# Emotions as Attitudes **Abstract:** In this paper, we develop a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions are evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion–value connection at the level of content and that we should instead locate it at the level of attitudes or modes. We begin by explaining the contrast between content and attitude, a contrast in the light of which we review the leading contemporary accounts of the emotions. We next offer reasons to think that these accounts face substantial problems since they locate the link emotions bear to values at the level of content. This provides the incentive to pursue an alternative approach according to which emotions qualify as evaluations because they are specific types of attitudes, an approach we substantiate by appealing to felt bodily stances. We conclude by considering two reasons why this approach may be resisted; they respectively pertain to the alleged impossibility of drawing the attitude–content contrast in the case of the emotions and to the suspicion that so doing raises qualia-related worries. In view of the well-known problems associated with mainstream accounts that understand the evaluative nature of emotions in terms of their having an evaluative content, we have an incentive to explore an alternative approach. The aim of this paper is to recommend and defend our attitudinal theory of the emotions (Deonna and Teroni 2012), whose central claim is that the different types of emotions are distinc **Authors:** [[Deonna and Teroni]]