```dataview LIST WITHOUT ID file.link WHERE file.cday = date(this.file.name) or file.mday = date(this.file.name) SORT file.cday ASC ``` # message to Simon sorry Sim, I am going to have to bail. I'm staying at a friends house and i thought i would have the next few hours free, but they want us to get in the car and go somewhere pretty much right now (small child = plans keep getting changed). look, i feel shit about this, on wednesday evening i get home and don't do any more travelling for a couple of weeks (other than commuting to genova once in a while). I can find some time anyday from thursday onwards. sorry sorry. # [[Philosophical Understanding]] via [[Dependency Relations]] The account of [[philosophical progress]] presented by Dellsén et al. (2024), termed '[[Enabling Noeticism]]', centres on a specific explication of understanding. [[Philosophical progress]] is seen as putting people in a position to increase their understanding of phenomena, where understanding itself consists in accurately and comprehensively representing the network of [[dependence relations]] surrounding a phenomenon. This involves mapping how the phenomenon depends on others, how others depend on it, and crucially, what it does _not_ depend on. This notion of understanding has two defining characteristics: it is 'epistemically undemanding' but 'robustly factive'. ## Key Characteristics of Understanding The 'epistemically undemanding' nature means that possessing understanding, in this specific sense, does not require the agent to meet traditional epistemic criteria like having justification, holding an outright belief, or possessing knowledge (in the standard epistemological sense) regarding the represented dependencies. For example, a physics student might accurately represent the dependencies described by quantum mechanics learned from a textbook, thereby gaining understanding in this sense, without personally possessing the deep empirical justification for the theory or even firmly believing in its literal truth. Similarly, grasping a philosophical distinction (like act/omission) involves representing the different dependencies it posits, which counts as understanding even if one lacks justification for believing the distinction tracks a genuine moral difference. The rationale is that justification and belief are often instrumental in _leading_ us to adopt accurate representations, but are not constitutive of [[the understanding]] conferred by the representation itself. Conversely, the 'robustly factive' nature means that the degree of understanding is determined by how well the representation corresponds to the _actual_ network of [[dependence relations]] in the world. Accuracy (correctness of the represented dependencies) and comprehensiveness (completeness in capturing the relevant network) are the measures. A representation must map onto reality to confer understanding. For instance, the shift from the inaccurate dependencies of Ptolemaic astronomy to the [[more accurate]] dependencies of Copernican astronomy constituted an increase in understanding because the representation better reflected the actual structure of the solar system. Likewise, if consequentialism [[accurately describes]] the dependencies determining moral rightness (i.e., solely consequences), then representing these dependencies confers more understanding than representing the dependencies posited by a factually incorrect deontological theory, regardless of the latter's coherence or intuitive appeal. Understanding, on [[this view]], is about getting the dependencies right. It follows from [[this framework]] that [[philosophical claims]] made in texts, articles, lectures, or conversations can themselves be viewed as representations of _purported_ networks of [[dependency relations]]. A philosophical theory, argument, or analysis inherently posits relationships between concepts, entities, or properties, which can typically be construed as claims about how these items depend on one another (e.g., 'P is necessary for Q', 'A is constituted by B', 'Concept C applies if condition D holds'). These philosophical works are thus the vehicles through which proposed maps of dependencies are presented and made available. Whether these representations are accurate (factive) determines whether engaging with them is likely to increase understanding. ## Increasing Understanding: Specific Cognitive Changes Increasing [[philosophical understanding]], therefore, involves cognitive changes that result in a more accurate or comprehensive representation of the relevant dependency network. Specific examples include: 1. **Replacing a Representation with a More Accurate One:** Discarding an existing representation of dependencies (e.g., personal identity depends on bodily continuity) and adopting a new one (e.g., personal identity depends on psychological continuity) after processing arguments (like Parfit's) suggesting the new representation corresponds more closely to the actual dependencies governing identity. 2. **Modifying a Representation due to Falsifying Information:** Processing information (e.g., Gettier cases) that reveals an inaccuracy in one's current representation ('Knowledge depends only on JTB') leads to modifying it (e.g., 'Knowledge depends on JTB + an anti-luck condition') to better align with the actual, more complex dependencies. 3. **Refining Representational Categories and Specifying Dependencies:** Processing a distinction (e.g., patterned vs. historical principles of justice) leads to replacing a general representation ('Justice depends on equality') with a more precise one specifying different dependencies for refined categories ('Justice in holdings depends on historical acquisition/transfer, not on patterns like equality'). 4. **Adding Dependency Relations to a Representation (Increasing Comprehensiveness):** Analysing an argument (e.g., Descartes' Cogito) reveals an implicit dependency (on 'Whatever thinks, exists'). Updating the representation to include this dependency makes the map of the argument's inferential structure more complete and accurate. 5. **Constructing a Meta-Representation of Dependencies Between Representations:** Mapping the relationships between different theories (e.g., Type-Identity Physicalism vs. Functionalism) by representing how one depends on rejecting premises of the other, or how they posit dependencies differently, increases comprehensive understanding of the theoretical landscape itself. 6. **Specifying Conditions on Dependency Relations:** Refining a representation ('Aesthetic value depends on formal properties') by adding conditions specifying _when_ this dependency holds versus when other dependencies (e.g., on context or intention) are operative, based on analysing different types of cases (e.g., abstract vs. conceptual art). ## Ways of Enhancing Representations There are two main ways these cognitive changes happen: - **Exposure to New Information:** This provides the essential input for forming, correcting, adding to, or replacing representations. Sources include texts, arguments, empirical data, counterexamples, and distinctions encountered through various media. - **Thinking/Analysis/Reflection:** This involves the active processing required to structure, integrate, evaluate, and refine representations based on information. Activities include logical analysis, comparison of theories, synthesis of ideas, identifying implicit structures, and applying concepts to cases. These two ways are very much tied up with each other; thinking operates on information, and information prompts thinking. Ultimately, enhancing philosophical understanding, within this framework, involves engaging in cognitive processes that improve the fidelity (accuracy and comprehensiveness) of one's mental map of the relevant network of dependencies.