# PERCEPTUAL BELIEF AND NONEXPERIENTIAL LOOKS (2) **Opening (not a real abstract):** How things look (or sound, taste, smell, etc.) plays two important roles in the epistemology of perception.1 First, our perceptual beliefs are epistemically justified, at least in part, in virtue of how things look. Second, whether a given belief is a perceptual belief, as opposed to, say, an inferential belief, is also at least partly a matter of how things look. Together, these yield an epistemically significant sense of ‘looks’. A standard view is that ‘‘how things look’’, in this epistemically significant sense, is a matter of one’s present perceptual phenomenology, of what nondoxastic experiential state one is in. On this standard view, these experiential states (a) determine which of my beliefs are perceptual beliefs and (b) are centrally involved in justifying these beliefs. As an alternative to this view, I want to argue that there is a nonexperiential sense of ‘look’ as well and that this sense of ‘look’ is at least as **Authors:** [[Jack Lyons]]