# Seeing what I am Doing **Opening (not a real abstract):** Many philosophers think that an agent’s knowledge of her own intentional action is non-observational. In an intuitive way this seems correct. As agents we do not need to study or look at ourselves or scrutinize the changes our actions bring about in the world in order to know what we are doing. Some philosophers take these innocuous intuitions a step further. They think that the agent’s knowledge of her own action is constitutive of its being an intentional action. That is, they think that an agent’s action is intentional only if the agent has some knowledge of relevant aspects of her own action. If you think this, then maybe you will find it obvious that the agent’s knowledge could not be observational. If the agent’s knowledge is constitutive, it must be knowledge had in the act or even before the act. Perception of one’s own **Authors:** [[THOR GRÜNBAUM]]