The paper asks whether time seems to pass. It rejects the thought that any such seeming must be found in the perception of movement or change, turning instead to stasis, occurrent renewal, and structural features of temporal consciousness. Cases in which nothing before the subject is visibly changing are meant to do the real work. The claim is that these cases reveal something about temporal experience that accounts centred on ordinary perceptual change leave out. I do not think the argument yet gets from its starting point to its conclusion. In sections 4.1 to 4.4 the paper moves from occurrent renewal, to the tripartite structural features of temporal experience, to the claim that the subject "seems to occupy successive perspectives in time", and finally to the claim that this amounts to "a phenomenology of time as passing". One can grant the first three steps and still resist the fourth. The author's own language at the final stage reveals the difficulty. In 4.4, the paper claims that the subject enjoys "an incessantly and irrevocably updating awareness" of how she is temporally oriented to occurrences first anticipated, then present, then past. This gives us a phenomenology of updating temporal orientation. But the paper then asserts, without further argument, that "it is through such an awareness of continually changing temporal locations… that subjects experience time as passing: time seems to pass the subject who seems to endure." The awareness described — of occupying successively updating perspectives — is compatible with a phenomenology of succession, experiential renewal, or changing temporal orientation, none of which need amount to a seeming of passage itself. The paper needs to explain why awareness of being carried from one standpoint to the next is a seeming _as of passage_ rather than a seeming as of persisting through successive times. As the author acknowledges, the target explanandum is a phenomenology in which future events "becom[e] less and less future", then present, then past (§2.1). But the structural features described in 4.2 and 4.3 are compatible with a subject who registers sequential change in her own temporal orientation, without this amounting to a seeming that time itself is doing anything. Sattig (2025) therefore needs much fuller treatment. He is not a nearby source; his book addresses the very gap identified above. Sattig distinguishes between cognitive passage — the belief that time passes, explicable by appeal to changing temporal perspectives — and experiential passage, which must be grounded in the content of temporal experience itself. The changing-perspectives story is what Sattig classifies as the source of cognitive passage: "a subject's pre-theoretical belief that there is tripartite passage rests on their awareness that they occupy different temporal perspectives — involving different perceptual experiences, episodic memories, and episodic anticipations — at different moments." The present paper's appeal to structural features — the subject's awareness of her retention-impression-protention structure updating over time — maps closely onto this machinery. Sattig argues that such a succession of perspectives does not yet yield experiential passage, because "a succession of experiences is not an experience of a succession." For Sattig, the challenge is to explain how dynamicity is represented _within_ temporal experience, not reconstructed across successive experiential episodes. The paper is vulnerable here: its positive account describes a subject whose awareness of passage-like structure is constituted by the interplay of memory and anticipation that Sattig treats as generating cognitive, not experiential, passage. If the author wants to resist this distinction, that resistance needs to be argued for. If instead the author wants to satisfy Sattig's demand, the paper needs to say how the structural features it describes deliver something richer than an awareness of changing temporal perspectives — something Sattig has already suggested is insufficient for experiential passage proper. Other recent work that bypasses perceptual change in addressing the origin problem — e.g. Young (2022) on agentive experience — would also warrant engagement, since it bears on the same question of whether the structural features identified ground a phenomenology of passage or an experiential basis for passage-belief. For these reasons I cannot recommend acceptance. The gap between what the argument establishes and what the paper concludes is not a matter of presentation or emphasis; it is a gap in the paper's central inferential move. Closing it would require either a new argument — one that explains why updating temporal orientation constitutes a seeming of passage rather than something weaker — or a substantial recalibration of the paper's aims, scaling back from the claim that time seems to pass to the more modest claim that certain structural features of temporal experience dispose subjects to believe that it does. Either route would amount to a different paper. The orientation away from perceptual change and towards stasis and structural features of temporal experience is worth pursuing, and the discussion of occurrent renewal in §4.1 draws attention to a phenomenon that deserves further treatment. But the paper as it stands does not yet have the argument its conclusion requires.