# Aspect Perception After Wittgenstein Seeing-As and Novelty Edited **Opening (not a real abstract):** This volume brings together new essays that consider Wittgenstein’s treatment of aspect perception in relation to the idea of conceptual novelty broadly construed; that is, the acquisition or creation of new concepts and the application of an acquired understanding in unfamiliar or novel situations. Over the last 20 years, aspect perception has received increasing philosophical attention, largely related to applying Wittgenstein’s remarks on the phenomena of seeing-as, found in Part II of Philosophical Investigations (1953), to issues within philosophical aesthetics. Seeing-as, however, has come to occupy a broader conceptual category, particularly in philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology. The essays in this volume examine the exegetical issues arising within Wittgenstein studies, while also considering the broader **Authors:** [[Brendan Harrington, Dominic Shaw, and Michael Beaney]]