# Epistemic paternalism via conceptual engineering **Keywords:** epistemic paternalism, conceptual engineering, nudging, evidence suppression, epistemic autonomy **Abstract:** . The paper targets conceptual engineers who aim to improve other people’s patterns of inference and attention by shaping their concepts. Such conceptual engineers sometimes engage in a form of epistemic paternalism that I call “paternalistic cognitive engineering”: instead of explicitly persuading, informing and educating others, the engineers nonconsultatively rely on assumptions about the target agents’ cognitive systems to improve their belief-forming. The target agents could reasonably regard such benevolent exercises of control as violating their sovereignty over their own belief-formation. This is a pro tanto reason against such engineering. In addition to the relevant projects of conceptual engineering, paternalistic cognitive engineering plausibly includes certain kinds of nudging and evidence suppression. The paper distinguishes the sovereignty-based concern from other ethical worries about conceptual engineering and discusses how one might justify the relevant conceptual engineering projects despite the sovereignty-based reason against them. **Authors:** [[Eve Kitsik]]