# Philosophical Methodology: From Data to Theory **Authors**: John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer-Landau **Publisher**: Oxford University Press, 2022 --- ## Introduction: The Nature of Inquiry The book opens by situating philosophical inquiry within the broader context of theoretical investigation: > "This book is an attempt to understand philosophical inquiry." The authors frame philosophy's historical self-doubt through Kant's famous metaphor of metaphysics as: > "a battlefield of endless controversies" They cite Peter Godfrey-Smith's observation about philosophy's methodological anxiety: > "All of philosophy is plagued with discussion and anxiety about how philosophical work should be done..." The authors also invoke Sherlock Holmes's methodological principle: > "No data yet... It is a capital mistake to theorize before you have [them]." ### The Two-Stage Model of Inquiry The authors propose that theoretical inquiry has two stages: 1. **Stage One: Data Collection** — gathering considerations that must be handled 2. **Stage Two: Theorizing** — constructing and evaluating theories A theory is defined as a set of claims about a domain that handles the data by accommodating and explaining them. ### Methods as Criteria A method comprises criteria that serve a dual role: - Providing instructions for theory construction - Serving as standards for theory evaluation A method is called "sound" just in case: > "satisfaction of its criteria thereby positions inquirers to achieve an ultimate proper goal of inquiry" --- ## Chapter 1: The Structure of Inquiry ### The Goals of Inquiry The authors draw on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, proposing that: > "an ultimate proper goal of theoretical inquiry is the acquisition of epistêmê—where this is not mere ordinary knowledge, but a special kind of epistemic ideal that many commentators designate with the term 'understanding.'" They cite Peirce's phrase for one possible goal of inquiry: > "the fixation of belief" They define an "ultimate proper goal" as one whose realization is: > "sufficient to resolve inquiry in a fully successful way, reaching the point at which, to put it simply, there is no more work to be done" On proper goals of inquiry: > "When the activity is theoretical inquiry, undertaken for its own sake, success or excellence does not consist in scoring points, winning accolades, or cultivating good habits. Rather, it resides in making an intellectual improvement, in the form of an epistemic or alethic achievement. In our view, this is the têlos of inquiry; it is what inquiry is for." ### Why Knowledge Is Not Enough The authors argue that ordinary knowledge fails to resolve inquiry: > "For such an achievement might be gained on the basis of testimony or rote memorization, rendering it compatible with obliviousness to the considerations that support or explain the answer. Ordinary knowledge is also congruent with messes or tangles, as when new information does not resolve cognitive dissonance, but instead induces it. In either case, inquiry isn't finished." Knowledge can incorporate confusion: > "A grade-school class might know that π is the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter, while being confused about the concept ratio. For instance, they could mistakenly conceive of a ratio as (say) something whose decimal expansion must terminate or repeat." ### Theoretical Understanding: Six Features A theory that provides understanding must possess six properties: 1. **Accurate** — "largely inaccurate theories will fail to dispel confusion (a characteristic of misunderstanding)" 2. **Reason-based** — "positively supported by considerations, beyond mere coherence, that speak in favor of its accuracy. For in the absence of such support, signing on to the theory would be arbitrary or haphazard (again, a characteristic of misunderstanding)" 3. **Robust** — "answering a multitude of questions about the most important features of the domain under investigation. A theory that neglects or dodges such questions leaves out just what's needed to yield comprehension" 4. **Illuminating** — "its answers must at least sometimes be not just general but also genuinely explanatory, going beyond a mere description of those features to explain why each exists or is instantiated" 5. **Orderly** — "not simply offering such feature-specific explanations but also affording a broader view of the domain by revealing how those (and other) features, as well as the proposed explanations, gel or hang together—for example, by exposing basic relations or systematic connections among them. Such a theory avoids miscellany, the paradigm of which is a mere list, which says nothing about how, if at all, its various items are ordered or organized" 6. **Coherent** — "not only internally but also externally, fitting well with a wide range of understanding-providing theories of other domains. A theory of one subject matter that massively conflicts with a coherent cluster of accurate, reason-based, robust, illuminating, and orderly