# The Representational Deep Structure of Phenomenal Experience **Opening (not a real abstract):** 3.1 What Is the Conceptual Prototype of a Phenomenal Representatum? The goal of this chapter is to develop a preliminary working concept, the concept of a “phenomenal mental model.” I shall proceed in two steps. First, I construct the baselines for a set of criteria or catalogue of constraints by which we can decide if a certain representational state is also a conscious state. I propose a multilevel set of constraints for the concept of phenomenal representation. The second step consists in putting these constraints to work against the background of a number of already existing theories of mental representation to arrive at a more precise formulation of the preliminary concept we are looking for. At the end I briefly introduce this hypothetical working concept, the concept of a “phenomenal mental model.” In chapter 4 I shall proceed to test our tool kit, employing a short representational analysis of unusual states of consciousness. A series of brief **Authors:** [[Metizinger]]