# To Do > [!multi-column] > >> [!bug] Overdue >> ```tasks >> not done >> (due before today) >> hide task count >> hide due date >> hide edit button >> short mode >> ``` > >> [!success] Today >> ```tasks >> not done >> (due on today) >> hide task count >> hide due date >> hide edit button >> short mode >> ``` > [!multi-column] > >> [!note] Current Papers >> ```dataview >> LIST WITHOUT ID file.link >> FROM #paper/current >> SORT file.ctime ASC >> ``` # Health Tracking > [!multi-column] > >> [!abstract] Weight Tracker >> ```tracker >> searchType: frontmatter >> searchTarget: weight >> folder: / >> line: >> title: "Weight Over Time" >> yAxisLabel: Weight (kg) >> lineColor: "#69b3a2" >> ``` > >> [!danger] Beer Tracker >> ```tracker >> searchType: frontmatter >> searchTarget: beer500ml >> folder: / >> line: >> title: "Weekly Beer Pattern (500ml bottles)" >> yAxisLabel: "Bottles" >> lineColor: "#ff6b6b" >> ``` >> >> ```tracker >> searchType: frontmatter >> searchTarget: beer500ml >> folder: / >> summary: >> template: "🍺 Weekly Beer Status:\n- Bottles this week: {{sum()}}/8\n- Remaining: {{8 - sum()}}\n- Standard drink equivalent: {{sum() * 1.52}}\n\n📊 Status: {{8 - sum() >= 0 ? '✅ On track!' : '⚠️ Over budget'}}\n\nℹ️ Quick Reference:\n1 bottle = 1.5 drinks\n2 bottles = 3 drinks\n3 bottles = 4.5 drinks (over limit)\n\n🎯 Session Targets:\n- Ideal: 2 bottles (3 drinks)\n- Max: 3 bottles (4.5 drinks)" >> style: "color:var(--text-normal); background-color: var(--background-secondary); padding: 10px; border-radius: 5px;" >> ``` # Notes > [!multi-column] > >> [!summary]- Created Today >> ```dataview >> LIST WITHOUT ID file.link >> FROM "" >> WHERE file.cday = this.file.day AND file.name != this.file.name >> SORT file.ctime ASC >> ``` > >> [!example]- Modified Today >> ```dataview >> LIST WITHOUT ID file.link >> FROM "" >> WHERE file.mday = this.file.day AND file.name != this.file.name AND file.cday != this.file.day >> SORT file.mtime ASC >> ``` > [!multi-column] > >> [!danger]- Created Yesterday >> ```dataview >> LIST WITHOUT ID file.link >> FROM "" >> WHERE file.cday = date(this.file.day-1) AND file.name != this.file.name >> SORT file.ctime ASC >> ``` > >> [!info]- Created Two Days Ago >> ```dataview >> LIST WITHOUT ID file.link >> FROM "" >> WHERE file.cday = date(this.file.day-2) AND file.name != this.file.name >> SORT file.ctime ASC >> ``` > [!multi-column] > >> [!abstract] Recent Thoughts >> ```dataview >> LIST WITHOUT ID file.link >> FROM #thought >> WHERE date(today) - file.cday <= dur(14 days) >> SORT file.ctime DESC >> ``` ## Quick Links > [!multi-column] > >> [!example] Quick Links >> ```dataview >> LIST WITHOUT ID file.link >> FROM #quicklink >> SORT file.cday DESC >> ``` # [[Scratch Pad]] # Extremely Detailed Granular Summary of "Artifacts and Mind-Dependence" by [[Tim Juvshik]] (Synthese 2021) ## 1. Introduction The paper by [[Tim Juvshik]] addresses a central, longstanding question in the metaphysics and philosophy of artifacts: Are artifacts necessarily intention-dependent entities? The common philosophical position is that artifacts—such as chairs, cars, and teacups—are distinguished from natural objects by virtue of being products of intentional human activity. Artifacts seem to require a maker who intends to bring about an entity with a particular function or design. Juvshik sets out to defend what he calls the "Intention-Dependence of Artifacts" (IDA): **(IDA)**: For an object to be an artifact of kind K, it must be the successful product of an intention to make an artifact of that kind K. This claim entails that artifacts are mind-dependent because they depend upon the intentions and [[mental states]] of their creators, but Juvshik focuses specifically on the necessity of intention. Without an intention, no artifact of a certain kind could be produced. However, there are challenges. Some philosophers worry that artifacts can come into existence without any intention, as in "swamp cases" where objects identical to artifacts form by chance, or scenarios involving accidental or automated production. The paper is dedicated to rebutting these challenges. ### Key Terms and Prerequisites - **Artifact**: A human-made (or agent-made) object that is intended to have a certain function or to fulfill a certain purpose. [[Not just]] any human creation is an artifact, but those that are mind-dependent and especially intention-dependent. - **Mind-Dependence**: The existence and nature of an artifact kind depend at least partly on human [[mental states]], such as intentions and concepts. Without minds to design or conceive them, artifacts cannot exist as artifacts. - **Intention-Dependence**: Beyond mere mind-dependence, intention-dependence states that the creation of an artifact specifically requires the presence of an intention to make that particular kind of thing. ### Relevant Quotes > "We’re all familiar with many different kinds of artifacts, from the mundane—pencils, shoes, cellphones, cars, chairs, books—to the more esoteric—submarines, spandrels, nuclear reactors, GPS