# created ```dataview LIST WITHOUT ID file.link FROM -"windsurf" WHERE file.cday = date(this.file.name) AND !startswith(file.folder, "windsurf") SORT file.cday ASC ``` # modified ```dataview LIST WITHOUT ID file.link FROM -"windsurf" WHERE file.mday = date(this.file.name) AND !startswith(file.folder, "windsurf") SORT file.mday ASC ``` --- # [[diary and thoughts]] #thought #diary --- # Notes 1. LLMs have gotten better at reasoning. this is a big deal.  1. we might think that this puts citizens in a better position re propaganda than previously –we can use LLMs to analyse claims that might be 2. Mckenna: LLMs can be thought of as rationally persuasive technologies. "A rationally persuades B to adopt attitude α if: > (i) A brings it about that B adopts α, > (ii) A does so only by providing B with reasons for adopting α, > (iii) B adopts α based on recognizing some of the reasons given by A, > (iv) A intends each of (i)-(iii) (Mitchell, et al., [2024](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00146-025-02624-z#ref-CR47), 3). >[[The basic idea]] is simple enough: what is distinctive about rational modes of persuasion is that they involve *providing reasons for adopting a new attitude or changing one’s existing attitudes.* In their paper Mitchell and Douglas specify that by “reason” they mean a fact that counts in favour of (or against) the attitude in question ((Durmus 2024), 5). For example, the fact that it will reduce rates of transmission is a reason to support a vaccination programme, whereas the fact that it will have serious side-effects for many who take it is a reason not to support it, or at least to only support a limited rollout of it. 1. The new reasoning LLMs seem to be able to do exactly this: they provide text specifying reasons, and thye are getting better and better at arguing logically, as explained in 1. 2. Although McKenna does not believe that LLMs are better at reasoning than humans, he thinks issues arise regarding the scale and speed of LLMs to produce rationally persuasive arguments: > The first is that persuasive AI technologies have the potential to dominate the marketplace of arguments. For humans, contributing to the marketplace of arguments is time-consuming and labour-intensive—it involves coming up with new arguments, or finding ways of recycling old ones, and then looking for a way of getting those arguments disseminated more widely (e.g. publishing them somewhere where people will see them). Persuasive AI technologies provide a way of avoiding these time and labour constraints. The purveyors of persuasive AI technologies can generate huge numbers of “arguers for hire” (AI agents) or huge amounts of “persuasive content” within minutes, with any dilution in the quality of arguments often [[more than]] made up for by the massive increase in quantity. >The second reason is that [[not just]] anyone can create and run persuasive AI technologies. The resources—[[not just]] financial, but also in terms of infrastructure, skills, and knowledge—required to design and operate a LLM are massive, so much so that only a very small number of companies operate in this field, at least at [[the level]] relevant to the argument of this paper (e.g. Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepMind, Microsoft, Meta). This means that the barriers to entering the marketplace in this way are very high, so high that ordinary people cannot hope to meet them. 3. [[The idea]] I think is that by having control of rationality engines, powerful organisations have the power to create very many sound, true, rationally persuasive arguments, and then flood the marketplace of ideas with these so as to persuade the populace/the part of the population they are targetting with these arguments, thereby crowding out other good arguments 4. Now what McKenna describes here I think could be counted as propaganda. "A communicative act C counts as propaganda if, and only if... >(1) C conveys an epistemically defective message, in the broad sense that C implies or implicates a message that is false, inappropriate, or connected to other beliefs in ways that are inapt, misleading, or unwarranted, given C’s illocutionary and perlocutionary intents [Message] >(2) C is produced by, or on behalf of, a social or political institution, organization, or cause with the intention to persuade, for direct political ends [Sender] >(3) a socially significant group of people [Receiver] >(4) while the producer/s of C either is/are aware of the epistemic defectiveness of the message or should have been aware of such defectiveness [Awareness]. >(From Bonard, Contesi, Marques 2024) 5. A rationally persuasive argument, one that persuades someone to adopt a new attitude based on reasons, seems as if it could still be epistemically defective. 1. Sound, true arguments can still lead to beliefs being formed in inapt ways. Say through the omission of other relevant reasons **EXAMPLE** 2. MORE? ### brainstorm on why i think this isn't going to work - Imagine I employ an army of a million excellent sophists to rationally persuade the population that climate change isn't real. - Are you going to get a million, unique rationally persuasive arguments? [[This seems]] quite implausible to me. should it? - How many good (rationally persuasive) arguments against manmade climate change are there left to find? - We might say, well, these sophists might not come up with wholly original arguments but they would more thoroughly cover the conceptual terrain than someone with less sophists. - True, but are fine grained details going to make *that* much difference in terms of messages directed at the populace? - a second worry I have is with the fact that once an argument is out there, it is subject to rational consideration.