# What is the Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness? **Abstract:** Phenomenally conscious experiences are unified into particular streams of consciousness. In order to account for this, Bayne and Dainton suggest there must be an ‘overall experience’ responsible for unifying less phenomenally complex experiences together. In order to distinguish this experience from the mere conjunction of experiences that compose it, they propose that this ‘overall experience’ possesses some additional phenomenal character. Against this, I argue that, given that we don’t find this additional phenomenal character when we introspect, we ought to account for the phenomenal unity of consciousness in a way that doesn’t introduce an ‘overall experience’ which possesses additional phenomenal character. I suggest we do this by distinguishing between particular, count-quantifiable streams of consciousness, and the merely mass-quantifiable experiences that compose them. I propose that for experiences to be unified is for them to together constitute a single stream of consciousness. **Authors:** [[Oliver Rashbrook]]