# Perceptual knowledge of nonactual possibilities - October 11 **Opening (not a real abstract):** It is widely assumed that sense perception cannot deliver knowledge of nonactual (metaphysical1) possibilities. So, for example, we aren’t supposed to be able to know that some proposition p is necessary (◻p) or that p is possible (◇p) (if p is false), by sense perception. The chief aim of this paper is to argue that the role of sense perception is not so limited. I argue that lots of our modal knowledge is perceptual. We can know lots of modal facts by perception. These include facts concerning necessity and impossibility, and not just facts concerning possibility and contingency. Granting a familiar distinction between direct and indirect perceptual knowledge, I then suggest that a narrower, but still interesting, range of modal knowledge is directly perceptual. Specifically, visual experiences can provide direct knowledge of **Authors:** [[Margot Strohminger]]