# Chromatic Illumination –Conscious Intentionality without Conscious Representation **Opening (not a real abstract):** In this paper we argue that phenomenological introspection reveals an aspect of conscious experience that hitherto has been largely unappreciated in philosophy of mind and in cognitive science: conscious appreciation of a large body of background information, and of the holistic relevance of this information to a cognitive task that is being consciously undertaken, without that information being represented by any conscious, occurrent, intentional mental state. We call this phenomenon chromatic illumination. We contend that this form of intentionality-involving conscious experience is ubiquitous, and that it plays a vital role in many conscious processes including belief formation, belief maintenance, common-sense practical rationality, and various other conscious phenomena such as understanding jokes. **Authors:** [[David Henderson, Terry Horgan, Matjaž Potrč, and Vojko Strahovnik]]