# Events of coming to be and indeterminate existence **Opening (not a real abstract):** Events of coming to be and indeterminate existence The aim of this note is to amend an fallacious argument presented in a recent book by Ross Cameron (2015). The aim might seem modest – the argument is put forth in a somewhat casual and tentative way in the book –, but the fallacy has general interest. The argument’s premises are: (1) Time is gunky (viz., any temporal interval has proper parts); (2) Changes in existence are underwritten by Aristotelian events of ‘coming to be’; and its conclusion is: (C) There must be cases of indeterminate existence. It is useful to break Cameron’s reasoning into two parts. Here is the first one: [Consider arbitrary object A and] suppose A exists, but didn’t always exist. By (2) there must have been an event of A’s coming to be. Give (1), this event was not instantaneous.