# THE PERCEPTION OF ACTIVITY Thomas Crowther **Abstract:** There is a much-discussed form of argument the conclusion of which is that we do not directly perceive space-filling material objects themselves, only parts of their surfaces. Donald Davidson’s view that events are temporal particulars invites a structurally similar argument about the direct perception of events. In this paper, I spell out such an argument and consider a number of possible solutions to it. I explore the idea that a satisfactory response to this problem in the philosophy of perception can be grounded in a temporal ontology that includes temporal stuff as well as temporal particulars. I discuss different ways of developing this idea, and I go on to identify what I take to be the most promising version of an approach of this kind. As well as perceiving material objects and their properties it seems that we also perceive events.1 In our everyday thought and talk we are happy to pick ourselves, and others, out as having seen, say, the changing of the guard, or having heard some particular car crash. In work on the philosophy of perception, it is hard to find much resistance to the idea that events are capable of being perceived.2 But though there are some important exceptions, there has been relatively little sustained discussion of the perception of events in the literature.3