# High Level Content and Multimodal Perception - current **Abstract:** In contemporary philosophy of perception, two currently flourishing topics include the high-level content debate and issues concerning the scope of perception’s multimodality. Surprisingly, each topic is typically addressed in isolation from the other. Notably, the question of whether there is high-level content in perception is largely debated within a unimodal (specifically visual) framework. But since multimodal perception is the norm, not the exception, the high-level content debate needs reorienting into the multimodal framework. Here, I aim to undertake such a reorientation via an examination of four multimodal illusions. I conclude that at least one of these, the rubber-hand illusion, supports postulating high-level perceptual content. This is good news for friends of highlevel content on a number of fronts, least of all because it supplies them with an empiricallygrounded response to those who deny high-level content on the basis that there are no perceptual illusions of high-level properties. I. Unimodal vs Multimodal Approaches to High-Level Content Let us assume that perception has content, i.e. that it attributes properties to objects and so represents the world as being some way. A matter we will need to settle is what properties can figure in that content. According to Conservatives (Byrne 2009; Price 2009; Brogaard 2013), perceptual content is limited to basic, ‘low-level’ sensibles:      Vision: colour, shape, spatial location and orientation Audition: lo **Authors:** [[High-Level Content and Multimodal Perception]]