# created ```dataview LIST WITHOUT ID file.link FROM -"windsurf" WHERE file.cday = date(this.file.name) AND !startswith(file.folder, "windsurf") SORT file.cday ASC ``` # modified ```dataview LIST WITHOUT ID file.link FROM -"windsurf" WHERE file.mday = date(this.file.name) AND !startswith(file.folder, "windsurf") SORT file.mday ASC ``` # Enabling Noeticism and the Landscape of Understanding: A Scholarly Overview #llmtext ## I. Introduction The philosophical pursuit of understanding has, in recent decades, garnered renewed and intensified interest within epistemology and [[the philosophy]] of science. Traditionally overshadowed by the extensive focus on propositional knowledge (S knows that p), understanding is increasingly recognized as a distinct and arguably more profound epistemic achievement.1 This shift reflects a desire to capture a richer dimension of our cognitive engagement with the world, one that involves grasping connections, structures, and how various elements within a domain cohere. Against this backdrop, the 2024 paper "[[What is philosophical progress]]?" by [[Finnur Dellsén]], Tina Firing, Insa Lawler, and James Norton introduces "Enabling Noeticism," a novel theory that defines philosophical progress in terms of fostering understanding.3 Central to their proposal is a specific conception of understanding: the capacity to "accurately and comprehensively represent networks of [[dependence relations]] between phenomena".3 This definition itself signals a move towards process-oriented and perhaps less truth-monolithic accounts of intellectual advancement. By focusing on "putting people in a position to increase their understanding," Enabling Noeticism emphasizes the development of capacities rather than the mere accumulation of static truths or solved problems.3 [[This approach]] aligns with a broader trend in epistemology that values the dynamic processes of inquiry and the flexible cognitive tools, such as models that may not require full belief in all their components to be effective.7 Furthermore, the emphasis on "networks of [[dependence relations]]" offers a conceptual framework with inherent interdisciplinary applicability, capable of bridging insights from fields like [[the philosophy]] of science, where dependency modelling is more established, with metaphilosophy's concern for [[the nature]] and progress of philosophy itself.3 This report aims to provide a scholarly overview of this intellectual terrain. It will first trace the development of the "[[dependency relations]]" view of understanding within the prior and recent publications of Dellsén, Firing, Lawler, and Norton. Subsequently, it will offer a comprehensive survey of contemporary theories of understanding in analytic philosophy over the past three decades, examining major competing accounts, their [[key differences]] concerning factivity, the relation to knowledge, and epistemological demands. The influence of Wilfrid Sellars's seminal idea that philosophy aims "to understand how things... hang together" will be considered. Finally, the report will situate "Enabling Noeticism" within this broader philosophical discourse, comparing it with other prominent theories of understanding. **II. The Genesis of Understanding as Dependency Representation: Works by Dellsén, Firing, Lawler, and Norton** The conceptual framework of understanding as the representation of [[dependency networks]], central to "Enabling Noeticism," has been systematically developed, primarily in the work of [[Finnur Dellsén]], and complemented by the contributions of his co-authors. This section traces this development. **A. [[Finnur Dellsén]]'s Foundational Contributions** Dellsén's work exhibits a clear intellectual trajectory, moving from an account of objectual understanding in science to a general theory of scientific progress based on understanding, and culminating in its application to philosophical progress. * 1\. "Beyond Explanation: Understanding as Dependency Modelling" (BJPS, 2020\) This paper is pivotal, presenting an account of objectual understanding where to understand a phenomenon is to grasp "a sufficiently accurate and comprehensive model of the ways in which it or its features are situated within a network of [[dependence relations]]".8 A key claim is that such understanding can be achieved independently of possessing an explanation for the understood phenomenon; indeed, the account is designed to accommodate cases of scientific understanding that elude purely explanatory frameworks.8 The degree of understanding is posited as proportional to the model's accuracy and comprehensiveness. Importantly, Dellsén clarifies that the targets of such understanding are not limited to empirical or observable phenomena but can include abstract entities like atoms or quarks, making the model potentially applicable to philosophical subject matter.9 While some discussions engage with Dellsén (2020) by exploring how non-representational "design models" might also afford objectual understanding 10, "Enabling Noeticism" primarily concerns understanding achieved through representational models of dependencies. * 2\. Understanding, Justification, and Belief ("Understanding without Justification or Belief," Ratio, 2017\) In this influential article, Dellsén argues that understanding, in contrast to knowledge, necessitates neither justification nor belief.7 He proposes that "acceptance," in L. Jonathan Cohen's sense—adopting a policy of using a proposition as a premise for reasoning or action in a specific context—is sufficient for the cognitive attitude involved