# The Perspectival Character of Perception **Abstract:** We can perceive things, in many respects, as they really are. Nonetheless, our perception of the world is perspectival. You can correctly see a coin as circular from most angles. Yet the coin looks different when slanted than when head-on, and there is some respect in which the slanted coin looks similar to a head-on ellipse. Many hold that perception is perspectival because we perceive certain properties that correspond to the “looks” of things. I argue that this view is misguided. I consider the two standard versions of this view. What I call the pluralist approach fails to give a unified account of the perspectival character of perception, while what I call the perspectival properties approach violates central commitments of contemporary psychology. I propose instead that perception is perspectival because of the way perceptual states are structured from their parts. ∗ I am indebted to Tyler Burge and Gabriel Greenberg for their comments on multiple drafts. I also received helpful comments from Katie Elliot, Bill Kowalsky, Gabbrielle Johnson, Gabe Dupre, Ian Boon, Rene Jagnow, Susanna Schellenberg, and Ned Block. Thanks also to those involved in the 2016 IIFs-UNAM Philosophy Graduate Conference. In perception, one can transcend the limitations imposed by one’s perspective and see things, in many respects, as they really are. For example, a circular coin can reflect dramatically different patterns of light to your eyes depending on where you are viewing it from. Each of the **Authors:** [[Kevin J. Lande]]