# Audible Independence and Binding **Opening (not a real abstract):** Audible Independence and Binding Casey OʼCallaghan Forthcoming in Phenomenology and the Neurophilosophy of Consciousness, ed. Richard Brown. In “What We Hear,” Jason Leddington (ms) argues against two claims about sounds and hearing. The first is that sounds are proper objects of hearing—that sounds are inaccessible to other senses. The second is that only sounds are heard directly—one hears sound sources only in virtue of hearing sounds. Leddingtonʼs main target is the second claim, so it is my focus. Leddingtonʼs case against the second claim turns on arguing against Phenomenological Independence, the claim that, as presented in auditory experience, sounds seem independent from ordinary material things and happenings. He claims that auditory experiences present sound sources as being available for primitive **Authors:** [[O'Callaghan]]