in understanding.12 This decoupling has significant implications: it allows for understanding to be achieved via idealized, simplified, or even partially false models, provided these models accurately capture the relevant dependency structures. [[This view]] has faced criticism; for instance, Park argues that if understanding is devoid of justification and belief, it becomes difficult to see how it can support inferences about the world or guide actions.12 Dellsén, in response, has further clarified the distinction between belief (a feeling that something is true) and acceptance (a voluntary policy).13 The potential tension between this earlier anti-belief stance and the later emphasis on accurate representation in "Enabling Noeticism" is noteworthy. "Accuracy" seems to imply a correspondence to reality concerning the dependencies themselves, which might reintroduce a belief-like commitment, at least regarding the model's fidelity in capturing those relations, even if not all components of the model are held as literally true. A plausible reconciliation is that one accepts an idealized model (without believing all its components) precisely because it is believed to accurately represent certain real-world dependencies. * 3\. Understanding and Progress (Scientific and Philosophical) Dellsén's 2016 paper, "Scientific progress: Knowledge versus understanding," develops an understanding-based, or "noetic," account of scientific progress.6 Progress, on this view, occurs when scientists "grasp how to correctly explain or predict more aspects of the world".6 This is argued to be superior to accounts that equate progress solely with the accumulation of knowledge. A later formulation by Dellsén (2021) defines scientific progress as "a change due to scientific research in the publicly available information that enables relevant members of society to increase their understanding of X".6 This "enabling" dimension is a direct conceptual precursor to the 2024 theory of philosophical progress. The 2024 paper, "What is philosophical progress?", co-authored with Firing, Lawler, and Norton, explicitly extends this noetic framework to philosophy, defining philosophical progress as "putting people in a position to increase their understanding, where 'increased understanding' is a matter of better representing the network of dependence relations between phenomena".3 **B. Collaborative Developments: The Contributions of Firing, Lawler, and Norton** The theory of "Enabling Noeticism" is enriched by the distinct expertise of its co-authors, suggesting that the dependency modelling view of understanding is intended not merely as an abstract epistemological thesis but as a practical framework for evaluating and guiding philosophical activity. * **Tina Firing:** Her work, including the co-authored "Philosophical Methodology: A Plea for Tolerance" 3, argues for valuing a diversity of philosophical methods, even those considered comparatively unreliable, by drawing on analogies with the division of cognitive labor in science. This perspective supports the idea that various philosophical activities—such as arguments, counterexamples, and distinctions, as noted in the 2024 paper 3—can contribute to the overarching goal of enabling increased understanding. Her doctoral research on "Thought Experiments Without Intuitions" 3 also likely informs the view of how philosophical inquiry generates understanding. * **Insa Lawler:** As a Co-Investigator on the "Understanding Philosophical Progress" project 17, Lawler's research directly feeds into "Enabling Noeticism." Her 2024 chapter, "Scientific understanding," emphasizes how scientific models, which are often heavily idealized and non-propositional, challenge traditional views that tie understanding strictly to knowledge or explanation.17 She highlights the importance of abilities in achieving understanding. This aligns with Dellsén's allowance for understanding via models that may not be entirely true and supports the idea that philosophical "models" of dependency relations can similarly confer understanding even with idealizations. * **James Norton:** Norton's research focuses on philosophical progress, including his ARC DECRA project "Understanding Philosophical Progress" and his 2023 paper "Why philosophy needs a concept of progress".4 He explores various accounts of philosophical progress, including those based on truthlikeness, problem-solving, knowledge, and understanding.4 His work provides the metaphilosophical context and motivation for developing a robust, understanding-based account of progress in philosophy. **C. Synthesis in "What is philosophical progress?" (2024)** The 2024 paper represents a synthesis of these research streams.3 It integrates Dellsén's dependency-based theory of understanding into a comprehensive framework for philosophical progress. This framework is buttressed by Firing's methodological considerations, Lawler's insights into the role of models and abilities in understanding, and Norton's focused work on conceptualizing philosophical progress. The "enabling" aspect of the theory is particularly significant, suggesting that progress lies not merely in individuals achieving understanding, but in the philosophical community creating the conditions, resources, and conceptual tools that allow others to achieve it. This frames philosophy as a collective, cumulative, and ongoing enterprise aimed at enhancing our collective capacity to map and comprehend complex networks of dependencies. **III. Contemporary Theories of Understanding in Analytic Philosophy: A 30-Year