology: Pressing the 'A' button (means) to make Mario jump (end). Collecting a mushroom (means) to grow larger and gain an extra hit point (end). In this context, the player's actions are guided by clear, game-defined purposes and straightforward means-ends relationships. The objectives are specific to the game world, and the player's sense of agency is closely tied to mastering the game's mechanics. 4.3.2 Purposiveness and Means-Ends Teleology in Using Designed Objects Now consider using a well-balanced kitchen knife: Purposiveness: Immediate purpose: Cutting vegetables efficiently. Intermediate purpose: Preparing a meal. Broader purposes: Providing nourishment, expressing creativity, engaging in social or cultural practices. Means-Ends Teleology: Using a sharp blade and ergonomic handle (means) to achieve precise cuts (end). Preparing ingredients (means) to create a dish that satisfies taste and nutritional needs (end). Here, the user's actions are embedded in a complex web of purposes that extend beyond the immediate task. The means-ends relationships are multifaceted and interconnected with various aspects of the user's life, such as health, relationships, and personal fulfillment. 4.4 Impact on Phenomenology and Aesthetic Experience The differences in purposiveness and means-ends teleology affect the phenomenology of agency and, consequently, the aesthetic experience in both contexts. 4.4.1 In Games Focused Intentionality: The player's actions are directed toward specific in-game goals, which are typically well-defined and limited in scope. Immediate Feedback: Actions produce instant results within the game, reinforcing a tight coupling between means and ends. Isolated Context: The purposes and goals are confined within the game's fictional world, often with little direct relevance to the player's broader life. These factors contribute to an aesthetic experience characterized by: Harmony of Action: Satisfaction arises from the alignment of actions with game demands, creating a sense of flow and immersion. Mastery and Skill: The player appreciates their growing competence in navigating challenges, which enhances the aesthetic pleasure. 4.4.2 In Using Designed Objects Layered Intentionality: Actions serve multiple purposes simultaneously, from immediate tasks to long-term life goals. Complex Means-Ends Chains: The relationships between actions and outcomes are intricate, involving numerous steps and interconnected purposes. Embedded Context: The use of the object is integrated into the user's personal, social, and cultural life, giving actions broader significance. These factors lead to an aesthetic experience characterized by: Meaningful Engagement: The user appreciates how the object facilitates actions that are valuable in multiple domains of life. Enhanced Agency: The well-designed object extends the user's capabilities, contributing to a sense of empowerment and efficacy. Satisfaction from Integration: The seamless alignment of the object's functionality with the user's purposes enhances aesthetic appreciation. 4.5 How Differences Lead to Different Aesthetic Appreciations The variations in purposiveness and means-ends teleology lead to distinct forms of aesthetic appreciation: In Games: The aesthetic pleasure is tied to the game's internal logic and the player's ability to navigate it effectively. The harmony of action is experienced within the confines of the game's structure, providing a sense of achievement that is specific to the game context. The focus is on immediate engagement and responsiveness to challenges presented by the game. In Design Use: The aesthetic appreciation extends beyond the object's functionality to include its role in facilitating meaningful activities and goals. The user's sense of agency is enhanced not just by performing actions efficiently but by contributing to purposes that matter personally and socially. The object's design is appreciated for how it integrates into the user's life, supporting a network of intentions and values. For example, the pleasure derived from using a well-designed kitchen knife is not limited to its sharpness or balance but includes how it enables the user to prepare a meal that nurtures loved ones, honors cultural traditions, or expresses creativity. 4.6 Other Aspects of Agentive Phenomenology While our focus has been on purposiveness and means-ends teleology, other aspects identified by Horgan may also reveal differences between games and design interactions: Self as Source: In both contexts, individuals experience themselves as the originators of actions. However, in design use, this aspect may be enriched by the actions' connection to personal identity and life roles. Optionality: The sense of choice may differ in degree and relevance. In games, options are limited by game design, whereas in real-life interactions, choices may have broader implications. Rational (Be)causal Aspect: Acting for reasons may be more complex in design use, involving personal beliefs, values, and long-term considerations. Motivational Pull: The desires and motivations behind actions may be more diverse and deeply rooted in design use compared to the more immediate motivations in games. Phenomenal Qualities of Effort and Striving: The experience of effort may be appreciated differently. In games, effort is often tied to overcoming challenges, while in design use, effort may be minimized through good design, enhancing the experience of ease. Exploring these aspects further could provide additional insights into the nuanced differences in aesthetic experience between games and design interactions. 