# Philosophy of Technology Abstract from Andrea Di Giovine **Abstract:** In the debate concerning the existence of artifact kinds, a variety of positions can be adopted, all of which ultimately revolve around two primary responses: aMirming their genuine metaphysical existence or denying it. Those who deny the existence of artifacts typically argue for a form of reducibility, positing that artifacts can be entirely explained in terms of their constituent components. This perspective aligns with a form of eliminativism, which asserts that "only simple entities exist, and anything composed of them lacks existence in the robust metaphysical sense." In contrast to this view, I will argue for the non-reducibility of artifacts to their constituent parts, asserting that artifacts should be understood as a hybrid product of human intentions and physical matter. I contend that the dependence of artifacts on human intention does not provide grounds for questioning their existence. On the contrary, I will argue that this very dependence is what substantiates their genuine existence. To illustrate my position, I will engage with the classical example of the lump of clay and the statue, which is often used to challenge the genuine existence of artifacts. While I may have strong intuitions that the statue itself does not exist in the same way as the lump of clay, I will argue that such intuitions do not suMice as a basis for denying the genuine existence of artifacts. Instead, I will ground my argument in the distinct intentional properties that diMerentiate st