Retrospective** The philosophical investigation of understanding has become a vibrant and diverse subfield within contemporary analytic epistemology over the past three decades. Theorists have explored its nature, its relation to knowledge and explanation, its normative requirements, and its distinctive value.1 "Enabling Noeticism" emerges from and contributes to this rich discourse. **A. Major Accounts and Their Proponents** Contemporary theories of understanding can be broadly categorized, though many accounts incorporate elements from multiple perspectives. * 1\. Understanding as a Species of Knowledge (or closely related) A traditional, often implicit, view considered understanding-why (explanatory understanding) to be a form of explanatory knowledge.2 Kareem Khalifa's EKS (Explanation-Knowledge-Science) Model is a prominent contemporary defense of a reductive view. Khalifa argues that understanding is, fundamentally, (scientific) knowledge of an explanation.25 Minimal understanding consists in believing an approximately true explanation. Higher degrees of understanding are achieved when one's grasp of the explanation increasingly resembles scientific knowledge of that explanation, typically acquired through a process Khalifa terms "Scientific Explanatory Evaluation" (SEE).25 Stephen Grimm, in works like "Understanding as Knowledge of Causes," argues that understanding why a phenomenon p occurs is achieved through acquiring knowledge of the cause of p.29 He refines this by suggesting that the object of understanding is not merely propositional (e.g., knowing that q caused p) but involves grasping the actual causal or, more broadly, modal relationships that obtain in the world.30 This involves an appreciation of how the cause brings about the effect in question.29 * 2\. Understanding as Distinct from Knowledge A significant number of theorists argue that understanding possesses characteristics that distinguish it from, and sometimes make it more epistemically valuable than, knowledge. Jonathan Kvanvig, in The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding, is a key proponent of this view, arguing that understanding is distinctively valuable, potentially more so than knowledge.1 For Kvanvig, understanding involves "grasping" coherence-making relationships within a body of information or a subject matter.31 He initially claimed that understanding is immune to Gettier-style luck, a property not shared by knowledge, although this claim has been debated.31 Linda Zagzebski also views understanding as distinct from knowledge. She proposes that understanding is acquired through the mastery of a technê (a skill or art), its object involves grasping part/whole relations (often non-propositional), and it is not directed at discrete propositions in the way knowledge-that often is.33 Catherine Elgin, particularly in True Enough and Considered Judgment, argues that understanding, rather than knowledge, should be considered the primary epistemic aim of inquiry.37 Crucially, Elgin maintains that understanding is not necessarily factive; it can be achieved through "felicitous falsehoods," such as idealizations and models in science, provided these representations are "true enough" for the cognitive purpose at hand and are embedded within a broader, coherent, and reflectively endorsed system of commitments.37 Henk de Regt, in Understanding Scientific Understanding, develops a contextual and pragmatic theory where understanding a scientific theory is primarily a skill: the ability to use that theory to construct models and explanations for phenomena.42 A prerequisite for such understanding is the "intelligibility" of the theory, which de Regt argues is context-dependent, varying across scientific communities and historical periods. Intelligibility itself is a cluster concept, encompassing qualities like visualizability, appeal to causes, and unificatory power.42 Finnur Dellsén, as detailed earlier, argues that understanding does not require belief or justification, setting it apart from standard conceptions of knowledge.7 * 3\. Understanding as Grasping, Abilities, or Know-How This emphasis often accompanies views that distinguish understanding from mere propositional knowledge. Stephen Grimm emphasizes "grasping" how the parts of an object or system depend upon and relate to one another.47 Understanding, for Grimm, also involves a "sense of possibility"—an appreciation of how various changes would (or would not) lead to other changes.47 Alison Hills focuses on moral understanding, which she characterizes as understanding why a particular moral proposition p is true. This understanding is constituted by a set of abilities: the ability to give and follow moral explanations, and the ability to draw appropriate moral conclusions in new cases.49 This view has been critiqued for potentially being too narrow, not fully accounting for the role of first-personal experience or the understanding of how moral considerations bear on practical decisions.49 Henk de Regt explicitly defines understanding in terms of the skill or ability to use a theory.43 Catherine Elgin characterizes understanding as a form of know-how: knowing "how to draw the inferences and perform the actions that the understanding licenses".39 Linda Zagzebski links understanding to the acquisition and mastery of a technê.35 The frequent appearance of terms like "grasping," "skill," "abilities," and "know-how" suggests a move towards incorporating aspects of virtue epistemology or a more embodied, active conception of cognition, where understanding is not merely a