theories of other domains does not further comprehension but muddles it" The first four features are fundamental; the latter two contribute conditionally: > "The orderliness and coherence of a theory contribute to its ability to supply understanding only if the theory possesses the other four features to at least some extent. In this way, these first four are fundamental to understanding in a way that the final pair are not." ### Against Chalmers on Convergence The authors reject Chalmers' view that collective convergence on truth is the goal: > "Convergence on the truth closes inquiry only when it is accompanied by understanding. In this sense, it is aiming for mere agreement on the truth that would be 'something of a lowering of our sights.'" --- ## Chapter 2: Philosophical Data ### Four Features of Data The authors identify four basic features that characterize data: 1. **Starting points** — "inputs, not outputs, of such theorizing. In this respect, the data in a given domain bear an asymmetrical relation to theorizing about that domain" 2. **Inquiry-constraining** — "comprise a data set that functions to anchor a given theoretical inquiry to its subject matter, the domain that such inquiry is about" 3. **Collected** — through various procedures and sources 4. **Neutral** — "There are two respects in which this is so. The first is that data are non-factive, at least insofar as a particular datum might be mistaken. Even if a pool of data is on the whole correct, there are sometimes errors in the data... The second respect in which data are neutral is that they function as common currency among theorists." ### Examples of Philosophical Data The authors provide concrete examples: > "in philosophy of language, it is a datum that a user of a proper name sometimes knows next to nothing about the person being named; in philosophy of perception, that we sometimes suffer vivid illusions and hallucinations; in philosophy of action, that some attempts are unsuccessful; in metaethics, that moral judgments are intimately connected to action; in aesthetics, that certain works of art are masterpieces; in feminist philosophy, that a range of social practices and institutions promote the interests of men over women" ### The Theory-Ladenness of Data On responding to theory-ladenness concerns: > "the idea of the data's being 'theory-laden' could mean that the data are infused with a theory, or instead partial to a theory. These are importantly different. But neither, we think, is inherently troublesome." ### Against Strict Neutrality On rejecting Williamson's "Strict Neutrality": > "the main problem with Strict Neutrality as applied to data is not that it is overkill, but that it dooms inquiry. Given philosophers' ability to come up with reasons to doubt even the most obvious claims, few if any considerations could garner the type of consensus demanded by this thesis. Strict Neutrality shrinks the data to a vanishing point, thereby undermining the very possibility of inquiry." ### Three Inadequate Theories of Data **1. The Sociological Theory** — data are what inquirers provisionally agree upon Problem: "inquirers' agreements do not determine what belongs to a domain" The authors cite Rorty critically: the sociological theory allows that data: > "closely track 'what our peers let us get away with.'" **2. The Metaphysical Theory** — data are constitutive features of reality Problem: "the metaphysical theory implies that the data are never mistaken, which directly contradicts the non-factivity—and so the neutrality—of data" **3. The Psycho-Linguistic Theory** — data are claims about appearances or language use Problem: "The psycho-linguistic theory makes a mockery of much legitimate philosophical inquiry, which in the paradigm case explores the nature and status of the denizens of a non-psychological, non-linguistic reality. Philosophers are striving to answer such questions as whether God exists, or whether a priori knowledge is possible, or whether there are objective aesthetic and moral facts. We misconstrue the philosophical enterprise and are bound to fail to answer its central questions if we focus exclusively on claims about our psychological states or the language we happen to use to explore these questions." --- ## Chapter 3: The Epistemic Theory of Data ### The Epistemic Reasons Theory The authors' preferred view: > "Epistemic Reasons Theory: φ is a datum regarding domain D if, only if, and because φ is about D, φ does not belong to any well-formed theory of D, and inquirers, considered collectively, have good reason to believe φ." A "good reason" is characterized as an undefeated epistemic reason for belief that: - Would not be easily defeated by competing considerations - Whose possession implies possession of at least some evidence The relevant reasons are broadly social: > "On the view of data that we are developing, the relevant reasons are broadly social in the sense that they are reasons for inquirers considered collectively." ### The Process of Data Collection Data collection has three components: - **Inputs** — whatever is potentially relevant to answering central questions - **Outputs** — the data themselves - **Procedures** — ways of moving from inputs to outputs Procedures comprise: - **Sources** — ways of forming thoughts about inputs - **Techniques** — applications of sources to inputs Examples of data collection procedures: > "Perception of items in one's environment; Introspection of one's own phenomenal states; Intuitions about thought experiments; Linguistic judgments about the grammaticality, meaning, or truth-conditions of sample sentences; Common sense verdicts about what exists, is known, etc.; Imagining future possibilities; Inductive inference from observed samples; Sociological observations about ordinary conversations; Attending to the testimony of members of marginalized or oppressed groups; Statistical analyses of survey results; Selecting, implementing, and analyzing a model of a scenario; Searching for the origins of a practice through archival study; Interpreting a text using particular hermeneutics" The authors advocate: > "a discriminate pluralism, which recognizes multiple procedures possessing varying degrees of authority" ### Core Data in Metaethics The authors provide examples of core data in metaethics: - **Correlation**: "How things are morally is correlated with how things are non-morally" - **Independence**: "Some moral demands hold regardless of what the subjects of those demands think, feel, desire, hope, fancy, etc." - **Inescapability**: "Some moral demands and reasons are inescapable with respect to normative assessment" - **Priority**: "Moral demands and reasons sometimes have priority over non-moral ones" - **Non-Arbitrariness**: "Morality is not arbitrary" - **Non-Contingency**: "It's not deeply contingent that some things have the moral features they do" - **Practicality**: "Moral judgments have marks of practical attitudes: they direct, guide, and motivate action" - **Declarative**: "Moral judgments have marks of declarative attitudes: they are predicative, truth-evaluable, and apt for inference" - **Grasp**: "Moral agents sometimes grasp, or are duly placed to grasp, moral reality" - **Fallibility**: "Moral agents can be mistaken about moral reality" - **Evident**: "Some moral claims are evident, sometimes highly so" - **Agreement**: "There is widespread moral agreement about a range of moral issues" - **Disagreement**: "There is widespread moral disagreement, some of which may be unresolvable" ### Data Imposters and Data Disablers **Imposters**: putative data that aren't genuine — "discovering that there is not, despite appearances, a good reason to believe a given claim, at least among inquirers considered collectively. Such claims are not data but imposters." **Disablers**: considerations that legitimately defeat a genuine datum > "C disables a datum for a set of inquirers if and only if C provides them with good reason either to believe that the datum is mistaken or to suspend judgment with respect to it, and this reason is at least as strong as the reason(s) for believing that datum." The authors note: > "Data are the lifeblood of philosophical inquiry, neutral starting points that serve as inputs to theorizing." --- ## Chapter 4: The Question of Method ### The Question of Method > "The question of method arises in part because, as we've noted, the data do not by themselves select a single theory, let alone one primed to resolve inquiry. To answer the question of method is, among other things, to address such underdetermination of theory by data." The authors acknowledge skeptics and anarchists: > "Some thinkers believe that there is no answer at all to the question of method: such skeptics deny the existence of a method that will, in suitable conditions, lead philosophers who follow it from the data to understanding. Others think that there is no principled answer to this question: such anarchists contend that the best strategy for attaining inquiry's ultimate proper goal is simply for whoever to do whatever, however, whenever, wherever, whyever." ### Two Data About Method **1. The Friendliness Datum** — philosophical method is friendly to: - Advancing arguments - Raising objections - Offering replies to objections - Providing clarification - Developing explanations - Displaying sensitivity to logic, mathematics, science, and common sense > "it is fair to say that a set of criteria for theory construction and evaluation in philosophy that is unfriendly to one or more of the activities listed above is best classified as either incorrect, incomplete, or revisionary" **2. The Determinativeness Datum** — a sound method must be: > "determinative only if its criteria select among multiple theories all of which fit the data, ruling a great many of them out of contention. Determinativeness addresses the underdetermination of theory by data." ### The Virtues Datum A sound philosophical method must be: - **Comprehensive**: "calls for theories to address not just a single consideration, or type of consideration, but a wide range of data" - **Support-requiring**: "delivers a theory that is epistemically well-supported by positive considerations that speak on its behalf" - **Synoptic**: "ensures that whichever theory it favors is best positioned to expose systematic relationships, including explanatory ones, in the subject matter in question" - **Multidimensional**: "incorporates multiple criteria" - **Hierarchical**: "recognizes that criteria play diverse roles, and that some roles possess more significance than others" - **Comparative**: "enables assessment of both individual and relative merits of rival theories" ### Four Extant Methods **1. Method of Analysis** > "When constructing a theory about a given domain, theorists ought to identify a set of theses about the domain that provide analyses of its central terms, concepts, or properties, where such analyses meet some sufficiently high standard. The best theory is the one whose proposed analyses meet this standard to the highest degree relative to rivals." **2. Method of Argument** > "When constructing a theory about a given domain, theorists ought to identify a set of theses about the domain that are the conclusions of arguments whose premises and inferences meet some sufficiently high standard. The best theory is the one whose central theses are supported in this way to the highest degree relative to rivals." **3. Cost-Benefit Method** Drawing on Armstrong's phrase: "an intellectual cost-benefit analysis" > "When constructing a theory about a given domain, theorists ought to identify a set of theses about the domain that possess a high ratio of positive features (benefits) to negative ones (costs), where these features are in themselves roughly equal and aggregative. The best theory is the one that achieves the highest such ratio relative to rivals." The authors reference Enoch's language of "tallying plausibility points" **4. Method of Reflective Equilibrium** Following Rawls: > "When constructing a theory about a given domain, theorists ought to attend to their considered judgments that address the central questions about the domain, seeking to achieve coherence between their considered judgments (at any level of generality) and principles that account for them through a reflective process of modification, addition, and abandonment of either the judgments or principles in case of conflict (with each other, or with any of their other relevant convictions). The best theory is the one that achieves such coherence to the highest degree relative to rivals." ### Problems with Extant Methods On the Cost-Benefit Method: > "At the root of the trouble is the Cost-Benefit Method's tolerance for illicit trade-offs, stemming from the method's signature commitment to treating 'plausibility points' as roughly equal and aggregative. When it comes to understanding, it is far from clear that a gain with respect to one criterion compensates for losses with respect to others." On Reflective Equilibrium: > "the method opens the door to systematic theories whose claims are unsupported by any consideration, beyond coherence, that speaks in their favor" The authors cite Sellars' criticism that outputs which rest on coherence alone belong: > "in a box with rumors and hoaxes" On Scanlon's defense of Reflective Equilibrium: > "[I]t seems to me that this method, properly understood, is in fact the best way of making up one's mind about moral matters and about many other subjects. Indeed, it is the only defensible method; apparent alternatives to it are illusory." The authors respond: > "The last claim of this passage strikes us as incorrect." --- ## Chapter 5: The Tri-Level Method ### Overview > "We endorse the method not because it makes a philosopher's job easy; indeed, it is quite demanding. Nor are we drawn to its constituent criteria because they revolutionize philosophical thinking; on the contrary, all of them are familiar from the way many philosophers go about their business. However, they have not yet been combined, integrated, and clarified in a way that reveals how their conjunction can promote inquiry's ultimate proper goal: theoretical understanding." ### The Method Stated > "Tri-Level Method: When constructing a theory of a given domain, theorists ought to articulate a set of theses about the domain that (i) accommodate and explain the data, (ii) are themselves substantiated and integrated, and (iii) possess specific theoretical virtues. All of the criteria at the first two levels, given by (i) and (ii), include escape clauses. Each level takes priority over its successors. The best theory is the one that satisfies the criteria at these levels (so ordered) to the highest degree relative to its rivals." ### Level One: Handling the Data **Criterion 1: Accommodation** > "Accommodation Criterion: A theory of a given domain must accommodate the data in that domain, or at least give an adequate defense of the claim that those data require no such accommodation" A theory T "accommodates" a datum just in case that datum is likely to hold or be true, given T. **Criterion 2: Explanation** > "Explanation