# The Ontology of Emotion **Opening (not a real abstract):** To which ontological category do emotions belong? Are they states? Are they events, or processes? In the philosophical literature on emotions one finds associated with any given emotion, a variety of different mental and bodily phenomena, of different ontological categories – e.g. cognitive states, conative states, affective states, evaluative judgements, phenomenal feelings, bodily sensations, episodes and conditions of bodily arousal, physiological expression, and behavioural tendencies. So it seems that before one can address any such question about the ontology of emotions, one has to answer a more basic, preliminary,​ ​but​ ​nonetheless​ ​difficult​ ​question:​ ​which​ ​of​ ​these​ ​phenomena​ ​is​ ​the​ ​emotion? When faced with that challenge, one might be tempted to adopt the following approach: to **Authors:** [[Soteriou revised]]