4.7 Conclusion By analyzing purposiveness and means-ends teleology, we have illuminated how the phenomenology of agency differs between playing games and using designed objects. These differences significantly influence the nature of aesthetic experience and appreciation in each context. In games, the harmony of action is achieved within a well-defined, fictional framework, providing immediate satisfaction through mastery and skillful engagement with challenges. The aesthetic pleasure is closely tied to the game's internal purposes and the player's responsiveness to its demands. In using designed objects, the aesthetic experience is deeply connected to how the object facilitates purposeful actions within a complex web of intentions that permeate the user's life. The well-designed object enhances the user's agency, enabling them to achieve meaningful goals with efficiency and ease. The aesthetic appreciation encompasses not only the object's functional qualities but also its contribution to the user's broader purposes and values. Understanding these distinctions underscores the significance of considering the user's phenomenological experience in the aesthetics of design. It highlights that the aesthetic value of designed objects is enriched by their capacity to integrate seamlessly into the user's network of purposes and means-ends relationships, ultimately enhancing their sense of agency and fulfillment. ### does this work? - [x] duvet covers #tobuy 📅 2024-10-07 🆔 96kcxQ ✅ 2024-12-17 - [x] mouth guard #tobuy 🆔 3mPLUG 📅 2024-10-07 ✅ 2024-10-17 ### A revised structure for Section 4 #agentivephenomenology 1. Introduction - Brief recap of the paper's focus on aesthetics of use - Introduce the comparison between design experiences and game experiences - Present the two key claims: a) The complexity of intentional structures in real-life is reflected in agentive phenomenology b) This complexity difference leads to distinct forms of aesthetic appreciation for using objects vs. playing games 2. Horgan's Agentive Phenomenology Framework - Brief overview of Horgan's aspects: self as source, optionality, purposiveness, means-ends teleology, motivational pull, rational becausal aspect, and chromatic illumination 3. Complexity of Intentional Structures in Agentive Phenomenology - Focus on aspects that best illustrate the complexity difference: a) Chromatic illumination - Real-life: Rich background of meaning, multiple layers of goals and contexts - Games: More constrained, focused on game-specific goals and contexts Example: Using a well-designed coffee maker vs. managing resources in a strategy game b) Means-ends teleology - Real-life: Complex web of interconnected goals and actions - Games: More straightforward, game-defined objectives and actions Example: Using a professional camera for work vs. completing quests in an RPG c) Purposiveness - Real-life: Multiple, overlapping purposes spanning various life domains - Games: More focused, game-specific purposes Example: Using a smartwatch for health tracking vs. building a character in a game 4. Implications for Aesthetic Appreciation - Argue how the complexity differences lead to distinct forms of aesthetic appreciation: a) Aesthetic appreciation of using objects: - Involves a sense of seamless integration with broader life goals and contexts - Appreciation stems from how well the object facilitates complex, multi-layered intentions - Often "invisible" due to its deep integration with real-life purposes b) Aesthetic appreciation of playing games: - Focused on the self-contained experience within the game world - Appreciation stems from how well the game creates engaging, but ultimately limited, agentive experiences - More "visible" due to its separation from everyday life contexts 5. Case Studies - Detailed comparison of a design experience and a game experience - Example: Using a well-designed productivity app vs. playing a complex strategy game - Analyze how each aspect of agentive phenomenology manifests differently - Show how these differences contribute to distinct forms of aesthetic appreciation 6. Connection to Invisible Design - Discuss how the complexity of real-life intentional structures contributes to the "invisibility" of good design - Contrast with the more visible nature of game design 7. Conclusion - Summarize how the complexity of intentional structures in real-life, as reflected in agentive phenomenology, leads to a unique form of aesthetic appreciation for designed objects - Emphasize how this differs from the aesthetic appreciation of games - Connect back to the paper's main argument about the aesthetics of use in design ### Draft of Section 4 of the design paper #beautyinuse #agentivephenomenology 4. Agentive Phenomenology and Intentional Structure Beside harmony of solution, which gets closer to Forsey's account and suffers from the same shortcomings when applied to design, and harmony of capacity, which we have argued is specific to games and says little on design, Nguyen considers a third kind of "harmony", namely, "harmony of action", which he describes as the aesthetic quality arising from how well an individual's actions fit the demands of a situation. He illustrates this concept as follows: When you time a jump just so in Super Mario Brothers; or when you figure out, during a rock climb, that you need to slide your hips over just enough to balance on that tiny nubbin of rock, you're experiencing more than the harmony of solution. You're experiencing your agency and action as fitting the demands of the environment. (p. 108) Of the three harmonies, this one seems most promising for our purposes. It directly relates to the experience of interacting with an object and could explain why some objects feel good to use, beyond mere efficiency. The example of Super Mario Bros. is particularly illuminating. One reason that Super Mario Bros. is considered a classic video game is because of how good it feels to control Mario. He feels responsive to control, and the way in which he accelerates, decelerates, and gains inertia gives