# The Limitations of Perceptual Transparency **Abstract:** I have two aims in this paper. The first is to show that the idea that perceptual experience is transparent cannot serve the purpose to which it is assigned. That is, the transparency claim is no help whatsoever in motivating an externalist account of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. My second aim is to show that the internalist qualia theorist’s response to the idea that perceptual experience is transparent has been unnecessarily concessive to the externalist. Surprisingly, internalists seem to allow that much of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience depends essentially (and not just causally) upon externally located properties; however, they argue that we can also be aware of internal, non-intentional qualia. I present the response a consistent internalist should make when faced with the idea that perceptual experience is transparent. They should argue that seeming to be aware of externally located properties just is being aware of internally constituted experiential features.