Criterion: A theory of a given domain must explain the data in that domain, or at least give an adequate defense of the claim that those data require no such explanation" A theory T "explains" φ just in case T invokes some ψ such that φ holds or is true because ψ holds or is true. The two criteria are distinct: > "These criteria also potentially diverge, at least insofar as a theory may render a datum likely without explaining it." On minimal adequacy: > "a theory is minimally adequate, standing a chance of facilitating understanding of the domain, only if it does modestly well with respect to both criteria at level one" ### Level Two: Grounding the Theory **Criterion 3: Substantiation** > "Substantiation Criterion: A theory of a given domain must substantiate its claims and commitments, or at least give an adequate defense of the claim that it is not required to do so." Substantiation = defense + explanation of the theory's own claims and commitments Two types of defense: - **Primary**: "provision of positive epistemic support for a given claim" - **Secondary**: "responding to genuine objections to one's views... By diagnosing and adequately replying to objections, this sort of defense can buttress the positive case" The rationale: > "a theory affords greater understanding of its target to the extent that it substantiates its claims and commitments. By defending its claims and commitments, a view becomes reason-based; by explaining its claims and commitments, it adds robustness and overall illumination." **Criterion 4: Integration** > "Integration Criterion: A theory of a given domain must ensure that its claims and commitments integrate with each other and our best picture of the world, or at least give an adequate defense of the claim that the absence of such integration is unproblematic" A theory T "integrates" with φ to the extent that T is not just consistent with but coheres with φ. "Our best picture of the world" includes: > "those uncontroversial claims furnished by common sense and our best physics, biology, chemistry, medicine, logic, and mathematics" On respectability: > "Suppose that a minimally adequate theory also manages to do modestly well with respect to the criteria at level two. Then, and only then, is the theory 'respectable,' being on track to deliver a modest level of understanding." ### Level Three: Highlighting the Virtues **Criterion 5: Virtue** > "Virtue Criterion: All else being equal, a theory of a given domain must be more theoretically virtuous than rival theories." This criterion plays only a tie-breaking role: > "We interpret the prefatory clause 'all else being equal' to signify that the Virtue Criterion plays just a tie-breaking role, and does so only when two conditions are in place: (i) the candidate theories are all respectable, doing at least modestly well at levels one and two; and (ii) the candidates are roughly equal—that is, more or less on a par—with respect to the four criteria at those levels." ### Against Theoretical Virtues as Primary The authors argue against simplicity as primary through the solipsism example: > "Solipsism is, on at least one construal of simplicity, a much simpler theory than one that posits you and your mental states plus an external world, distinct from you, inhabited by some untold number of types of entities and tokens of those types. And yet solipsism is a crazy view. It is crazy largely because it so thoroughly disregards the data that any view regarding what there is must accommodate and explain" The core claims: > "(i) None of the theoretical virtues, either by itself or in tandem with others, is such that its possession contributes to or enhances the view's capacity to provide understanding of its subject matter. > (ii) Once the Accommodation, Explanation, Substantiation, and Integration Criteria are satisfied at least modestly well, then a view's exemplifying a theoretical virtue does contribute to or enhance the view's capacity to provide understanding of its subject matter." ### Brief Illustration: Mind-Body Problem > "According to the identity theory, each type of mental state is identical with a type of brain state; by contrast, dualism maintains that mental states cannot be wholly accounted for by physical states, including brain states." On level two: > "while both theories appear to be internally coherent, dualism is alleged to conflict with our best science, whereas the identity theory is alleged to conflict with common sense" ### Types of Objections Illuminated The method characterizes what counts as an objection: > "A consideration is an objection to a philosophical theory if, only if, and because that consideration provides reason to think that the theory does poorly in some regard with respect to one or more of the Tri-Level Method's criteria." The authors provide a taxonomy: - **"Not really a theory, incomplete"** — fails Accommodation and Explanation Criteria - **"Descriptively inadequate, counterintuitive, phenomenologically off-key"** — fails Accommodation Criterion - **"Explanatorily