# Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Recollection (Chapter) Soteriou **Opening (not a real abstract):** Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Recollection Just as it is intuitive to think that a bodily sensation of pain is something that only a phenomenally conscious subject can feel, it is also intuitive to think that perceptually imagining something is an activity that only a phenomenally conscious subject can engage in. Under the category of perceptual imagination I have in mind acts of visual- izing,hearing in one’s mind’s ear,and so on,as well as acts of imagining (from the inside, as one might put it) feeling a sensation and performing an action.In particular,I think it is natural to hold the following: one couldn’t be engaged in the activity of perceptually imagining something without the occurrence of phenomenally conscious events, and the phenomenal character of the mental events involved determine, at least in part, and in some important way, the kind of mental activity one is