# Sense, Reference, and Selective Attention **Opening (not a real abstract):** he idea that there is a distinction between propositional and imagistic content is familiar and compelling, but it brings with it a problem. The problem is to explain the relation between the two types of content. This problem can seem so difficult that to escape it, you would abandon the propositional/imagistic distinction. But that is an extreme reaction; we can solve the problem. My proposal in this paper is that the primary mechanism for mediating between propositional and imagistic content is perceptual attention. Propositional content involves reference to objects. There are many ways in which we can refer to concrete objects, but the most basic sort of reference is when you can see the thing, or perceive it somehow, and refer to it on the strength of that perception. If you and I are looking out of the window, then we may discuss the castle **Authors:** [[Campbell and Martin]]