# Diachronic Unity and Temporal Transparency **Abstract:** Is it the case that, in order to have a perceptual experience as of change, duration, or any other temporally extended occurrence at all, the duration of the experience itself must come apart from the apparent duration of what is experienced? I shall argue that such a view is at least coherent. The largest part of the paper will be concerned with an objection from Ian Phillips (2010; 2014). The objection is interesting in so far as it is an argument from introspection. If it worked, it would give us a priori, non-empirical grounds for thinking that a cluster of views about temporal perception are wrong, or worse, impossible. I will argue, however, that the objection fails. Towards the end, I briefly explore the view that we have no introspective access at all to the duration of our experiences. I suggest that such a view may well be supported by some considerations about the phenomenal continuity of consciousness. Is it the case that, in order to have a perceptual experience as of change, duration, or any other temporally extended occurrence at all, the duration of the experience itself must come apart from the apparent duration of what is experienced?1 I shall argue that such a view is at least coherent. A full defence certainly involves the discussion of relevant empirical research; however, in this paper I shall focus on the philosophical side of the debate. As such, I set out to deal with a range of arguments from the literature. Some of these arguments purport to Corresp **Authors:** [[Diachronic Unity and]]