# Perceptual Experience - Intentionality without Representation **Abstract:** According to some philosophical accounts of perception (such as naïve realism), our perceptual experiences cannot be assessed for accuracy because they do not have intentional (or representational) contents. That is, perceptual experiences do not, themselves, make claims about the way the world is. Our perceptual experiences may, of course, give rise to certain beliefs about the way the world is, and these beliefs can be assessed for truth or accuracy. But it is only at the level of belief that questions about truth and accuracy come into play. On an alternative view, perceptual experiences are intentional (representational) states which can be assessed for accuracy. Proponents of this view – representationalists - therefore believe that questions about accuracy arise at the level of perceptual experience itself. Working under the assumption that our account of perception should be compatible with a physicalist/ naturalistic metaphysics, I argue that perceptual experiences cannot legitimately be assessed for accuracy, even though they are intentional states as the representationalist claims. 1