# The Phenomenal Presence of Perceptual Reasons **Opening (not a real abstract):** It is very common to endorse doxasticism about our awareness of normative (or justifying) reasons, according to which we can recognise our reasons for forming attitudes or performing actions only by means of normative judgements or beliefs. In other words, it is often assumed that we can identify things (e.g. facts, considerations, mental states or episodes, etc.) that do constitute reasons for us and discriminate them from things that do not only by means of judging or believing that things of the first kind (but not of the second) are reasons for us.1 Take the case of two people who both see that a third person is injured and in distress. While one of the two recognises that she has a reason to help the hurt (and subsequently helps him), the other fails to do so (e.g. because of a lack of moral sensitivity). What doxasticism maintains is that the basic difference between the two is **Authors:** [[Dorsch]]