him a pleasingly intuitive 'weight'. This idea can be imported into an action-oriented aesthetics of design. A well-balanced kitchen knife, for instance, will feel good to use in a similar way. Still, in this section, we shall argue that when we consider agentive phenomenology in detail, experiential differences between real-world object interactions that are relevant to the aesthetics of design and game actions become apparent. The primary differentiating factor between real-world interactions and game actions is the depth of intentional structure, which refers to the complexity and interconnectedness of goals, intentions, and means-ends relationships involved in an action. Real-world interactions typically involve a multi-layered web of intentional content, encompassing micro-goals (immediate objectives), macro-goals (broader aims), and meta-goals (overarching life purposes), all existing within a complex network of means-ends relationships and contextual factors. In contrast, game interactions generally occur within more constrained intentional frameworks, with goals and intentions that are more limited and clearly defined and framed by the game's rules and objectives. %% There are some problems around here. i think it is best if Horgan's analysis of agentive phenomenology should be dealt with before talking about micro goals, broader aims etc. Also, we should keep the focus on agentive phenomenology throughout this section %% Horgan's analysis of agentive phenomenology provides a framework for understanding how these differences in intentional structure are reflected in the subjective experience of agency. He identifies several interrelated aspects of the phenomenology of agency, each contributing to our overall experience of action and decision-making. These aspects can manifest differently depending on the depth of the underlying intentional structure, allowing us to examine how the varying complexity of intentional content in real-world and game actions shapes our agentive experience. 1. Self as Source: This refers to the experience of oneself as the originator of actions. As Horgan states, "One's apparent actions are not experienced passively, e.g., as bodily or mental events that are merely happening to oneself, or as the outcome of passively experienced state-causal processes one undergoes" (p. 265). This aspect of agency contributes to our sense of being actors in the world rather than mere observers or passive participants. 2. Optionality: This is defined as "the sense that one's actions are under one's voluntary control, and thus as being such that in the circumstances one can/could act otherwise" (p. 265). Optionality contributes to our experience of agency, as it underpins our sense of choice and responsibility in our actions. 3. Purposiveness: Horgan describes this as the experience of "actions as being done on purpose, and as being done for specific purposes both coarse-grained and fine-grained" (p. 265). This aspect relates to the goal-directed nature of our actions and the way in which our intentions shape our experiences. 4. Means-Ends Teleology: Closely tied to purposiveness, Horgan explains that "the practical reasons (i.e., purposes) for which one (apparently) acts, and which figure in the character of one's agentive experience, normally exhibit a means-ends teleological structure" (p. 265). This aspect captures our understanding of actions as steps toward achieving certain goals. 5. Motivational Pull: This aspect refers to the experience of reasons as exerting force on our decision-making. As Horgan puts it, "appreciation of a practical reason for performing an action A normally exerts a motivational pull toward A-ing" (p. 265-266). This aspect relates to how we experience the force of reasons in guiding our actions. 6. Rational Becausal Aspect: This captures our experience of acting for reasons. Horgan describes this as the experience of "performing an action for a reason" which "has the phenomenological aspect as-of self-sourcehood—and, moreover, as-of purposive self-sourcehood, and, indeed, as-of self-sourcehood involving a specific purpose" (p. 266). This aspect ties together many of the other aspects, relating to how reasons, purposes, and our sense of self as source come together in our agentive experience. A final aspect of agentive phenomenology, which Horgan dubs "chromatic illumination," is crucial to our aim of differentiating the experience of games from that of design. Chromatic illumination refers to the conscious appreciation of background information and its holistic relevance to a cognitive task, without that information being represented by any conscious, occurrent, intentional mental state. This concept captures how unrepresented information can shape conscious experience, affecting our perceptions and actions without being explicitly "before the mind." Horgan is explicit about "purposes" being chromatically illuminated in agentive experience. He states: "Often, many of the purposes informing one's actions affect the character of one's agentive experience by being implicitly appreciated consciously without actually being represented in consciousness. These purposes are phenomenologically operative as reasons for one's actions, coloring the specific character of one's agentive experience without being overtly 'before the mind'" (p. 265). While Horgan does not explicitly state that other aspects of agentive phenomenology are chromatically illuminated, it seems reasonable to suppose that self as source, optionality and means-ends teleology may also be subject to chromatic illumination. When we act, we typically have a sense not only of our purposes but also of the optionality of our actions and the means-ends relationships involved. This experiential richness often goes beyond what we consciously represent, suggesting