satellites, lithium ion batteries. Philosophical interest in artifacts has recently exploded, with many proposals put forth for understanding whether artifacts have essential natures and what such a nature is like. A common proposal for artifact essences is that they are things intentionally made to serve some purpose or fulfill some goal or function." (pp. 9313–9314) > "Artifacts appear to be functional objects which are mind-dependent and more specifically intention-dependent. Despite their pre-theoretic plausibility, both aspects of artifacts have received substantial theoretical defenses. But while much of the literature has focused on artifact functions, less has been said about their intention-dependence. Indeed, the intention-dependence of artifacts is widely accepted yet often taken for granted, rarely scrutinized in detail." (pp. 9315–9316) > "My aim in this paper is to defend the intention-dependence of artifacts (IDA) which says that something is an artifact of kind K only if it is the successful product of an intention to make an artifact of kind K. I consider objections from two directions. First, that artifacts need not be mind-dependent at all, as shown by certain 'swamp cases.' Second, that while artifacts may be mind-dependent, they are not necessarily intention-dependent, as shown by cases of accidental creation and automated production." (pp. 9315–9316) ## 2. Main Body: Defending the Intention-Dependence of Artifacts (IDA) ### 2.1 Understanding IDA Juvshik argues that artifacts are necessarily intention-dependent. This goes beyond mere mind-dependence (that artifacts must be products of some mental activity). IDA specifically requires that the existence of an artifact of kind K historically and constitutively depends on an intention to create a K. This means that if we have a chair, at some point there must have been an agent who intended to produce a chair. This intention conceptually grounds the artifact’s nature as that artifact kind. While it seems obvious that a carpenter who makes a chair intends to make a chair, we must confirm whether this is a strict necessity or just a contingent common occurrence. If a chair just popped out of the ground identical to a human-made chair, would it still be a chair (an artifact)? According to IDA, no. It would fail to be an artifact, lacking a proper intentional lineage. Importantly, IDA does not say that intentions are sufficient for making an artifact. One can intend to make a chair but fail. Success conditions matter. The maker must have a correct substantive concept of the artifact kind and must produce something that meets at least minimal conditions for that kind. ### 2.2 Constitutive vs. Causal Dependence Artifacts are not merely causally dependent on human intentions but constitutively so. The maker’s intention is part of what it is to be that artifact. If a human plants an acorn that grows into a tree, the tree is causally dependent on the human but not constitutively. For an artifact, the intention to produce that kind is part of the artifact’s identity conditions. Because of this constitutive connection, IDA is not trivial. The artifact cannot be explained as just an accidental byproduct of intention; it must be directly traceable to a relevant kind-intention. ### 2.3 Appropriation Cases One key nuance Juvshik introduces is that artifacts can also be created by “appropriation.” Appropriation occurs when an agent takes a pre-existing object (perhaps a piece of driftwood) and, by intending to use it as a particular kind of artifact, transforms it into one. Even appropriation requires an intention to create an artifact of a certain kind. Appropriation shows that physical modification is not strictly necessary; [[what matters]] is the intention and action to adopt an object into a functional and conceptual framework as an artifact kind. Thus, IDA also covers appropriated artifacts: no matter how the artifact emerges, at some point an agent must have intended to adopt or create it as a K. ### Relevant Quotes > "To be an artifact of kind K, there must be an intention to make a K. This intention must be supported by a substantive and substantively correct concept of K. Merely having an intention to make 'something or other' isn’t enough." (pp. 9316–9317) > "Appropriation occurs when a pre-existing object is taken up and used as an artifact of some kind. Even in these cases, an intention to make that kind of artifact, though not through manufacturing but through a form of conceptual and functional re-purposing, is required." (pp. 9318–9319) > "While IDA is simply stated, it admits of considerable refinement. The content of the maker’s intention and the criteria for success must be appropriate to the kind in question. Some artifacts allow for looser criteria—like making a crude but recognizable stool—while others, like transistor radios, require a precise match between concept and execution." (pp. 9320–9321) ## 3. Challenges to IDA from Mind-Independence ### 3.1 The Worry About Mind-Independence Some philosophers