# The logic intentionality and phenomenology of emotion **Abstract:** . My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions, and I restrict my attention to emotions that are actual conscious experiences. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as s​ ui generis​ —as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to r​ educe t​ he intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. In this paper, I argue for the s​ ui generis approach. 1​My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. I will therefore restrict my attention to emotional states that are intentional states — states that are about or directed at something or other, whether it be a person, a sunrise, a market fluctuation, or a geometrical proof — and leave open the question whether all emotional states are intentional states.1 I’ll use the word ‘cognition’ to cover beliefs, judgments, and thoughts equally, using the word ‘thought’ to refer to concrete occurrences, actual conscious entertainings of propositions,2 and I’ll restrict attention to emotions that are actual conscious experiences. I will take it, in other words, and in a highly natural way (somewhat obscured in recent analytic philosophy), that all emotions, all actual emotions, are experiences.3 Desires and cognitions are the tradi **Authors:** [[Michelle Montague]]