inadequate, impoverished, unilluminating"** — fails Explanation Criterion - **"Ad hoc, unmotivated"** — fails defense component of Substantiation - **"Mysterious, stops too soon"** — fails explanation component of Substantiation - **"Circular"** — fails Substantiation Criterion - **"Untenable, implausible, contravenes science or common sense"** — fails Integration Criterion - **"Unparsimonious, inelegant, ugly, unruly, unnatural, intractable"** — would fail Virtue Criterion if applicable ### The Method's Distinctive Features > "the Tri-Level Method instructs theorists to craft their views as well and fully as they can, rather than to simply exchange arguments and objections with their rivals, as sometimes happens when theorists merely shift burdens of proof or fixate on admissible moves within a given dialectic" > "the method instructs philosophers to focus not on other theories, but rather on handling the data, first and foremost" --- ## Chapter 6: Philosophical Progress ### The Problem of Progress The authors quote Russell's famous worry from *The Problems of Philosophy*: > "If you ask a mathematician, a mineralogist, a historian, or any other man of learning, what definite body of truths has been ascertained by his science, his answer will last as long as you are willing to listen. But if you put the same question to a philosopher, he will, if he is candid, have to confess that his study has not achieved positive results such as have been achieved by other sciences." And Kant's metaphor: > "a battlefield, and indeed one that appears to be especially determined for testing one's powers in mock combat; on this battlefield no combatant has ever gained the least bit of ground, nor has any been able to base any lasting possession on his victory. Hence there is no doubt that up to now the procedure of metaphysics has been a mere groping..." ### Four Questions About Progress 1. **Existential Question**: Has philosophy actually made noetic progress with respect to its central questions? 2. **Comparative Question**: Is there noetic progress in philosophy comparable to progress made by other fields? 3. **How-To Question**: How is it possible for philosophy to make noetic progress? 4. **Evaluative Question**: How is it possible to attain a principled evaluation of philosophy's noetic progress? > "if our method-oriented diagnosis above is correct, providing such a method is also required to answer the first pair of questions in a fully satisfying way. So, although the existential and comparative questions have received the bulk of the attention in recent literature, we submit that the how-to and evaluative questions identify the root of the problem." ### Inference to the Understanding-Provider > "Inference to the Understanding-Provider (IUP): If a respectable theory satisfies the Tri-Level Method's criteria to the highest degree relative to its rivals, then (ceteris paribus) inquirers have strong reason to accept that theory over those rivals." ### Fundamental vs. Foremost Questions A key distinction: > "The first are the fundamental questions of a field, whose resolutions are among the field's ultimate (perhaps even constitutive) aims at any time. The second are a field's foremost questions at a specific time, which are not." Philosophy has made substantial progress on foremost questions even if fundamental questions remain open: > "When people query progress in philosophy, they tend to emphasize the absence of answers regarding its fundamental questions. This tendency misses the possibility that there have been significant advances with respect to foremost questions" > "By contrast, when people extol progress in the sciences, they often refer to the many advances regarding its foremost questions, passing over the fact that the fundamental ones remain open." > "This familiar dynamic rests on a double standard that is so pervasive as to be nearly invisible." ### Shared Frameworks Even amid disagreement, philosophers share substantial common ground: > "Philosophers thinking self-consciously about their discipline are often attuned to the debates therein. But they shouldn't overlook the vast agreement that subserves those debates. This agreement operates as a common framework, whose elements constitute a partial view of the domain under investigation. The (typically controversial) theories at the center of philosophical debates build on these shared frameworks." ### Four Forms of Noetic Progress 1. **Identifying deep difficulties** with previously accepted views > "Edmund Gettier's counter-examples deflated the JTB analysis of knowledge; logical positivism was undone by work that revealed the self-undermining character of its verifiability criterion; hedonism has been dogged by the specter of Robert Nozick's experience machine; endorsement of the logical problem of evil has largely disappeared, owing to Alvin Plantinga's exposure of its vulnerabilities; after the incisive analyses of Helen Longino and others, the longstanding notion that science is wholly value-free has breathed its last." 2. **Articulating distinctions** that enable better theorizing > "Our understanding of the mind has substantially improved as a result of regimenting the difference between phenomenal and access consciousness. Prizing apart varieties of simplicity (e.g., ontological, qualitative, ideological, syntactic, etc.) promotes a better understanding of its role(s) in theory choice. The fourfold Hohfeldian division among types of rights and their correlative duties has assisted inquirers in cutting through various ambiguities and confusions when theorizing about these normative relations." 