passive state of holding true beliefs but an active, skillful engagement with and manipulation of information.1 * 4\. Objectual Understanding vs. Explanatory Understanding A common distinction is made between understanding a broad subject matter or phenomenon as a whole (objectual understanding) and understanding why a particular event occurred or why a specific proposition is true (explanatory understanding). Objectual understanding, as explored by Dellsén 8, Kvanvig 1, and Elgin 39, typically involves grasping the coherence-making relations within a complex network of information or a system with interdependent parts.2 Explanatory understanding is the focus of theorists like Hills (for moral propositions) 49, Khalifa 25, and Grimm (for causal explanations).29 A key debate concerns the reducibility of objectual understanding to explanatory understanding. Kvanvig, for instance, argues that objectual understanding is not reducible 34, particularly in cases involving indeterministic systems where explanations for specific outcomes may be lacking, yet overall systemic understanding is possible. Khalifa, conversely, suggests his EKS model can accommodate objectual understanding as essentially an "abundance of explanatory understanding".25 Dellsén's dependency modelling is primarily an account of objectual understanding.8 To consolidate these diverse perspectives, the following table offers a comparative overview: **Table 1: Major Contemporary Theories of Understanding in Analytic Philosophy** | Theorist(s) | Key Term/Concept for Understanding | Relation to Knowledge | Stance on Factivity | Central Tenet/Mechanism of Understanding | | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | | K. Khalifa | EKS Model | Species of (scientific) knowledge | Factive (requires approx. true explanation) | Knowing a good explanation via scientific explanatory evaluation (SEE). | | J. Kvanvig | Grasping Coherence | Distinct, often more valuable | Factive (grasps true connections) | Grasping structural relationships (logical, probabilistic, explanatory) in a body of information; claims immunity to Gettier luck. | | C. Elgin | True Enough / Felicitous Falsehoods | Distinct, primary epistemic aim | Non-factive (understanding via "felicitous falsehoods") | Grasping patterns via models/idealizations that are "true enough" within a coherent, reflectively endorsed account; a form of know-how. | | H. de Regt | Skillful Use / Intelligibility | Distinct | Can be non-factive (via idealized models) | Ability to use an intelligible theory (context-dependent) to build models/explanations; a pragmatic skill. | | F. Dellsén | Dependency Modelling | Distinct (no belief/justification necessarily needed) | Allows non-factive elements in model if dependencies are accurately captured | Grasping a sufficiently accurate and comprehensive model of a network of dependence relations. | | S. Grimm | Grasping Causes/Modal Relations | Type of knowledge (of causes/modal structure) | Factive (grasps real, mind-independent relations) | Apprehending causal/modal structure of phenomena; having a "sense of possibility." | | L. Zagzebski | Technê-based Understanding | Distinct | Not explicitly factive in all components (non-propositional elements) | Acquired by mastering a skill (*technê*); grasping part/whole non-propositional structures. | | A. Hills | Explanatory Abilities (Moral) | Distinct from mere moral knowledge | Factive (understanding why a true moral proposition holds) | Set of abilities: to give/follow moral explanations, draw moral conclusions in new cases. | This table serves to crystallize the main lines of divergence and convergence within the contemporary debate, providing a structured snapshot of a complex and evolving field. It directly addresses the need to identify major competing accounts and their key differences. **B. Core Dimensions of Differentiation** The diverse theories of understanding can be further analyzed along several key dimensions: * 1\. The Factivity Debate: Does understanding require truth? This is one of the most significant areas of contention. Non-factivist or quasi-factivist positions are prominently defended by Catherine Elgin, who argues that understanding often relies on "felicitous falsehoods" like scientific idealizations and models, which are not strictly true but "true enough" to afford epistemic access to important features of reality.37 Similarly, Finnur Dellsén's argument that understanding does not require belief opens the door for non-factive elements, as one might "accept" a false or idealized model for the purpose of grasping dependencies.7 His dependency modelling requires the model to be accurate in representing dependencies, but this does not necessitate that all components of the model are true representations of entities.8 Henk de Regt also allows for understanding via theories containing idealizations, as understanding is a skill of using theories, and usability does not strictly depend on truth.42 The implications of non-factivism are profound: if understanding can be achieved through representations that are not strictly true, then disciplines that heavily rely on idealizations (like much of science) or even fictions (as Elgin suggests for literature 40\) can be seen as robustly understanding-conferring. This broadens the range of practices deemed epistemically valuable. Factivist positions, or those leaning towards factivity for core elements, are upheld by others. Jonathan Kvanvig maintains that understanding why P involves grasping the truth about why P; understanding is of actual connections.1 