# Seeing Subjectivity- Defending a Perceptual Account of Other Minds **Opening (not a real abstract):** Seeing Subjectivity: Defending a Perceptual Account of Other Minds Joel Krueger and Søren Overgaard 1. Introduction The problem of other minds has a distinguished philosophical history stretching back more than two hundred years.Taken at face value, it is an epistemological question: it concerns how we can have knowledge of, or at least justified belief in, the existence of minds other than our own. In recent decades, philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, anthropologists and primatologists have debated a related question: how we actually go about attributing mental states to others (regardless of whether we ever achieve knowledge or rational justification in this domain). Until the mid-nineties, the latter debate – which sometimes goes under the name of the “mindreading” debate – was characterized by a fairly clear-cut opposition between two theoretical outlooks: **Authors:** [[Seeing Subjectivity: Defending a]]