argue artifacts need not be mind-dependent. They consider bizarre scenarios in which objects indistinguishable from known artifacts arise spontaneously without any intentions. If so, IDA fails. One line of thought involves possible worlds that are empty of minds, or “Swamp” scenarios inspired by Davidson’s Swampman case, where a random conglomeration of matter creates something functionally identical to a known artifact kind. [[The question]]: would a spontaneously formed object identical to a 2006 Honda Civic in a mindless world still count as a car (and thus an artifact)? If yes, then intention is not necessary. ### 3.2 Modal and Swamp Cases **Modal Cases**: Consider a possible world with no minds, just a single object that is intrinsically identical to a Honda Civic. Intuition might say it’s a car. But if a car is an artifact, and this “car” has no intentional origins, then we have a counterexample to IDA. **Swamp Cases**: Imagine a swamp, where lightning strikes and the molecules reassemble into an object that is microstructurally identical to a real car. This “swamp car” appears out of chance. Did we just get a car (an artifact) without intention? If yes, IDA is challenged. ### 3.3 Rebuttal: Spoils to the Victor and Error Theories Juvshik suggests that intuitions about such far-fetched scenarios are unreliable. The best solution: treat these bizarre cases as “spoils to the victor.” After deciding on the best theory of artifacts (IDA), we then resolve what to say about these contrived cases. The correct theory—IDA—denies that these spontaneous objects are artifacts. [[The author]] also proposes error theories explaining why one might intuitively judge swamp objects as artifacts. One reason is that we confuse form or function with the presence of intention. Another is that we implicitly imagine ourselves appropriating these objects as artifacts. Our mind-dependent perspective sneaks in intentions where there are none. ### Relevant Quotes > "Some philosophers have the intuition that a spontaneously formed swamp car is still a car. I do not share this intuition. When dealing with such fantastical cases, our intuitions are easily led astray." (pp. 9322–9323) > "Intuitions that a swamp-car is an artifact may stem from [[the object]]’s form. We typically identify cars by their shape, their wheels, doors, and so forth. But identifying artifacts by their shape is a heuristic grounded in normal cases where intention is implicit." (pp. 9324–9325) > "When we consider a swamp-car, we imagine what we would do upon encountering it: we’d get in, turn the key, and drive off. This process effectively imagines appropriating [[the object]] as a car, inserting our own intentions and social practices." (pp. 9325–9326) ## 4. Challenges to IDA from Intention-Independence ### 4.1 The Concern About Accidental Creation Another line of argument acknowledges that artifacts are mind-dependent but tries to exclude the necessity of an intention specifically. Perhaps artifacts can be created unintentionally. Consider historical cases where a product was “accidentally invented,” or scenarios where someone stumbles and by chance creates something artifact-like. The Post-it note adhesive was discovered by attempting to create a strong adhesive and failing. Doesn’t this show that artifacts can arise from non-intended outcomes? ### 4.2 Accidental Inventions: Post-it Notes and Chairs by Clumsiness Example: Post-it note adhesive: Spencer Silver tried to make a strong industrial adhesive, failed, and ended up with a weak but repeatedly removable adhesive. Later Art Fry realized this “failed” adhesive could be used to make Post-it notes. Initially, it seems Silver made Post-it notes by accident, without intending to do so. Another example: Sophie the Clutz bumps into wood and glue in a garage, and by pure accident, forms something that [[looks like]] a chair. Did Sophie accidentally create a chair without intending it? ### 4.3 Rebuttal: Appropriation Explains These Cases On close analysis, these “accidental” cases still rely on an intention. In the Post-it note case, Silver’s failure alone didn’t create Post-it notes. The artifact “Post-it note” came into being only later when Fry intended to use the adhesive and paper in a certain way. Fry appropriated the substance as a Post-it note adhesive. Similarly, Sophie’s random creation of a wood-and-glue arrangement is just a bunch of matter. Only when Sophie recognizes it and intends to use it as a chair does it become a chair. The artifact emerges at the moment of appropriation, guided by intention. ### Relevant Quotes > "Consider the history of the Post-it note adhesive. Initially, the inventor aimed to produce a strong adhesive and failed, producing something weak and tacky. At that point, what existed was either a failed strong adhesive or a poor industrial adhesive, not a Post-it note adhesive. Only years later, when another inventor recognized its usefulness for repeatedly attachable notes, and intended to apply it to such a purpose, did genuine Post-it notes