# belief desire imagination immersion **Abstract:** entities. After all, one can imagine world peace without having any visual imagery of world peace. Moreover, one can imagine being upset without forming any visual imagery. I will not constrain the notion of imagination to perception-like cases, but will rather allow for the possibility that at least some imaginations do not involve mental imagery. It is worth highlighting though that Thomas and Kind can accept (IMNC) and (IMSC) as long as they understand pretending and fantasizing as requiring imagery. On the face of it, beliefs and imaginations differ in many ways. The most important difference is arguably that, in contrast to imaginations, beliefs can be assessed for truth and falsity. For the purposes of this paper, it will suffice to think of a belief as a mental state of taking to be true. Arguably, being a mental state of taking to be true is the most minimal constraint for a mental state to count as a belief. A person who imagines that p need not take p to be true. After all, I can fantasize what my life would be like, would I be living in the 24th century, without taking it to be true that I am living in the 24th century. However, as I will show in §3, while imagining p to be the case does not entail taking p to be true, in the context of imaginative immersion imagining p can come very close to taking p to be true. All accounts of imagination have it that imaginations play a distinctive cognitive role. Most accounts of imagination argue that beliefs and imaginations