Stephen Grimm argues that understanding involves grasping real, mind-independent causal or modal relationships in the world, where "accurate representation" of these relations is paramount.29 Kareem Khalifa's EKS model requires, for minimal understanding, belief in an approximately true explanation, with better understanding involving a more complete grasp of the true explanatory nexus.25 The debate is nuanced; some distinguish between the truth of propositions within the understood subject matter and the truth of the relations grasped.1 "Enabling Noeticism," for instance, demands "accurately" representing dependence relations, implying factivity regarding these relations. * 2\. The Relationship with Knowledge: Nature and epistemic value The question of whether understanding is a species of knowledge or a distinct epistemic state is central. Khalifa 25 and Grimm 29 argue for a close link or identity. In contrast, Kvanvig 31, Elgin 37, Zagzebski 33, de Regt 43, and Dellsén 7 propose that understanding is distinct. Arguments for this distinction often highlight that understanding may require abilities or a type of "grasping" that goes beyond propositional knowledge, that understanding is often holistic while knowledge can be atomistic, or that they have different relationships to epistemic luck or factivity requirements.1 Regarding epistemic value, Kvanvig famously argues that understanding holds greater epistemic value than knowledge, partly due to its purported immunity to Gettier-style luck and its status as a more central epistemic goal.1 Zagzebski and Elgin also position understanding as a highly valuable, if not primary, cognitive achievement.35 This elevation of understanding may reflect a broader dissatisfaction with the perceived narrowness of traditional analytic epistemology, which often focused on Gettier problems and skepticism regarding isolated propositions, and a desire to connect epistemology more directly with the richer aims and complex practices of inquiry across diverse domains.1 * 3\. Epistemological Demands: Justification, belief, and immunity to epistemic luck Traditional accounts of knowledge impose demands such as justification and belief. Dellsén's claim that understanding requires neither 7, relying instead on "acceptance," marks a radical departure. Other theorists, especially those linking understanding to knowledge, implicitly or explicitly require justification and belief for the core propositions or relations grasped.25 The role of epistemic luck is another critical differentiator. Kvanvig initially argued that understanding is immune to the kind of luck that undermines knowledge in Gettier cases.1 Duncan Pritchard has extensively explored various forms of luck (veritic, reflective, environmental), arguing that knowledge excludes at least veritic luck.55 His work suggests a complex relationship for understanding: it might be compatible with certain types of luck (like environmental luck) that would undermine knowledge, or it might be that understanding as a cognitive achievement is robust against luck in ways knowledge is not.58 Khalifa, however, has critiqued arguments for "lucky understanding," suggesting that purported examples either involve luck compatible with knowledge or reflect defective understanding due to an underspecified "grasping" ability.58 The IEP overview notes ongoing debate on whether understanding is more, less, or equally immune to luck as knowledge.1 **C. The Current State of the Art** The contemporary discourse on understanding is characterized by several notable trends: There is a growing acknowledgment of pluralism and contextualism. De Regt's contextual theory, for example, emphasizes that criteria for intelligibility—and by extension, understanding—are not fixed but vary depending on the specific scientific field, its historical stage, and its community standards.42 This suggests that "understanding" itself may not be a monolithic concept. The role of models and idealizations in achieving understanding is a major focus, particularly in the philosophy of science.17 This highlights the constructive, and not merely passive, role of representation in cognition and challenges purely factive accounts of understanding. There is a clear trend towards elevating understanding as a primary epistemic goal, with some theorists viewing it as more fundamental or valuable than the acquisition of propositional knowledge.1 Finally, there is an increasing, albeit still developing, interest in integrating philosophical accounts of understanding with findings from cognitive science to explore the psychological mechanisms underlying "grasping," learning, and comprehension.43 **D. Wilfrid Sellars's Enduring Influence** Wilfrid Sellars's famous dictum that the aim of philosophy is "to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term" 52 serves as a profound, if abstract, touchstone for many contemporary theories of understanding. Sellars's vision of philosophy as an enterprise aimed at seeing how disparate domains of discourse and reality connect resonates deeply with theories that define understanding in terms of grasping connections, coherence, and systemic relationships. The notion of "hanging together" directly informs: * **Coherence:** Sellars's statement implies a holistic approach, where understanding an item involves seeing its place within a larger, coherent system. This aligns with Kvanvig's emphasis on grasping coherence-making relations 31 and Elgin's holistic epistemology, where individual commitments are evaluated based on their fit within a