3. **Incrementally improving** existing theories > "The proto-utilitarianism of Hume, or even the codified formulation offered by Bentham, is far less sophisticated and comprehensive than the consequentialist theory available in Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics. Similarly, today's versions of metaethical expressivism are light-years ahead of the non-cognitivist views they descend from." 4. **Expanding important possibilities** > "Examples here are also abundant, and include W. D. Ross' theory of prima facie duties in normative ethics, Ernest Sosa's and Linda Zagzebski's virtue epistemologies, Ruth Barcan Marcus' contributions to modal logic, and Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach to well-being." ### Example: Moral Reasons and Motivation The authors list truths contemporary metaethicists have established about the connection between moral reasons and motivation: > "Something is a motivation only if it is capable of contributing to an explanation of an agent's action." > "There is a distinction between (at least) two types of motivation: a certain type of mental state, such as desire, that plays a causal role in action (a 'motivator'), and a consideration in the light of which one acts (a 'motivating reason')." > "Motivators and motivating reasons are both distinct from normative reasons, which are considerations that favor some response." > "A consideration is a good motivating reason if and because it is also a strong, undefeated normative reason." > "Something is a moral reason only if it is a normative reason." These claims are: > "All thirteen of these claims are reason-based, and with respect to the connection between moral reasons and motivation, they are, when taken together, accurate, robust, illuminating, coherent, and orderly. Although they comprise only a partial view of their target, they already jointly realize the six features of theoretical understanding, and so represent substantial noetic progress regarding a foremost question of contemporary metaethics." ### Example: Philosophy of Perception Truths contemporary philosophers of perception have established: > "Seeing is not believing: perceiving an object as having some feature does not require believing that the object has that feature." > "Perceiving o's being F requires more than perceiving o and perceiving F." > "Perceiving o's being F is not identical to knowledge that o is F, though it can serve as the basis for such knowledge." > "Perception can ground de re reference and singular thought." > "Perception is at least sometimes theory-laden." > "Experts perceive more or better than novices at least partly because the former possess a richer conceptual repertoire than the latter." ### The Role of the Tri-Level Method The method explains why progress has occurred: > "By endorsing all thirteen claims regarding the connection between moral reasons and motivation, contemporary metaethicists are better positioned than their predecessors to accommodate and explain data about such reasons. They have also substantiated and integrated these claims to a greater extent than those asserted by earlier views." The method explains why progress has been slow on fundamental questions: > "philosophers have not constructed well-substantiated views that accommodate and explain most or all of the data regarding the subject matters of the fundamental questions in a manner that is internally and externally integrated" ### Conclusion > "Even if there is in this sense no 'end' to philosophy, were theorists to satisfy the method's criteria to a high degree, this would secure noetic progress with respect to the subject matters of those questions." --- ## Key Concepts Summary | Term | Definition | |------|------------| | **Data** | Considerations inquirers have good epistemic reason to believe about a domain | | **Theory** | A set of claims that handles the data by accommodating and explaining them | | **Method** | Criteria for theory construction and evaluation | | **Sound Method** | One whose satisfaction positions inquirers to achieve understanding | | **Accommodation** | A datum is likely given the theory | | **Explanation** | The theory invokes claims that show why the datum holds | | **Substantiation** | Defense and explanation of the theory's own claims | | **Integration** | Coherence with other claims and our best picture of the world | | **Noetic Progress** | Advancement toward theoretical understanding | --- ## Related Notes - [[Sessions/Generating Philosophy]]