# Perception without propositions **Opening (not a real abstract):** In recent years, many philosophers have claimed that perceptual representations bear some kind of propositional content. If the baby in the stroller looks unhappy, then I have a visual perception of the baby that says, “The baby is unhappy”. If the tree on the left looks further away than the tree on the right, then I have a visual perception that says, “The tree on the left is further away than the tree on the right”. There are basically three motivations for this claim. The first is that perceptions can be correct or incorrect. The hypothesis that they bear propositional can be identified with the truth of the proposition it bears. The second has to do with the phenomenon of seeing-as. It is tempting to suppose that when one sees the duck-rabbit as a duck, one’s perception says, “That’s a duck”. The third **Authors:** [[Gauker]]