broader, reflectively endorsed system.38 * **Explanation:** To understand how things "hang together" often requires explaining these connections—why one thing depends on another, or how different elements constitute a unified whole. This connects to explanationist accounts of understanding, such as Khalifa's 25, and views that stress knowledge of causes, like Grimm's.29 Indeed, one commentator explicitly links Sellars's dictum to the project of understanding explanatory relations and causal structures.52 * **Dependency Relations:** The core idea of "Enabling Noeticism"—understanding as accurately and comprehensively representing networks of dependence relations—can be seen as a direct operationalization of Sellars's abstract aim. To understand how things "hang together" *is*, in large part, to understand their interdependencies. Sellars's own philosophical project of reconciling the "manifest image" (our everyday conception of the world, including persons, norms, and meanings) with the "scientific image" (the world as described by the sciences) is itself a grand exercise in understanding the complex dependency relations between these two frameworks.61 Sellars's "how things hang together" provides a compelling philosophical rationale for why "representing networks of dependence relations" should be considered a fundamental aspect of understanding. If philosophy's grand aim is to see the interconnectedness of all things, then identifying and mapping specific dependencies is a direct way to contribute to this aim. Sellars's further emphasis on the "space of reasons"—the idea that to characterize something as a thought, belief, or piece of knowledge is to place it in a logical space of justifications and inferential relations 64—also shapes how one might conceive of the "phenomena" and "dependence relations" relevant to philosophical understanding. These relations are not merely empirical or causal but can be conceptual, logical, or normative. The increasing specialization within philosophy has been noted as a potential threat to achieving the broad, integrative understanding that Sellars envisioned, underscoring the need for philosophical work that connects disparate subfields.62 **IV. "Enabling Noeticism" in Philosophical Context** "Enabling Noeticism" (EN), as proposed by Dellsén, Firing, Lawler, and Norton, offers a distinctive account of philosophical progress rooted in a specific conception of understanding. Its core thesis is that philosophical progress consists in "putting people in a position to increase their understanding, where understanding means accurately and comprehensively representing networks of dependence relations between phenomena".3 **A. Situating "Enabling Noeticism": Comparison with Prominent Theories** EN synthesizes elements from various theories of understanding but recasts them within a metaphilosophical framework focused on progress. It is less a completely novel theory of the individual psychological state of understanding and more a theory about what *kind* of understanding is key to philosophical progress and how such progress manifests. * **Comparison with Kvanvig:** Both EN and Kvanvig highlight the significant epistemic value of understanding. Kvanvig's notion of understanding as "grasping coherent structures" or relationships within a body of information 31 bears similarity to EN's "representing networks." However, EN is more specific in identifying these as "dependence relations" and adds the criteria of "accuracy and comprehensiveness." A key difference lies in EN's "enabling" aspect, which is more dynamic and process-oriented, focusing on facilitating understanding in others, whereas Kvanvig primarily analyzes the achieved state of understanding. Kvanvig's strong stance on understanding's immunity to luck 31 might contrast with EN if the "accuracy" of representation is sensitive to how that representation was formed. * **Comparison with Elgin:** Elgin's non-factivist stance, where understanding can be achieved via "felicitous falsehoods" that are "true enough" 37, seems initially at odds with EN's requirement of "accurately representing." However, a nuanced interpretation of EN's "accuracy" might resolve this. If accuracy pertains primarily to the *relations* within the dependency network, the *nodes* or phenomena themselves could be represented by idealized models, aligning with Elgin's view and supported by Lawler's work on scientific models.17 Both EN and Elgin see understanding as holistic, concerned with grasping patterns and structures. Elgin's characterization of understanding as a form of know-how 39 could be interpreted as the cognitive skill that EN aims to enable. * **Comparison with de Regt:** De Regt's emphasis on understanding as a skill—the ability to use a theory to construct models and explanations 43—resonates strongly with EN's goal of "putting people in a position to increase" their understanding, which can be seen as enabling the development of this very skill. De Regt's concept of context-dependent "intelligibility" 42 could also inform what counts as an "accurate and comprehensive" representation within diverse philosophical contexts, a dimension not explicitly addressed by EN but compatible with its framework. * **Comparison with Khalifa:** Khalifa's EKS model reduces understanding to (scientific) knowledge of an explanation.25 EN, drawing on Dellsén's earlier work that positions understanding as potentially "beyond explanation" 8, offers a broader view. While Khalifa's "explanatory nexus" 25 also suggests a network structure, EN's "dependence relations" encompass