# Sensory Integration **Abstract:** I develop an argument for perceptual experience’s having representational content. The argument takes the form of an inference to the best explanation. The explanandum is the phenomenon of sensory integration. Sensory integration takes a number of forms, including: makeperceive, cognitive penetration, perceptual learning and absence perception. In each, perceptual experiences are influenced by (and in some cases combine with) mental states that are representational: sensory imaginings, beliefs, concepts and memories, respectively. If perceptual experiences have representational content, then there is a framework within which to explain the confluence of such states with perception. Purely relational accounts of perception, like naïve realism, leave sensory integration mysterious, even when formulated with so-called ‘standpoints’ or ‘third relata.’ I. Introduction Philosophers and psychologists increasingly recognise that there is significant interaction between distinct parts of the mind, with particular attention paid to interaction between its perceptual and non-perceptual parts. The view of perception as a discrete informational system that merely feeds into belief from the ‘bottom up’ is outdated. More and more, we are invited to recognise that there are also various ‘top down’ influences on visual, auditory, tactual, olfactory and gustatory experiences. Perceptual experiences are sensory states. So let us call such occurrences ones of ‘sensory integration.’ Moreover, let **Authors:** [[Dr. Dan Cavedon-Taylor]]