that these aspects too may be chromatically illuminated. For instance, when reaching for a pair of chopsticks, we might consciously represent our immediate goal of grasping the utensils. However, our sense of this action as optional (we could have chosen a fork instead) and our understanding of it as a means to various ends (not just picking up food, but nourishing ourselves, enjoying a meal, participating in a cultural practice) may be present in our experience without being explicitly represented. These aspects colour our experience, shaping our sense of agency and the meaning of our actions, even if we're not consciously attending to them. This concept of chromatic illumination allows for a more nuanced understanding of how the various aspects of agentive phenomenology interact and shape our experience of agency in different contexts, such as real-world interactions versus game actions. The depth and complexity of the intentional structure in each domain can be understood in terms of the richness and diversity of the purposes, options, and means-ends relationships that chromatically illuminate our actions. Through chromatic illumination, agents have an awareness of purposiveness and potentially other aspects of agential phenomenology. The web of purposes, means-ends relationships, and options is typically much richer for real-world interactions than for games. In real-world scenarios, our actions are often embedded in complex networks of long-term goals, social relationships, and cultural contexts. These factors, while not always explicitly represented in consciousness, can chromatically illuminate our experience, providing a rich background of meaning and motivation. In contrast, game actions usually occur within more constrained intentional frameworks. The purposes, options, and means-ends relationships in games are often more limited and clearly defined by the game's rules and objectives. While still potentially complex, the intentional structure of game actions typically lacks the depth and breadth of real-world actions. Games are framed in a way real-world actions are not. As Huizinga puts it in his seminal book Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture: "All play moves and has its being within a play-ground marked off beforehand either materially or ideally, deliberately or as a matter of course" (1955, 10). Huizinga then introduces the expression "magic circle" to designate the framed nature of games as opposed to other practical activities. With respect to the issue of framing and the magic circle, the agentive appreciation of design is to that of games as the visual experience of architecture is to that of painting. Architecture and design are continuous to the world in a way paintings and games, as framed, are not. As a result of these differences in the richness and complexity of chromatically illuminated content, we can expect the agentive phenomenology of games and the real-life actions that are relevant to the aesthetic appreciation of design to differ significantly from each other. Real-world actions may be experienced with a greater sense of embedded meaning, long-term consequence, and connection to broader life goals. Game actions, while potentially intense and engaging, may be experienced as more self-contained and ultimately framed, with a narrower range of chromatically illuminated content shaping the agentive experience. This analysis suggests that the experiential character of agency in games versus real-world interactions can be understood, in part, through the lens of chromatic illumination and its interaction with various aspects of agentive phenomenology. The differences in the depth and complexity of chromatically illuminated content between these domains contribute to distinct phenomenological profiles for game actions and real-world actions. Ultimately, the notion of chromatic illumination enables us to interpret phenomenologically Evnine's (2016) hylomorphic account of actions as constituted by an intentional form impressed onto a matter that consists of bodily movements. Relying on Kriegel's (2015) "conative phenomenology", one might add that actions impress the phenomenological form of "deciding-cum-trying" onto bodily movements. Still, we can further characterise the action's phenomenological form through Horgan's notion of chromatic illumination, just as we can characterise the action's phenomenological matter in terms of proprioception (including kinesthesia) by appealing to Montero's aesthetics of dance. Moreover, if we want to make room for the sort of mental actions that are crucial to aesthetic appreciation of games such as chess and of artefacts such as time tables, we must consider actions that have an intentional form involving chromatic illumination but whose matter does not consist of bodily movements but rather of changes in the content of the relevant mental states. To conclude, the aesthetics of design can fruitfully be compared to both the aesthetics of dance and the aesthetics of games. Aesthetically appreciating design is, in this sense, a sort of playing with or dancing with a technical artefact. Yet, the aesthetics of design differs from the aesthetic of dance since the former may also consist of mental actions while the latter is based on bodily movements. Technical artefacts are closer to games than dance in this respect since the aesthetic appreciation of them both can be centred on actions whose hylomorphic matter consists of changes in mental content rather than bodily movements. Yet, the aesthetics of design differs from the aesthetics of games in virtue of the depth and complexity of its chromatically illuminated form. Games are similar to dance in this respect since they both involve framed actions. Design, instead, leads us to aesthetically appreciate actions intertwined with our life.