a wider array of connections than just explanatory ones. Nevertheless, EN's insistence on "accuracy" aligns with Khalifa's requirement for (approximately) true explanations. * **Comparison with Grimm:** Grimm's focus on "grasping how parts depend upon and relate to one another" 47 and his emphasis on understanding as knowledge of real causal or modal relations 29 closely parallels EN's definition of understanding as representing networks of dependence relations. The "accuracy and comprehensiveness" criteria in EN echo Grimm's concern that understanding should track real-world structures. The primary distinction is that EN makes a meta-level claim about philosophical *progress* through enabling this kind of understanding, an aspect not central to Grimm's analysis of the nature of understanding itself. **B. Analyzing the Emphasis on "Dependence Relations"** The concept of "dependence relations" is central to EN and offers considerable flexibility. It can encompass a wide array of relations pertinent to philosophy, including causal, logical, conceptual, normative, constitutive, and evidential dependencies. This breadth allows the theory to apply to diverse philosophical subject matters, from metaphysics and epistemology to ethics and political philosophy. This concept links Dellsén's initial work on scientific understanding, often focused on causal or nomological dependencies 8, to the more abstract and varied types of relations explored in philosophy. The criteria of "accuracy and comprehensiveness" provide normative benchmarks for evaluating philosophical endeavors aimed at mapping these intricate networks. **C. The Unique Contribution of "Enabling Noeticism"** EN's primary contribution lies in its formulation as a theory of *philosophical progress*. It links such progress directly to a specific, analyzable epistemic state: an increased understanding of dependency networks. The "enabling" component is particularly innovative, shifting the focus from the individual attainment of understanding to the collective enterprise of creating public resources—arguments, conceptual tools, distinctions, theories—that facilitate this understanding more broadly.3 This perspective aligns well with the nature of philosophy as a historically developed, communal, and discursive practice. By focusing on the facilitation of understanding dependency networks, EN offers a potentially more tractable and identifiable marker of progress than vaguer notions like "making sense" or even "solving problems," especially if problem-solutions are not themselves well understood. This emphasis on enabling understanding for others implicitly values the public, communicable, and pedagogical aspects of philosophical work. The "accuracy" criterion in EN, however, remains a point requiring further elucidation, especially when compared to non-factive accounts like Elgin's or Dellsén's own earlier anti-belief stance. Philosophical "phenomena" (e.g., justice, consciousness, knowledge) and the "dependence relations" between them (e.g., how justice depends on equality, or how knowledge depends on justification) are often highly abstract, normative, or contested. Defining what "accuracy" entails for representations of, for instance, the dependence relations between moral properties or metaphysical categories will be more complex than for empirical causal relations. This complexity points to a potential area for future development: specifying the criteria for accuracy across diverse philosophical domains, which might involve appeals to coherence, explanatory power within specific frameworks, or other non-correspondence virtues. **V. Conclusion** "Enabling Noeticism," as articulated by Dellsén, Firing, Lawler, and Norton, presents a compelling and innovative theory of philosophical progress centered on the enhancement of understanding, specifically defined as the accurate and comprehensive representation of networks of dependence relations. Rooted in Finnur Dellsén's earlier work on dependency modelling in science, and enriched by the diverse expertise of his co-authors, the theory situates itself within a vibrant contemporary landscape of philosophical accounts of understanding. The strengths of "Enabling Noeticism" are notable. It offers a clear, potentially unifying framework for what constitutes progress in a discipline often characterized by persistent disagreement. By linking progress to a well-defined epistemic state—the grasp of dependency networks—it provides a more concrete metric than many alternatives. Furthermore, its emphasis on "enabling" understanding aligns with the collaborative and public nature of philosophical inquiry, accommodating a wide range of philosophical activities (argumentation, conceptual analysis, model-building) as contributory to this aim. However, the theory also faces challenges and invites further development. Key among these is the need to precisely articulate and operationalize the criteria of "accuracy" and "comprehensiveness" for dependency networks in various philosophical domains, particularly those dealing with non-empirical, normative, or highly abstract phenomena. Clarifying how this accuracy requirement interacts with the use of idealized or simplified models in philosophical reasoning, and how it aligns with Dellsén's earlier arguments for understanding without belief, will be crucial. The specific mechanisms through which philosophical activities "enable" this particular kind of understanding also warrant more detailed exploration. "Enabling Noeticism" could significantly reframe debates about philosophical