# In_Defense_of_Sounds_as_Properties **Opening (not a real abstract):** According to Locke, sounds are neither objects nor events, but “sensible qualities” (Locke 1975: II, viii, 14). Philosophical tradition follows suit: sounds are not particulars, but properties; not bits of worldly furniture, rather features of (some) such furniture. Call this the Property View of Sounds. Recently, the Property View has fallen out of favor, and a number of arguments against it have appeared in the literature.1 Happily for traditionalists, these arguments fail. Or so I will argue. This essay has five parts. In Part I, I sketch a widely-overlooked but intuitively plausible version of the Property View on which sounds are properties of events. In Parts II–IV, I show that this version is immune to the main objections recently leveled at the Property View. Still, the question remains: What are sounds? Part V canvasses the **Authors:** [[Jason Leddington]]