# Illusionism and Givenness- Comments on Frankish* Jay L Garfield
**Abstract:** There is no phenomenal consciousness; there is nothing “that it is like” to be me. To believe in phenomenal consciousness or “what-‐it-‐is-‐like-‐ness” of “for-‐me-‐ness” is to succumb to a pernicious form of the Myth of the Given. I argue that there are no good arguments for the existence of such a kind of consciousness and draw on arguments from Buddhist philosophy of mind to show that the sense that there is such a kind of consciousness is an instance of cognitive illusion. Frankish argues that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion. I think he is right. Here I adduce a few other considerations in support of the thesis that—in the sense relevant to those who believe that there are phenomenal properties or concepts, or who believe that there is “something that it is like” to be conscious,” or that there is immediate experience, or that there are qualia, or that there is a “for-‐me-‐ness of experience; in short for anyone who subscribes to any of the currently popular forms of the Myth of the Given—there is no phenomenal consciousness. I will begin by querying the sense of the popular phrase introduced by Nagel (1974), “what it is like,” arguing that there is nothing that it is like to experience something, nothing that it is like to have qualitative experience. I will then ask whether the distinction between sentient beings and zombies demanded by those who believe in phenomenal properties makes any sense, arguing that if zombies are possible, we are all zombies. I