# created ```dataview LIST WITHOUT ID file.link FROM -"windsurf" WHERE file.cday = date(this.file.name) AND !startswith(file.folder, "windsurf") SORT file.cday ASC ``` # modified ```dataview LIST WITHOUT ID file.link FROM -"windsurf" WHERE file.mday = date(this.file.name) AND !startswith(file.folder, "windsurf") SORT file.mday ASC ``` --- # [[diary and thoughts]] #thought #diary --- # [[Proof that I submitted my student loan information]] #lifeadmin ![[attachments/Screenshot [[2025-06-02]] at 17.24.05.png]] # Aesthetics of Engineering draft 2 Jun 2025 #paper/aestheticsofengineering #draft ## 1. Utensils vs. Machines Lowe (2016) introduces a distinction between utensils and machines. He defines 'utensils' as artefacts that, by their own nature, do nothing; instead, they are configured to be suitable for human use (Lowe 2014, p. 24). As he states: > A table or a hammer, it seems, does nothing at all by its own very nature: it is only configured in a way that makes it apt for us to use, so that we can do something with it. In this case, we alone are the doers, not the table or hammer. (Lowe 2014, p. 24) Consequently, for Lowe, utensils are not governed by any special, sortal-specific laws dictating their behaviour, beyond the general [[physical laws]] applicable to their constituent parts (Lowe 2014, p. 25). In contrast, Lowe characterises 'machines' as artefacts possessing an intrinsic principle of activity and governed by what he terms 'sortal-specific laws,' specifically [[engineering laws]]. These are distinct from general [[physical laws]] (Lowe 2014, p. 24). He explains: > My answer is that the members of such machine kinds all seem to embody a distinctive unifying principle of activity which is constrained by sortal-specific laws. The laws in question are, moreover, distinctively laws of engineering, not mere laws of ‘natural science’ or ‘physics’, in the entirely indiscriminate sense in which the latter concern the behaviour of physical systems quite generally, at all scales of size and mass from that of fundamental particles upwards. (Lowe 2014, p. 24) Machines are thus defined by their capacity for autonomous, law-governed operation. Lowe argues that [[this distinction]] is metaphysically significant: because machines possess an internal principle of activity governed by [[engineering laws]], they have a stronger claim to being ontologically robust, or 'real', than utensils, which he sees as more passively dependent on human users and intentions (Lowe 2014, pp. 17, 25-26). While Lowe's full metaphysical thesis is not our main concern, this claimed difference between utensils and machines suggests they might also be appreciated aesthetically in different ways. For example, we might aesthetically value a well-crafted knife (a utensil) for its balance and how effectively it extends our physical agency, whereas we might value a complex [[mechanical clock]] (a machine) for the ingenuity of its self-contained, law-governed movement, irrespective of our direct interaction with it. Lowe acknowledges that the utensil-machine distinction may not always be sharp. He notes the existence of borderline cases but maintains this does not undermine the distinction's value, stating: > Of course, this then raises [[the question]] of how sharp [[the machine]]/utensil distinction can credibly be said to be. To which I reply that, while there may indeed be borderline cases, so too are there between living and nonliving things, and that we should not allow the existence of borderline cases to undermine our belief in real distinctions. (Lowe 2014, p. 26) Lowe's analogy to living and non-living things is pertinent here. Just as we often aesthetically appreciate living organisms (e.g., the form of a running animal) differently from non-living natural objects (e.g., [[the structure]] of a crystal), the utensil/machine distinction, despite its fuzzy edges, might similarly ground distinct aesthetic approaches. The conceptual separation can therefore remain a useful tool for analysing the [[aesthetic properties]] of [[designed objects]]. ## 2. [[Functional Beauty]] This section aims to provide a clear and concise overview of [[Glenn Parsons]] and Allen Carlson’s influential theory of "functional beauty." Understanding their framework is important because it will serve as a key point of reference when we later explore how the aesthetics of engineering might require us to expand or adjust such general theories of functional appreciation. By first outlining their core ideas, we can then more effectively pinpoint where the specific characteristics of machines—as distinct from utensils—might introduce new considerations or highlight aspects that the original theory doesn't fully address. Parsons and Carlson argue that our aesthetic appreciation of functional objects is deeply connected to our understanding of their function. They suggest that we perceive objects through "functional categories," which help us identify certain non-aesthetic features as "standard" (necessary for the function), "variable" (present or absent without affecting category membership), or "contra-standard" (tending to disqualify an item from the category). This structured perception, in turn, can lead to an object "looking fit" for its function, appearing "elegant" or "streamlined" in its design, or possessing a "pleasing visual tension" if it functions despite some contra-standard features. For this aesthetic appreciation to occur, merely knowing _what_ an object’s function is (e.g., "this is an X-ray machine") is insufficient; one must understand _how_ it performs that function for its features to become aesthetically legible. Parsons and Carlson originally present this framework as broadly applicable across diverse functional objects, from a simple spoon or a chef's knife to complex items like a centrifugal pump or even a Gothic nave, analysing them within a single, continuous model of functional beauty once their proper function and mode of operation are grasped. However, the distinction between utensils and machines, as discussed in the previous section, introduces certain tensions for this domain-neutral approach. The idea that functional beauty applies uniformly is challenged when we consider objects like a bicycle, where an observer can switch their focus. One might appreciate the bicycle frame’s static form as "streamlined" (a utensil-like quality of fitness for human use), but then shift to admiring the crisp, law-governed action of its derailleur system (a machine-like quality of autonomous mechanical operation). Furthermore, Parsons and Carlson’s framework primarily discusses failure in terms of an object "looking unfit." Yet, in the case of machines, observers often register "malfunction"—a deviation from its designed operational laws—as a distinct and significant aesthetic flaw, which is different from a simple lack of fitness for purpose. When our attention turns specifically to machines, the clarity with which internal forces, loads, and feedback loops are made perceptually available becomes aesthetically important; for example, the transparent back of a mechanical watch gains merit by revealing the intricate workings of its escapement, making the very process of energy metering visible, while a centrifugal governor's aesthetic impact is fully realised only when its regulatory action is witnessed. The concepts of efficacy and efficiency also warrant further attention in the context of engineering aesthetics, a distinction that was noted in initial discussions but isn't a primary focus of Parsons and Carlson's original categories. Efficacy can be seen as a binary concept – an object either successfully performs its intended purpose or it does not. Efficiency, on the other hand, is a graded concept, relating to the degree to which an object achieves its purpose with minimal waste of energy, material, or motion. The aesthetic appreciation of engineered objects often centres on visibly optimised efficiency – such as the smooth, precise arcs of linkages in an engine, reduced operational vibration, or the perfectly timed opening and closing of valves in a motor – qualities that are not always straightforwardly captured by the idea of an object merely "looking fit" for its function, but rather point to a more nuanced appreciation of its refined performance. This brings us to the idea of "minimalist dynamism," an aesthetic quality particularly relevant to machines that operate under demanding conditions or tight energetic constraints. This refers to the perception of an object achieving its function with "just enough and no more"—no superfluous material, no wasted motion, and no unnecessary complexity in its energy pathways. Spectators often value this perceived lack of redundancy, finding beauty in the extreme economy of means. For instance, the design of a Formula 1 gearbox, which must handle immense torque with minimal mass, or the elegant simplicity of the Swiss lever escapement in a watch, which regulates time with a remarkably small number of precisely interacting parts, both exemplify this quality of minimalist dynamism. Considering these points, it seems Parsons and Carlson’s framework might be augmented to better accommodate the specific aesthetic features of machines. The original three registers—looking fit, elegance/streamlining, and visual tension—remain highly relevant, especially for utensil-centred appreciation or for the static aspects of machines. However, for machine-centred appreciation, particularly when observing them in operation, we might propose two additional aesthetic registers: "dynamic transparency," which refers to the degree to which a machine’s operation clearly reveals the underlying forces, laws, and causal pathways at play; and the aforementioned "minimalist dynamism," the perceived sufficiency of its functional elements without any discernible surplus. The hypothesis, to be explored further, is that the functional beauty framework can indeed encompass both utensils and machines if these additional registers are acknowledged, and if we allow that observers can shift their perceptual focus and evaluative criteria depending on the nature of the artefact and the context of appreciation.