# IN DEFENSE OF PERCEPTUAL CONTENT **Opening (not a real abstract):** This paper defends the thesis that perception is constitutively a matter of representing the environment. Content Thesis: A subject S’s perceptual state M brought about by being perceptually related to a particular α is constituted by content c in virtue of S representing α. The content thesis figures prominently in the work of thinkers as different as Evans (1982), Searle (1983), Peacocke (1983), McDowell (1994), Dretske (1995), Tye (1995), Chalmers (1996), and Byrne (2001) and can be traced back to at least Kant.1 It has, however, been questioned by austere relationalists such as Campbell (2002), Travis (2004), Soteriou (2005), Brewer (2006), Fish (2009), Logue (2012), and Genone (2014) among others.2 According to austere relationalists, perception is not representational, but rather constitutively a matter of **Authors:** [[Susanna Schellenberg]]