# On Explaining Why Time Seems to Pass Natalja Deng **Opening (not a real abstract):** On Explaining Why Time Seems to Pass Natalja Deng (Southern Journal of Philosophy 51/3: 367-382. Please cite final version, available at Introduction Contemporary metaphysics of time is shaped by the opposition between A- and B-theorists. Usually, the B-theory of time is taken to involve the claim that time does not, in reality, pass: on the B-theory, nothing really becomes present and then more and more past, times do not come into existence successively, and which facts obtain does not change. Instead, time consists of a succession of equally real times/events, standing in temporal relations to one another; and being ‘past’ or ‘present’, like being ‘there’ or ‘here’, is a matter of perspective. A-theories, by contrast, come in many varieties. One of the most popular kinds of A-theories is presentism, which is the **Authors:** [[Natalja Deng]]