# Fractured Phenomenologies: Thought Insertion, Inner Speech, and the Puzzle of Extraneity Peter Langland-Hassan **Abstract:** How it is that one’s own thoughts can seem to be someone else’s? After noting some common missteps of other approaches to this puzzle, I develop a novel cognitive solution, drawing on and critiquing theories that understand inserted thoughts and auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia as stemming from mismatches between predicted and actual sensory feedback. Considerable attention is paid to forging links between the first-person phenomenology of thought insertion and the posits (e.g. efference copy, corollary discharge) of current cognitive theories. I show how deficits in the subconscious mechanisms regulating inner speech may lead to a ‘fractured phenomenology’ responsible for the reports of inserted thoughts and auditory verbal hallucinations of schizophrenic patients. Supporting work on virtual environments is discussed, and lessons concerning the fixity of delusional belief are drawn. --------------------------------Earlier versions of this work were presented at Toward a Science of Consciousness in Tucson, Arizona, the Center for Experimental Psychology’s ‘Exploring the Boundaries of Experience and Self’ conference at Oxford, and at the CUNY Graduate Center’s Cognitive Science Symposium. Many thanks to the questioners in the audiences at all those events. Special thanks also to Joëlle Proust, Galen Strawson, Shaun Gallagher, and two referees for this journal for their helpful comments and suggestions. Address for correspondence: Department of Philosophy, The Gr **Authors:** [[Peter Langland-Hassan]]