# INTROSPECTION, PHENOMENALITY AND THE AVAILABILITY OF INTENTIONAL CONTENT **Opening (not a real abstract):** California State University, Los Angeles I. I believe there’s a phenomenology – a “what it’s like” – of occurrent conscious thought. I believe this because I believe that any conscious state necessarily has phenomenal properties. Further, I believe that the phenomenology of occurrent conscious thought is proprietary: it’s a sui generis sort of phenomenology, as unlike (say) auditory and visual phenomenology as they are unlike each other – a cognitive phenomenology. I believe this because I believe that the conscious occurrence of any of the more familiar sorts of phenomenal properties is neither necessary nor sufficient for the occurrence of conscious thought. I also believe that the phenomenal character of a conscious occurrent thought is individuative: that is, in virtue of its having the phenomenal properties it has, it’s a thought (as opposed to some other kind of mental **Authors:** [[Pitt]]