# Phenomenal Objectivity and Phenomenal Intentionality- In Defense of a Kantian Account **Opening (not a real abstract):** Perceptual experience has the phenomenal character of encountering a mindindependent objective world. What we encounter in perceptual experience is not presented to us as a state of our own mind. Rather, we seem to encounter facts, objects, and properties that are independent from our mind. In short, perceptual experience has phenomenal objectivity. Phenomenal objectivity distinguishes perceptual experience from those types of experience, for example mood experiences, that have the phenomenal character of presenting to one only the states of one’s own mind. An account of phenomenal objectivity would be useful to believers in phenomenal intentionality—a form of intentionality that is constituted by phenomenality. This chapter proposes and defends a Kantian account of phenomenal objectivity. **Authors:** [[Phenomenal Objectivity and]]