# A NARROW REPRESENTATIONALIST ACCOUNT OF QUALITATIVE EXPERIENCE **Opening:** An increasing number of philosophers—for example, Lycan (1987, 1996), Harman (1990), Tye (1995), and Dretske (1995)—have proposed “Representationalist” theories of the qualitative character of especially sensory experience, according to which the apparent objects and properties of that experience are merely “representational” or “intentional” (I will use these terms interchangeably): they comprise the content of that experience without thereby being actually instantiated in the mind in the way that “Qualia Realists” (e.g. Block 1990, Chalmers 1996) claim.2 When, for example, someone experiences an oval green after-image, there isn’t any oval green object, or even any (instances of ) properties of looking oval or green that she’s somehow (intro)inspecting; there’s just an experience with the intentional content, to a first **Authors:** [[Georges Rey]]