# Truthmaking for presentists **Abstract:** This paper aims to reconcile presentism with truthmaker theory. I begin by motivating the reconciliation. In section 2 I ask what is wrong with the Lucretian strategy of grounding <there were dinosaurs> in the world’s instantiating being such that there were dinosaurs. I aim to pinpoint what is ‘peculiar’ about such properties and hence to say what kind of properties the presentist needs in order to give an acceptable reconciliation; in section 3 I argue that certain distributional properties do the job. In 4 I deal with some potential objections; in 5 I show how the presentist who accepts my view can deal with the open future; this raises questions concerning how to give truthmakers for indeterminate and determinate truths, which are dealt with in section 6. In section 7, I make some remarks concerning ontology versus ideology, which leads into a discussion of tense, determinacy and modality in section 8. 1: Introduction Truthmaker theory, as I’ll be using the term2, tells us that truth depends on being in the sense that there can’t be a difference in truth without a corresponding difference in being to explain the difference in truth. At a first shot, that is: Truthmaker: ∀w∀v∀p((pw & ¬pv) → ∃x((Ixw & ¬Ixv) V (¬Ixw & Ixv))) For all worlds w and v, and all propositions p, if p is true at w but not at v then there is (possibilist quantifier) some thing that exists at w and not at v, or vice-versa. Is Truthmaker true? Well, satisfaction of Truthmaker is easy, if that’s all we’ **Authors:** [[Cameron]]