# Phenomenality and Self-Consciousness Charles Siewert **Opening (not a real abstract):** Phenomenality and Self-Consciousness Charles Siewert For: Phenomenal Intentionality Past and Present, U. Kriegel, ed., OUP DRAFT September 4, 2011 1. Introduction Does consciousness essentially include self-consciousness? How you answer may determine your basic view of consciousness and its relation to intentionality. For example, if you say yes, you may think this paves the way to accounting for consciousness in terms of a self-directed, inward-pointing intentionality: consciousness not only includes but is exhausted by a kind of selfconsciousness—that is, a way in which a mind refers to or represents itself. On the other hand, you may object that consciousness—at least in the phenomenal sense—either does not necessarily involve self-consciousness at all, or else not in a way that licenses us to absorb consciousness into self-representation; if **Authors:** [[Charles Siewert]]