# Visual Awareness and Visual Appearances A Dual View **Opening (not a real abstract):** In this chapter, I offer a theoretical account of a phenomenological datum about perception that many philosophers from the traditions of both phenomenology and analytic philosophy have highlighted. The datum is that perceptual experience involves a certain duality: we seem to be visually aware of more than what is visually present or (as I shall put it) apparent to us. I try to clarify both terms of the duality, and enquire into the scope of visual awareness and the phenomenal nature of visual appearances. The chapter is structured as follows. In section 2, I present the duality hypothesis with respect to a central case, which concerns the visual perception of opaque volumetric objects. The intuition driving the duality hypothesis in this case is that we can be visually aware of a whole self-occluding object even though there is a phenomenal **Authors:** [[Jerome Dokic]]