# ‘Folk psychology’ is not folk psychology - MATTHEW RATCLIFFE **Keywords:** extended cognition, folk psychology, interaction, intersubjectivity **Abstract:** . This paper disputes the claim that our understanding of others is enabled by a commonsense or ‘folk’ psychology, whose ‘core’ involves the attribution of intentional states in order to predict and explain behaviour. I argue that interpersonal understanding is seldom, if ever, a matter of two people assigning intentional states to each other but emerges out of a context of interaction between them. Self and other form a coupled system rather than two wholly separate entities equipped with an internalised capacity to assign mental states to the other. This applies even in those instances where one might seem to adopt a ‘detached’ perspective towards others. Thus ‘folk psychology’, as commonly construed, is not folk psychology. Key words: extended cognition, folk psychology, interaction, intersubjectivity What is ‘folk psychology’? The term ‘folk psychology’ is employed in philosophy and cognitive science to mean our commonsense, everyday ability to understand each other and negotiate the social world. Its main ingredient is usually taken to be an ability to assign intentional states (especially beliefs and desires) to humans and other organisms, in order to predict and/or explain their behaviour. For example, Scholl and Leslie state that “a theory of mind refers to the capacity to interpret, predict, and explain the behaviour of others in terms of their underlying mental states” (1999, p. 132).1 Frith and Happé (1999) similarly describe it as the ability to attribute “mental