stagnation or the nature of philosophical disagreement. If progress is viewed as the collective endeavor of enabling a richer understanding of complex dependency networks, then disagreement and the proliferation of competing theories might be seen not merely as failures to converge on truth, but as integral parts of the process of exploring, mapping, and refining these multifaceted representations.4 The development of multiple, competing models of dependence, each perhaps increasingly comprehensive or accurate in particular respects or for specific purposes, could itself be indicative of progress. Future research could fruitfully explore the empirical question of whether and how specific philosophical interventions (e.g., new distinctions, arguments, or theoretical frameworks) actually lead to an increased capacity among philosophers or students to represent and reason about relevant dependency networks. Further conceptual work is needed on the nature of "dependence relations" as they manifest in distinct philosophical areas like ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology itself. The pedagogical implications of "Enabling Noeticism" are also rich, suggesting that philosophical education should perhaps focus more explicitly on cultivating the skills needed to identify, model, and evaluate networks of dependence. A further interesting question is how EN accounts for revolutionary philosophical progress, which might involve not just adding to existing maps of dependencies but fundamentally overturning and reconfiguring our understanding of how foundational concepts hang together. Ultimately, the success of "Enabling Noeticism" as a metaphilosophical theory may hinge on its own capacity to provide an accurate and comprehensive representation of the network of dependence relations between the core concepts it employs: 'philosophy', 'progress', 'understanding', 'dependency', 'accuracy', and 'enabling'. Its clarity, coherence, and explanatory power in illuminating these interconnections will serve as a testament to its own proposed criteria for philosophical advancement. **VI. References** * Baron, S., Dellsén, F., Firing, T., & Norton, J. (forthcoming). Philosophical Methodology: A Plea for Tolerance. *Analysis*. 3 * Dellsén, F. (2016). Scientific progress: Knowledge versus understanding. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A*, *56*, 72-83. 6 * Dellsén, F. (2017). Understanding Without Justification or Belief. *Ratio*, *30*(3), 239-254. 7 * Dellsén, F. (2020). Beyond Explanation: Understanding as Dependency Modelling. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, *71*(4), 1261–1286. 8" in a way that suggests it's the BJPS paper. Assuming 2020 is the correct publication year for the BJPS article based on typical journal timelines from acceptance to print/online availability. The user query also implies a 2020 or similar date for this key paper by using "Dellsén's (2020)" in the outline generation.) 8 * Dellsén, F., Firing, T., Lawler, I., & Norton, J. (2024). What is philosophical progress? *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *108*(2), 663-693. 3: 663-693 and year 2024\. User query also states 2024). 3 * Elgin, C. Z. (2004). True Enough. *Philosophical Issues*, *14*, 113-131. 37 * Elgin, C. Z. (2007). Understanding and the Facts. *Philosophical Studies*, *132*, 33-42. 37 * Elgin, C. Z. (2017). *True Enough*. MIT Press. 38 * Grimm, S. R. (2006). Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge? *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, *57*(3), 515-535. 14 * Grimm, S. R. (2011). Understanding. In S. Bernecker & D. Pritchard (Eds.), *The Routledge Companion to Epistemology* (pp. 84-94). Routledge. 66 (as an overview) * Grimm, S. R. (2012). Understanding as Knowledge of Causes. Unpublished manuscript. 2929 * Grimm, S. R. (Ed.). (2019). *Varieties of Understanding: New Perspectives from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology*. Oxford University Press. 48 * Hills, A. (2016). Understanding Why. *Noûs*, *50*(4), 661-688. 49 * Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (n.d.). *Understanding in Epistemology*. Retrieved from 1 * Khalifa, K. (2017). *Understanding, Explanation, and Scientific Knowledge*. Cambridge University Press. 25 * Kvanvig, J. L. (2003). *The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding*. Cambridge University Press. 31 * Lawler, I. (2024). Scientific understanding. In T. Knuuttila, N. Carrillo & R. Koskinen (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Scientific Modeling* (pp. 298-311). Routledge. 17 * Norton, J. (2023). Why philosophy needs a concept of progress. *Metaphilosophy*, *54*(1), 3-16. 4 * Pritchard, D. (2008). Knowing the Answer, Understanding, and Epistemic Value. *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, *77*, 325–339. 59 * Pritchard, D. (2009). Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value. *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements*, *64*, 19–43. 59 * Pritchard, D. (2010). Knowledge and Understanding. In D. Pritchard, A. Millar, & A. Haddock, *The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations* (pp. 3–90). Oxford University Press. 59 * de Regt, H. W. (2017). *Understanding Scientific Understanding*. Oxford University Press. 42 * de Regt, H. W. (n.d.). Understanding, Scientific. *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. (Implicit from context of other IEP entries) * Sellars, W. (1963). Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man. 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