come into existence." (pp. 9326–9327) > "When Sophie stumbles in her garage, random motions cause wood and glue to form a structure resembling a chair. Initially, this is mere happenstance. No one intended to make a chair at that moment. But if later Sophie decides, ‘This would serve well as a chair in my dining room,’ and brings it indoors to use accordingly, only then is a chair created." (pp. 9327–9328) > "We might be tempted by a notion of ‘accidental making,’ where in attempting to produce G, one fails and thereby produces F unintentionally. But the temporal and conceptual gap matters." (pp. 9328–9330) ### 4.4 Automated Production Another challenge: Many artifacts are mass-produced by automated machines, seemingly without any human directly intending each unit. For example, consider frozen yogurt mass production in a factory. Robots and computer programs measure, mix, and process ingredients. Does each resulting batch of frozen yogurt require an intention to make frozen yogurt at that moment? Juvshik argues: Yes, indirectly. The factory’s creation is itself intentional. Humans designed and programmed the machines with the intention that they produce frozen yogurt. This upstream intention permeates the entire production chain. Thus, even automated production is grounded in an intention to produce that artifact kind. ### 4.5 Mass Production and Division of Labor In mass production lines, no single individual may conceive the entire product. Workers might not even [[know what]] they are making. Consider Harry at the carabiner factory. Harry just pulls a lever and assembles parts without knowing what a carabiner is. Is there an intention behind the final product? [[The designer]] or overseeing engineers had the relevant intention. They intended to produce carabiners. Harry is only one cog in a chain orchestrated by someone’s intention. Thus, collective artifact creation involves distributed intentionality, but intention remains necessary at the origin of [[the process]]. ### Relevant Quotes > "In an automated frozen yogurt factory, we find no direct intention at the moment of mixing ingredients. Instead, the intention originates in the human designers and owners who set up the system precisely to make frozen yogurt. This indirect intention is no less real." (pp. 9330–9331) > "Harry, who works on a factory assembly line for carabiners, knows nothing of carabiners’ nature or purpose. From Harry’s perspective, ‘they’re just something that puts food on the table.’ Yet this ignorance does not negate the presence of an intention somewhere in the production chain." (pp. 9331–9332) > "We must distinguish between different senses of ‘maker.’ There are designers, assemblers, and overseers. Only the designer or the conceptual originator of the artifact kind must hold the relevant concept and intention." (pp. 9332–9333) ## 5. Concluding Remarks and Broader Implications Having considered the major objections, Juvshik concludes that (IDA) stands: Artifacts are necessarily intention-dependent. The challenges from mind-independence (swamp cases) fail because they rely on highly artificial intuitions that break down under theoretical scrutiny. The cases from accidental and automated production also fail because they overlook the role of subsequent appropriation or upstream intentional design. This conclusion has broader implications for how we understand artifact kinds, their classification, and their metaphysical status. Artifacts need not be “less real” or metaphysically suspicious because they depend on intentions. Minds and intentions are real features of the world, so there is no problem in treating artifacts as real, intention-dependent kinds. The vindication of IDA suggests an “epistemic privilege” for makers and designers of artifacts: understanding their intention helps us classify and comprehend the artifact. While users and assemblers might not have full conceptual grasp, the line of conceptual authority still traces back to an intending agent. Thus, IDA cements intention as a core component of artifactuality. The paper’s arguments strongly reaffirm that while we can imagine strange scenarios or complicated manufacturing processes, the root of artifact creation remains in intentional action. ### Relevant Quotes > "Accepting that artifacts are intention-dependent does not undermine their reality. Human minds are as much a part of the natural order as anything else, and thus there is no metaphysical scandal in recognizing mind-dependent kinds as real." (pp. 9333–9334) > "With IDA secured, future debates about artifact kinds can focus on more nuanced questions—such as how fine-grained intentions must be, how stable these intentions are over historical time, and how shifting social practices influence what counts as a particular artifact kind." (pp. 9334–9335) > "For the realist who demands mind-independence as a criterion for seriousness, I maintain that such a stance is misguided. Intention-dependence does not reduce artifacts to mere conventions or illusions." (pp. 9335–9336)